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I. Argument of the Trilogy: Trade as Counter-Terrorism 
 International trade law always has been about economic development. 
International trade law always has been about national security. And, since the advent of 
Islam in 610 AD with the first revelation from Allāh through the Archangel Gabriel (in 
Arabic, Jibreel) to the Prophet Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him (PBUH)), Muslims 
have been engaged, in one way or another, in international trade law. 
 Thus, it is a fallacy to think that poor or Muslim countries are newcomers to the 
modern world trading system. The first two paragraphs of the Preamble to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) state: 
 The Governments of the Commonwealth of Australia, the 
Kingdom of Belgium, the United States of Brazil, Burma, Canada, 
Ceylon, the Republic of Chile, the Republic of China, the Republic of 
Cuba, the Czechoslovak Republic, the French Republic, India, Lebanon, 
the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, the Kingdom of Norway, Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, Syria, the 
Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, and the United States of America: 
 Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic 
endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, 
ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real 
income and effective demand, developing the full use of the resources of 
the world and expanding the production and exchange of goods, . . . .1 
 
From these paragraphs, three points are evident. 
 First, of the twenty-three original GATT contracting parties, eleven were poor 
countries (Burma, Ceylon, Chile, China, Cuba, Southern Rhodesia, and South Africa, 
plus India, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Syria). Second, four of the countries (India, Lebanon, 
Pakistan, and Syria) were Muslim or had sizeable Muslim communities. In other words, 
half of the countries founding the modern multilateral trading system in the aftermath of 
                                                 
1 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, pmbl., Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 
[hereinafter GATT], reprinted in RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY 
AND PRACTICE 113 (3d ed. Supp. 2008). 
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the Second World War were developing or least developed, and nearly 20% of them 
embodied Islam in a significant way. These figures understate both points because 
Belgium, France, Netherlands, and United Kingdom all held sway over vast poor and/or 
Muslim territories when GATT entered into force on 1 January 1948. 
 Third, Moreover, the original contracting parties did not view international trade 
as an end in itself. Rather, it was an instrument for economic growth and enhanced living 
standards. International trade was a, but not the only, means to raise incomes and 
generate jobs. After all, no nation in history has achieved sustained economic success 
through autarky. 
 It also is a fallacy to think international trade law is divorced from national 
security. Since ancient times, securing trade routes and assuring essential supplies of 
goods or services that cannot be obtained domestically has been a critical element in the 
rise and fall of empires. Sustained imperial development has meant some degree of 
economic integration and inter-dependence, and a set of rules for commercial intercourse, 
which in turn has demanded attention to threats to patterns and conduits of imports and 
exports. The histories of many empires, from the Roman and Carthaginian, through the 
Arab-Islamic and Ottoman Turkish, to the British and American, all reveal a link between 
international trade and national security. 
 This long-standing nexus among international trade law, economic development, 
and national security, in which Islam is engaged, is all the tighter in the post-9/11 world. 
Spread around the world, many Muslim communities, marginalized by poverty, have 
little hope for a brighter future through opportunities from multilateral trade 
liberalization. Extremism, even accompanied by violence, is a gravely sinful temptation 
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to which some of the marginalized poor are vulnerable. Weapons technology aided by 
evil genius has multiplied the force threat posed by violent extremist organizations 
(VEOs) to the global capitalist order, of which the trading system is an essential part. 
 It was this nexus, in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, which 
drove Members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to launch the Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA), commonly called the Doha Round, in November 2001. It 
is this nexus that the Members have long since betrayed. The thesis of this article is that 
the Doha Round is a failed counter-insurgency operation. The Round has lost nearly all 
links to its original purpose. That purpose was trade liberalization to spur development in 
a post-9/11 context in which extremism is wrongly perceived by some disaffected, 
impoverished, and thus marginalized Muslims as an alternative to stake-holding in the 
world trading system. 
 Why this failure? Because the WTO Members have succumbed utterly to the 
pursuit of commercial self-interest, so their Doha Round dealings have become a 
monstrous mishmash of minutiae. The Members have produced draft-negotiating texts 
that are so devoid of vision and so replete with exceptions that they are not fit for a dog’s 
breakfast. To use a different metaphor, Members have turned the Round into an exercise 
in Social Darwinism, forgetting the common good—to use multilateral trade 
liberalization to fight poverty and thereby Islamist extremism.2 
 Not surprisingly, therefore, in anticipation of the December 2011 WTO 
Ministerial Conference in Geneva, Members in August 2011, after a decade of Doha 
Round negotiations, sounded three themes. First, to save face for the WTO, it should be 
                                                 
2 See generally RICHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT (George 
Braziller, Inc. rev. ed. 1959) (explaining Social Darwinism). 
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made clear to the international trade community that the Organization and Round are not 
synonymous. 3  Failure of the Round should not damage the credibility of the WTO. 
Second, the single undertaking methodology, by which Members do not officially agree 
on any item until all of them have agreed on all items (i.e., nothing is agreed until 
everything is agreed, and all Members must agree to everything, thus horizontal trade-
offs across different sectors and topics are required), should be revisited.4 Possibly, it 
should be abandoned in favor of a more flexible approach that would account for the size, 
diversity, and complexity of the Membership. Third, to move beyond the Round without 
formally declaring it dead, discussions on “twenty-first century issues” should proceed.5 
Such issues would include agricultural export restrictions and food security, climate 
change, electronic commerce (particularly whether to extend the 1998 Moratorium on 
Customs Duties on Electronic Transmissions, i.e., the moratorium on collecting duties on 
goods transmitted digitally over the internet), foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
competition policy, foreign exchange rates and trade, intellectual property protection 
(particularly whether to extend a moratorium on non-violation nullification and 
impairment cases under the WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs)), trade rules and innovation, and transparency in customs 
facilitation. 
 All three themes are problematic. The first one is a lie. If the WTO cannot 
conclude a multilateral trade bargain, then it has failed at one of its essential purposes—
multilateral trade liberalization. To be sure, there are other reasons for its existence, most 
                                                 
3 See Daniel Pruzin, Upcoming WTO 2011 Ministerial Expected to Echo 2009 Gathering as Low-
Key Affair, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1305, at XX (Aug. 11, 2011). 
4 See Len Bracken, Business Representatives Explore Ways to Liberalize Trade as Doha Round 
Falters, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1274, at 1274–76 (Aug. 4, 2011). 
5 See Pruzin, supra note 3, at ??; Bracken, supra note 4, at ??. 
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notably, dispute resolution and monitoring and surveillance. But, it no longer is the 
single, indispensable forum for grand, global trade bargains. The second theme calls for 
betrayal of a historic mode of operation, dating from the era of how the Contracting 
Parties, acting jointly (i.e., the CONTRACTING PARTIES), under GATT worked. It also 
intimates a betrayal of developing and least developed countries, accusing some of them 
of playing the role of “spoiler,” seeking the “lowest-common denominator outcomes,” or 
free-riding on the concessions of others.6 In an age when they comprise the vast majority 
of the Membership, their individual and collective voice, through their ability to join or 
block a consensus, is suppressed. The third theme is misleading. Several of the issues are 
not time-bounded; that is, they existed in the twentieth century, and Members considered 
some of them when they debated what to put on the Doha Round agenda. 
 Regardless of the merits of the three themes, what is telling is that the WTO 
Members raised them. Their doing so manifests their loss of purpose. No longer are they 
dedicated to poverty alleviation and the struggle against Islamist extremism. That is, no 
longer do they seek to use multilateral trade liberalization as a counter-terrorist weapon. 
 It is said the Doha Round is “intended to improve global market access by cutting 
massive farm subsidies in rich countries and import tariffs in poorer ones . . . .”7 That 
characterization is simplistic: it is true as far as it goes, but it does not go far enough. The 
Round—intentionally launched in the heart of the Arab Muslim World—was thought to 
be an important way to fight oppression, and thereby wean people in poor countries, 
                                                 
6 Such were the epithets used in Susan C. Schwab, After Doha—Why the Negotiations Are Doomed 
and What We Should Do About It, FOREIGN AFF., May–June 2011, at 104, 111 (emphasis added). Ms. 
Schwab served as United States Trade Representative (USTR) from 2006–2009. Yet, Ambassador Schwab 
goes on to note that “one of the WTO’s most important characteristics is the inclusion of these developing 
economies in governance and decision-making from its origins as the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade in 1948.” Id. at 117. 
7 Tripti Lahiri, New Delhi ‘Breakthrough’ Sets Restart of Doha Round Ag, NAMA Talks for Sept. 
14, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1191, at XX (Sept. 10, 2009). 
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especially ones with significant Islamic populations, away from anti-capitalist thinking 
and, worse yet, violent action. 
 Unfortunately, in the Doha Round, the Members, and chiefly among them the 
United States (U.S.), European Union (E.U.), Brazil, China, and India, have used legal 
details to advance their narrow agendas. Since ancient times, city-states and countries 
have negotiated out of self-interest. Yet this time, in this Round, the dominant Members 
have taken self-interest to such a level that it is proper to query whether they are the 
extremists. They have lost all sight of the common good, and sacrificed the broad purpose 
of the DDA, which might be characterized as an effort to prove once and for all that 
Francis Fukuyama, in The End of History and the Last Man (1992), not Samuel 
Huntington, in The Clash of Civilizations (1996), was right. The middle “D” bespeaks the 
purpose of the Round, development, and intimates the follow-on link between boosting 
development and fighting Islamist extremism. 
 Yet, as the Round has ground on, to a halt, over the years, the middle “D” has 
gone missing, and the link between fighting poverty through trade liberalization, on the 
one hand, and reducing vulnerability to Islamist extremism, on the other hand, has been 
lost. Thus, the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), a prominent non-
governmental organization (NGO), released a study on 30 November 2009, the second 
day of the Seventh WTO Ministerial Conference, concluding that“[t]he Doha agreement . 
. . has an ambivalent impact on developing countries and does not offer enough to the 
poorest countries . . . . It has to offer more in terms of market access and reduced trade 
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costs.”8 Notably, 110 of the 153 Members of the WTO—nearly three-quarters of the 
Membership—are poor, that is, they are self-identified developing countries or classified 
by objective economic criteria as least developed countries.9 One-fifth, or 20%, of the 
Membership (roughly thirty-one countries) fits into the “least developed” category.10 
And, critically, the above-quoted conclusion applies to Muslim countries, insofar as 
nearly all of them are developing or least developed. In sum, another way to state the 
thesis of this article is as follows: Notwithstanding rhetoric from the WTO about the 
importance of the Doha Round to poverty alleviation, what the Members have done in the 
Round is enshrine Social Darwinism as trade policy.11 
 Even for seasoned experts, the proposed terms and conditions for a Doha Round 
bargain are devilishly complex. International trade law, like other fields of international 
business law, is not for the faint-hearted or wooly-headed. Pontification is more 
persuasive if it is based on catechesis. 12  No reliable meta-inferences can be drawn 
                                                 
8 Laura MacInnis, World Economy Has Outgrown Doha, WTO Meet Told, REUTERS, Dec. 1, 2009, 
available at http://af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/idAFGEE5B00G320091201?sp=true\ 
(emphasis added) (quoting International Food Policy Research Institute study). 
9 See RAJ BHALA, DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 279 (2008) (entry for “least 
developed country”); Daniel Pruzin & Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. Sought to Water Down Proposal for ‘Stock-
Taking’ Meeting on Doha, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1673, at 1674–75 (Dec. 3, 2009) (discussing 
remarks by Mari Pangestu, Minister of Trade, Indonesia). See also the website of the World Trade 
Organization, www.wto.org, for information and listings on developing and least developed countries. 
10 See Global Trading System Must Deliver More to the Least-Developed—Lamy in Istanbul, 
WORLD TRADE ORG. (May 9, 2011), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl191_e.htm. 
11 As one illustration among many of this rhetoric, see, for example, World Trade Organization, 
Seventh Ministerial Conference, Chairman’s Summary, Dec. 2, 2009, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min09_e/stat_e/velasco_closing_e.doc. See generally 
HOFSTADTER, supra note 2, at ?? (explaining Social Darwinism ideology). 
12 One example is the argument that (1) the Doha Round is increasingly irrelevant because it focuses 
on issues of declining importance, such as cutting tariffs (when the average worldwide duty rate is about 
10%) and domestic agricultural support (when those subsidies are declining in significance), and (2) 
therefore the agenda of the Round should be enlarged to cover issues like collusion among oil-producing 
countries, the regulation of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), and global financial supervision. See Aaditya 
Mattoo & Arvind Subramanian, From Doha to the Next Bretton Woods – A New Multilateral Trade 
Agenda, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.–Feb. 2009, at 15–26. The argument rests in part on the technically false 
premise that the Round proposals contain no meaningful guarantees against WTO Members reversing their 
trade policies or resorting to high punitive import tariffs. See id. at 17. A careful reading of the July and 
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without first meditating on practical details in real-world negotiating documents. The 
results make the effort worthwhile. There are grand themes buried in, but extractable 
from, the details. Those themes are hardly less grand than war and peace, wealth and 
poverty, Islam and globalization, statesmanship and self-interest, and accessibility and 
opaqueness of law. 
II. Trade Liberalization, Poverty Alleviation, and Islamist Extremism 
A. Is There Really a Link? 
No less an authority than the Roman Catholic Church has identified poverty as a 
cause of violence between nations and peoples. As part of the Second Vatican Council 
(October 1962–December 1965), the Church issued in December 1965 Gaudium et Spes. 
Chapter V of this document is entitled “The Fostering of Peace and the Promotion of a 
Community of Nations.” It begins with a definition of “peace:” 
78. Peace is not merely the absence of war, nor can it be reduced 
solely to the maintenance of a balance of power between enemies, nor is it 
brought about by dictatorship. Instead, it is rightly and appropriately 
called an enterprise of justice. Peace rests from that order structured into 
human society by its divine Founder, and actualized by men as they thirst 
after ever greater justice. The common good of humanity finds its ultimate 
meaning in the eternal law. But since the concrete demands of this 
common good are constantly changing as time goes on, peace is never 
attained once and for all, but must be built up ceaselessly. Moreover, since 
the human will is unsteady and wounded by sin, the achievement of peace 
requires a constant mastering of passions and the vigilance of lawful 
authority. 
 But this is not enough. This peace on earth cannot be obtained 
unless personal well-being is safeguarded and men freely and trustingly 
share with one another the riches of their inner spirits and talents.13 
                                                                                                                                                 
December 2008 Draft Modalities Texts on Agriculture, NAMA, and the November 2007 Draft Trade 
Remedy Rules Text, evinces such proposals. See also the sources cited supra, note 1. The argument also 
rests on the entirely unrealistic premise that broadening, rather than narrowing, the issues for negotiation 
would help conclude the Round. Amidst all the rhetoric among trade negotiators in the Round, one of the 
claims not heard is that they are unable or unwilling to reach a successful outcome on trade unless they 
strike a deal on oil, SWFs, and global finance. 
13  Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World (Gaudium et Spes), in THE SIXTEEN 
DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II ¶ 78, at 705–06 (1999) (emphasis added). 
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Manifestly, a necessary but not sufficient condition for true peace is justice, which 
includes vigilant attention to constantly changing economic conditions suffered by others. 
Such justice is required, above and beyond internal self-control. 
 Section 1 of Chapter V discusses “The Avoidance of War.” It expressly mentions 
“terrorism” as a form of “war.”14 It dubs the “arms race” an utterly treacherous trap for 
humanity, and one which ensnares the poor to an intolerable degree.”15 That is because 
vast expenditures go to arms, the opportunity cost of which is alleviation of “multiple 
miseries” around the world. 16  Section 2 discusses “Setting up an International 
Community.” Key paragraphs from these Sections state: 
83. In order to build up peace above all, the causes of discord among 
men, especially injustice, which foment wars must be rooted out. Not a few 
of these causes come from excessive economic inequalities and from 
putting off the steps needed to remedy them. Other causes of discord, 
however, have their source in the desire to dominate and in a contempt for 
persons. And if we look for deeper causes, we find them in human envy, 
distrust, pride and other egotistical passions. Man cannot bear so many 
ruptures in the harmony of things. Consequently, the world is constantly 
beset by strife and violence between men even when no war is being 
waged. Besides, since these same evils are present in the relations between 
various nations as well, in order to overcome or forestall them and to keep 
violence once unleashed within limits, it is absolutely necessary for 
countries to cooperate more advantageously and more closely together 
and to organize together international bodies and to work tirelessly for the 
creation of organizations which will foster peace. 
84. In view of the increasingly close ties of mutual dependence today 
between all the inhabitants and peoples of the earth, the apt pursuit and 
efficacious attainment of the universal common good now require of the 
community of nations that it organize itself in a manner suited to its 
responsibilities, especially toward the many parts of the world which are 
still suffering from unbearable want. 
 …. 
                                                 
14  Id. ¶ 79. 
15  Id. ¶ 81, at 709. 
16  Id. 
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85. The present solidarity of mankind also calls for a revival of greater 
cooperation in the economic field. Although nearly all peoples have 
become autonomous, they are far from being free of every form of undue 
dependence, and far from escaping all danger of serious difficulties. 
 The development of a nation depends on human and financial aids. 
The citizens of each country must be prepared by education and 
professional training to discharge the various tasks of economic and social 
life. But this in turn requires the aid of foreign specialists, who when they 
give aid will not act as overlords, but as helpers and fellow-workers. 
Developing nations will not be able to procure material assistance unless 
radical changes are made in the established procedures of modern 
commerce. Other aid should be provided as well by advanced nations in 
the form of gifts, loans or financial investments. Such help should be 
accorded with generosity and without greed on the one side and received 
with complete honesty on the other side.17 
 
Simply put, avoidance of war requires more than just a military strategy. Paragraph 83 
calls attention to underlying evils that cause conflict, one of which is gross disparities 
within and across communities, and which, in turn, emanates from egoism. The insight of 
the Church is as true today as it ever was. The reference in Paragraph 84 to cooperation 
through international organization almost augurs the birth of the WTO on 1 January 1995 
and agreement on the DDA six years thereafter. The discussion in Paragraph 85 is a 
reminder of the adage that poverty anywhere is a threat to prosperity and security 
everywhere, almost prescient about threats from terrorist organizations, and daring in the 
call for “radical” changes in the conduct of international business. 
 In the post-9/11 environment, the question the Doha Round presents to the world 
might be put this way: Why be a courier for Osama Bin Laden, as was the Kuwaiti-born 
Pakistani, Abu Ahmed (alias Arshad Khan), his most trusted messenger, if one can own 
and operate an import-export business that trades lawful goods and services or be 
                                                 
17  Id. ¶¶ 83–85, at 711–12 (emphasis added). 
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gainfully employed in such an enterprise? 18  Admittedly, some Islamist extremists—
particularly leaders within a terrorist organization—are from wealthy or middle-class 
backgrounds. They have their choice of occupations. Admittedly, too, some extremists 
are motivated by ideology regardless of their socioeconomic station in life. Salafi 
Jihādists are one example of religious zealots, and their movement originated in wealthy 
Saudi Arabia.19 They are determined to overthrow any regime they deem un-Islamic; 
hence, the Doha Round is quite irrelevant to them. But, to start with wealth or ideology is 
to beg a key question: Under what conditions is a person more liable to encounter, 
receive, accept, and execute an Islamist extremist message? 
 Manifestly, not every poor person is a terrorist or even disposed to extremism. If 
they were, the world would be far less safe than it is, given the roughly one billion people 
who live on less than U.S. $1 per day. Equally evident is that not every Muslim is a 
terrorist or even inclined to violence. Again, the world would be a lot less safe were that 
not so, as there are about 1.3 billion Muslims in the world. Moreover, Islam is most 
definitely not susceptible to terrorism. To think otherwise is prejudicial, and like most 
prejudices, this one is based on ignorance. The genuine, properly interpreted rules of the 
Sharī‘a (Islamic Law) do not support terrorist acts or extremist ideologies.20 Islam and its 
legal system is, of course, a beautiful paradigm characterized by considerable diversity 
within a unity of core precepts. This diversity includes people who hold religiously 
                                                 
18 M. Ilyas Khan, Who Was the Courier Who Led U.S. to Osama Bin Laden?, BBC NEWS (May 5, 
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13300680. Interestingly, the business in which the 
courier engaged to cover his work with Osama Bin Laden is unclear. The theories are dealing in smuggled 
auto parts, foreign exchange, and running a goods transport company. Id; see also Elise Labott & Tim 
Lister, Courier Who Led U.S. to Osama Bin Laden’s Hideout Identified, CNN WORLD (May 3, 2011), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-05-03/world/bin.laden.courier_1_al-qaida-members-al-qaeda-leader-tora-
bora?_s=PM:WORLD (identifying the courier). 
19 See Coming out of the Arab Woodwork, ECONOMIST, April 30, 2011, at 49, 49–50. 
20 See RAJ BHALA, UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC LAW (SHARĪ‘A) chs. 49–50 (2011). 
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extreme ideas, but who are non-violent, and also politically active Muslims who are 
inspired by their faith, but who are not fixated on seizing power by any means in the 
name of Islam.21 The sad reality is a tiny minority in any religion can distort genuine 
doctrines for evil purposes, and each religion has endured dastardly distortion at one 
juncture or another in its history. 
 In other words, blaming a religion for sponsoring terrorism is wrong. 
Accordingly, it would be equally reasonable, though perhaps euphemistic, to refer not to 
“Islamist extremism,” but rather “VEOs” and the “Persons of Interest” (POI) who run 
them, and who are recruited as evil minions to serve in them. What is clear is that 
“Islamic,” as distinct from “Islamist,” is the incorrect adjective: None of the bloodshed 
wrought by VEOs or their POIs is authentically Islamic. 
 In any case, there is not a great deal that international trade law, or the Doha 
Round, can do to change religious precepts or their abuse by fanatics. Poverty, however, 
is a different matter. The law as shaped by the Round can make a difference in the lives 
of poor people. Most obviously, it can create opportunities for new employment and 
higher income, and thereby help alleviate poverty. The question thus is joined: Does 
poverty alleviation through trade liberalization matter, in terms of reducing proclivity 
toward terrorism? 
 That is, is there a link between poverty alleviation and Islamist extremism? Surely 
the answer is yes. President Barack H. Obama declares: “Extremely poor societies . . . 
provide optimal breeding grounds for disease, terrorism, and conflict.”22His Secretary of 
                                                 
21 See Better than Cure—But Difficult, ECONOMIST, June 11, 2011, at 61, 61. 
 
22 Exploding Misconceptions, ECONOMIST, December 18, 2010, at 146, 146 (quoting President 
Barack Obama) (emphasis added). 
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State, Hilary Clinton, therefore categorizes economic development as “an integral part of 
America’s national security policy.”23 
 The link is not adamantine. The precise causal connection is not entirely clear. 
But, the basic connection is obvious enough, both self-evident and clear from observed 
experience: poverty, in the narrow sense of a lack of income, and a broader sense of 
capabilities deprivation or an even broader sense of oppression, connotes a lack of status 
as a stakeholder in the global trading system.24 Put succinctly, marginalization, which is a 
hallmark of poverty, is a contributory factor in vulnerability to violent religious 
fanaticism. Conversely, a world trading system in which a person finds opportunity 
through decently-paying jobs, and thereby hope for the socioeconomic advancement of 
himself and his family, is one—but by no means the only—way to offer the status of 
stakeholder. Concomitant with that status is the opportunity for better education and 
health care, both of which, along with a reduction in income poverty, give a person a 
rational basis for hope in the system. 
 This affirmative answer also is based on careful academic research. Consider the 
analysis offered by Oxford economist Paul Collier in his acclaimed book, The Bottom 
Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It (2007). 
He identifies an unmistakable link between economic underdevelopment and conflict. 
The gist of his argument is that the economic health of a country is a primary determinant 
                                                 
23 Id. (quoting Secretary of State Hilary Clinton) (emphasis added). 
24 The link is especially apparent to American military personnel who have served in Afghanistan, 
Indonesia, Iraq, Philippines, Thailand, and other theaters plagued by Islamist extremism. The author has put 
the question to such personnel (whose names must remain anonymous for security reasons) who serve as 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) officers. Invariably, the answer is affirmative, typically with an almost 
quizzical look because the point is so obvious. 
 On capabilities deprivation, see AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999), and the 
summary of this book in BHALA, supra note 9, at 116–22 (entry for “development as freedom”). 
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of its susceptibility to conflict.25 The poorer a country, in economic terms, the more prone 
it is to be mired in civil strife—a “Conflict Trap”—whereas the better its economic 
performance, the more likely it will not experience, or at least not remain mired in, 
conflict. While not linking poverty to Islamist extremism in particular, the Collier 
analysis is applicable: The former is a microcosm of the latter, which is the macrocosm. 
 To be sure, some Islamist extremists are home-grown in wealthy countries, like 
the United Kingdom and U.S. Among them, however, some are from poor or 
marginalized communities within those countries. Many terrorists are from poor 
countries—Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen are proven fertile grounds for 
recruiting and training Salafi Jihādis, who are active in yet other poor countries, such as 
Jordan and Libya. 26  Pakistan, the population of which is 97% Muslim, rightly has 
attracted considerable attention.27 That is for reasons more than its notoriety as the place, 
specifically Abbottabad, hardly two hours from Islamabad, where Osama Bin Laden was 
killed by American Special Operations Forces in May 2011. That also is because all of its 
regions bordering Afghanistan, from north to south, are marked by considerable poverty: 
the Northern Areas (Kashmir), Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), North and South Waziristan, and the province of 
Balochistan. As National Geographic put it, these regions, “[w]here the mountains meet 
the lowlands” are where “the fierce fundamentalism of the Afghan frontier confronts the 
moderate Islam of the Indian subcontinent.”28 Overall in Pakistan, the unemployment rate 
is 15% (and probably, unofficially, much higher), and 24% of the population ekes out an 
                                                 
25 See PAUL COLLIER, THE BOTTOM BILLION: WHY THE POOREST COUNTRIES ARE FAILING AND 
WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 19–20 (2007). 
26 See Coming out of the Arab Woodwork, supra note 19, at 49–50. 
27 See Don Belt, Struggle for the Soul of Pakistan, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, Sept. 2007, at 32, 40. 
28 Id. at 43. 
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existence below the poverty line.29 
 That defeating Islamist extremism in Pakistan (or Afghanistan) is not purely a 
military matter is indisputable, as America’s Commander-in-Chief observed. In his 
acclaimed June 2009 speech at Cairo University, President Barack H. Obama stated: 
We [the U.S.] also know that military power alone is not going to solve 
the problems in Afghanistan and Pakistan. That is why we plan to invest 
$1.5 billion each year over the next five years to partner with Pakistanis to 
build schools and hospitals, roads and businesses, and hundreds of 
millions to help those who have been displaced. And that is why we are 
providing more than $2.8 billion to help Afghans develop their economy 
and deliver services that people depend upon. 
 
I know that for many, the face of globalization is contradictory. The 
Internet and television can bring knowledge and information, but also 
offensive sexuality and mindless violence. Trade can bring new wealth 
and opportunities, but also huge disruptions and changing communities. 
In all nations—including my own—this change can bring fear. Fear that 
because of modernity we will lose control over our economic choices, our 
politics, and most importantly our identities—those things we most 
cherish about our communities, our families, our traditions, and our faith. 
But I also know that human progress cannot be denied. There need not be 
contradiction between development and tradition. Countries like Japan 
and South Korea grew their economies while maintaining distinct cultures. 
The same is true for the astonishing progress within Muslim-majority 
countries from Kuala Lumpur to Dubai. In ancient times and in our times, 
Muslim communities have been at the forefront of innovation and 
education.30 
 
But, solving the problem is not purely a trade matter, either. That is, the question is not 
whether a development-friendly set of rules agreed upon by WTO Members in the Doha 
Round would rid Pakistan of its many Islamist extremist groups. 
 After all, Pakistan—specifically, endemic corruption, poor governance, military 
                                                 
29 The World Factbook, Pakistan, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2012). 
Yemen is even worse off, with over 45% of its population below the poverty line. The World Factbook, 
Yemen, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ym.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2012). 
30 Barack H. Obama, Remarks by the President on a New Beginning, Speech at Cairo University 
(June 4, 2009). 
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interference in politics, and dysfunctional public education—is sometimes its own worst 
enemy. Small wonder why the Taliban or its sympathizers reputedly provide social 
services—they fill a gap a properly functioning state should cover, and they expand their 
ideological base in doing so. (The scenario is replayed in Lebanon by Hezbollah.) 
Consider, then, the observation of Javed Ibrahim Paracha: 
a bearded, heavyset former member of [Pakistan’s] parliament who has 
been dubbed “Al Qaeda’s lawyer” for successfully representing several 
hundred jihādists captured in Pakistan after 9/11. He explains what 
emboldens these young women [i.e., about 200 female religious students 
wearing black veils, who in 2007 took over a public children’s library in 
Islamabad to protest the destruction by the government of mosques run by 
extremist clerics, which the government said were built without permits] 
to risk their lives for Islam: “This government [of General Pervez 
Musharraf] has lost all credibility,” he says. “People look at Musharraf 
and they see a U.S. puppet who’s willing to declare war on fellow 
Muslims to satisfy America. They also see his generals getting rich, while 
they’re getting poorer every day. People are losing hope. Pakistan and its 
government are becoming two different things. This will have to change, 
and soon.31 
 
In other words, poverty is one among several structural problems to which Mr. Paracha 
refers that are causal factors as to why a minority of Muslims turn to extremism.32 The 
Doha Round cannot cure all such problems. 
 But, as President Obama suggests, there are some opportunities worth pursuing, 
beyond the obvious ones concerning trade rules governing agricultural and industrial 
products. Consider trade in services, which includes as a major sector educational 
services. There are over 10,000 Islamic schools (madrasas) in Pakistan. Many of them 
                                                 
31 Belt, supra note 27, at 42 (emphasis added). The government later backed down and allowed not 
only the mosques to be rebuilt, but also the removal from the library of any book deemed to be un-Islamic. 
32 Similarly, in Somalia, the Minister of Finance, Mohamed Abdullahi Omaar, dubbed international 
efforts to fight piracy as fatally flawed because they focused on containment of symptoms rather than the 
root causes of piracy—state fragmentation, incapacity, and a lack of investment to “improv[e] the stability 
and prosperity of Somalia.” Michael Peel, Somali Minister Hits at Anti-Piracy Policy, FIN. TIMES, April 19, 
2011, at 2. In other words, piracy, like terrorism, is symptomatic of deeper causal factors, a key one of 
which—but not the only one—is poverty. 
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cater to poor students and are run by moderate Islamic clerics. But, about 60 percent of 
the madrasas are affiliated with the extremist Deobandi sect of Sunni Islam.33 They teach 
a severe brand of the Sharī‘a, calling for a return to its fundamentals, namely, the Holy 
Qur’ān and Sunnah (traditions) of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) that were set in the 
seventh century A.D. 
 Pakistani parents tend not to want to send their children to such schools, where 
their kids memorize the Holy Qur’ān but receive no practical life skills. Typically, they 
do so for financial reasons. The schools are well-funded, providing free meals, uniforms, 
and a copy of the Holy Qur’ān. Parents who lose their jobs or suffer income declines—
perhaps (if they are cotton farmers) because of competition from subsidized American 
cotton or high barriers in the EU to textiles and apparel (T&A) merchandise (if they work 
in a mill or garment factory)—have little choice. Suppose the Doha Round yields, not 
only trade liberalization in primary and secondary educational services, but also 
assistance to Islamic countries to import first-rate teachers and pedagogies of essential 
modern skills, like reading, writing, arithmetic, and critical thinking. Might these imports 
put pressure on extremist madrasas by giving them competition? That is, might an 
increase in the supply of foreign educational services give parents a viable choice?  
 More generally, the question is whether development-friendly trade rules, if 
implemented alongside fundamental reforms, would support reforms that Pakistan ought 
to take. Might they boost employment and incomes for a large swathe of Pakistan’s 
population at the lower tiers, and thereby help engineer a transformation in Pakistan’s 
dreadfully skewed socioeconomic order? In turn, would the empowerment of millions 
dispose them against a radical agenda to convert Pakistan into a strict Islamic state, far 
                                                 
33 See Belt, supra note 27, at  44. 
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distant from the vision of its founder, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, that it be a secular 
democracy in which Islam imparted its cultural, but not political, influence?34 
 There are other examples. Nigeria, a WTO Member, the population of which is 
about 50% Muslim, is one. Nigerian Muslims live in the north, where per capita income 
is 50% less than in the predominantly Christian south, and declining, and where literacy 
rates are two-thirds lower than in the commercial capital, Lagos, which is a port city in 
the south.35 In the principal northern city of Kano, two of the nine million residents are 
beggars, and the industrial zones that once were home to garment manufacturers are 
abandoned.36 Thus, The Economist reported in May 2011, “[m]ilitancy is on the rise,” 
“[i]t is no surprise that extremists thrive in this climate,” and “Boko Haram, a local terror 
group, is roaming ever wider and fine-tuning its methods; a link up with al-Qaeda may be 
next.”37 Two months later, these fears were confirmed: In August, this VEO blew up the 
United Nations Headquarters in Abuja, killing twenty-three people and wounding more 
than eighty, and the individual who planted the bomb was linked to Al Qaeda.38 Poor 
governance, meaning corruption and communal divisions, is the cause. Once again, the 
relevant question is not whether a successful Doha Round can eliminate the threat of 
Islamist extremism in Nigeria. It cannot do so. Rather, the question is whether the Round, 
along with appropriate governmental reforms, can reduce poverty in Nigeria and thereby 
the appeal of extremism that some alienated Muslims might feel. 
B. Nevermind the Regressions 
                                                 
34 See id. at 40. 
35  A Man and a Morass, ECONOMIST, May 28, 2011, at 27, 27. 
36  Id. 
37 Id. 
38 See Nigeria U.N. Bomb: ‘Al-Qaeda Linked’ Man Named as Suspect, BBC NEWS (August 31, 
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14734738. Loosely translated from Hausa, “Boko Haram” 
means “Western education is forbidden,” and this VEO seeks imposition in Nigeria of what it calls the 
“Sharī‘a.” Id. 
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 Certain statistical and multivariable regression analyses suggest the link between 
poverty and extremism is tenuous. 39  They argue terrorism results from political 
oppression and other non-economic factors. But, these studies miss the mark, and in any 
event do not gainsay a link between poverty and extremism. 
 First, that suggestion defies common sense, as well as historical and field 
experience. Simply put, a person who has nothing to live for has nothing to lose. 
Resorting to violence in the grossly distorted name of a religion is perceived to hold few 
offsetting disadvantages. The lack of a decent education, because of poverty, means the 
inability to think critically, and thereby realize that name is being perverted, is under-
developed. 
 Second, these analyses focus on terrorists who commit violent acts, making much 
of the fact that some terrorists (as on 9/11) are from wealthy backgrounds. The studies 
often measure wealth by education, and thus point out some terrorists have high school 
diplomas. Al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, the Taliban, and other VEOs acting in the name 
of Islam are well aware that while they can and do obtain some recruits from educated 
but disaffected youths, their large, fertile recruiting pool is stocked with the marginalized 
poor. Moreover, those diplomas mean little.40  Bluntly put, a diploma from a typical 
school in many parts of the Arab world does not measure up to one from Western 
Europe, Japan, or the U.S. All that can be said is that to carry out a spectacularly evil 
terrorist attack with sophisticated devices or weaponry, special training is required to 
                                                 
39 For a summary of these studies, see Exploding Misconceptions, supra note 22, at 146 (discussing a 
2008 survey of studies by Alan Krueger of Princeton University, as well as other individual studies). The 
discussion above is not intended to be a comprehensive review and critique of these studies. 
 One oft-cited study is Alan B. Krueger & Jitka Maleckova, Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is 
There a Causal Connection?, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 119, 119 (Fall 2003). 
40 Here again, the author has put the question to U.S. SOF officers (whose names must remain 
anonymous for security reasons), who invariably confirm the point. 
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master those instruments.41 (Flying a plane into a building illustrates the point.) 
 Third, many poor people are facilitators of terrorism but not picked up in the 
datasets of economists. For example, some Bedouins in the Sinai Peninsula and tribal 
peoples in Waziristan trade arms and narcotics because they have no other lucrative 
means of support.42 To whom do they sell arms, for example, except terrorists? For such 
traders, a development-friendly Doha Round, which brought them into the formal trading 
system, could do wonders, with the knock-on benefit of cutting off from terrorists at least 
some of their intermediaries for weapons. Likewise, trafficking in counterfeit goods—
i.e., products that violate a lawful copyright, trademark, or patent—may be tempting to 
impecunious people seeking to eke out a living. Some of the proceeds of such sales may 
find their way into the hands of terrorists. 
 Finally, empirical analyses may suffer from one or the other of various 
shortcomings common in econometric research. For instance, one study focuses only on 
data from the Middle East, but neglects hotbeds of terrorist activity elsewhere, including 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and both North and Sub-Saharan Africa.43 As another 
instance, one study argues the typical terrorist is not “unusually poor or badly 
schooled.”44 But, delineating poor or badly educated from “unusually” poor or badly 
educated people may be difficult in practice—and perhaps not that relevant in terms of 
policies to promote development and counter-terrorism. As another example, one study 
                                                 
41 See Exploding Misconceptions, supra note 22, at 146 (discussing a study by Claude Berrebi of the 
RAND Corporation and Efraim Benmelech of Harvard University concluding, as The Economist put it, that 
“more educated suicide-bombers are assigned to attack more important targets”). Note, however, this study 
is limited to Palestinian suicide bombers between 2000 and 2005. 
42 On the general problem that many poor countries with large Muslim populations cannot 
effectively police their international boundaries, thus creating a vacuum in which Islamist extremists can 
operate, see Susan E. Rice, The Threat of Global Poverty, NAT’L INT, Spring 2006, at 76, 76–82. 
43 See Krueger & Maleckova, supra note 39. 
44 See Exploding Misconceptions, supra note 22, at 146 (discussing a study by Alan Krueger of 
Princeton University). 
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considers only male Palestinian suicide bombers recruited by Hamas and Islamic Jihād 
from the West Bank and Gaza, while another focuses on militants recruited by Hezbollah 
from the Shī‘īte majority region of Southern Lebanon.45  These studies urge that the 
average suicide bomber or militant, respectively, tends to be better educated and less poor 
than others in the respective statistical reference group. Yet, terrorists come from far 
more places than the Levant, come from far more nationalities than Palestinian, and may 
be women and children. 
 Still another problem concerns definitions. One study contends there is no hard 
link between the per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of a country and the 
propensity of that country to spawn terrorists.46 But, it defines “poverty” in terms of low 
literacy rates or residence in a country with a stagnant economy.47  In truth, broader 
concepts like capability deprivation or marginalization may be more appropriate 
measures to explore the link between poverty and generating terrorists. Likewise, a result 
in that study (that suicide attackers are less likely to come from the poorest than from 
relatively better-off countries) may be skewed by restricting the definition of a terrorist 
event to suicide bombing.48 
 To be sure, quantitative research on the causes and causal mechanisms of 
terrorism must not be categorically dismissed. One worthwhile insight may be provided 
by a study that indicates an inverse relationship between the skill level of the average 
                                                 
45 See id. (discussing a study by Claude Berrebi of the RAND Corporation and one by Alan Krueger 
of Princeton University). 
46 See id. (discussing a study by Claude Berrebi of the RAND Corporation and one by Alan Krueger 
of Princeton University). 
47  Id. 
48 See id. (discussing a study by Alan Krueger of Princeton University). 
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terrorist, on the one hand, and economic conditions, on the other hand. 49  As those 
conditions improve, educated people have enhanced job opportunities that earn higher 
incomes. 50  VEOs thus have a smaller pool of good talent from which to recruit 
evildoers.51 Conversely, the skill level of the average terrorist rises when job and income 
prospects are grim. However, this study is limited to Palestinian suicide bombers between 
2000 and 2006.52 In brief, the point is simply to appreciate the limitations of statistical 
and econometric methodologies.  
C. Did They Know of the Link? 
 The link between trade liberalization and poverty alleviation, and the follow-on 
link from poverty alleviation to reduced vulnerability to Islamist extremism, was on the 
minds of world leaders and their trade ministers when they launched the Doha Round in 
November 2001 in the Qatari capital. To think otherwise is to deny history.53 The Round 
“was originally championed as a means of demonstrating international solidarity and 
cooperation in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.”54 Indeed, in the 
                                                 
49 See id. (discussing a study by Esteban Klor of Hebrew University in Jerusalem, Efraim Benmelech 
of Harvard University, and Claude Berrebi of the RAND Corporation). 
50  See id. 
51  See id. 
52  Id. 
53 Countless news stories discuss the launch of the Doha Round “in 2001 in the capital of Qatar with 
the goal of helping poor countries prosper through greater access to markets in rich countries.” Doug 
Palmer, Analysis: WTO Faces Tough Choices After Latest Doha Setback, REUTERS, Apr. 21, 2011, 
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/21/us-trade-wto-doha-idUSTRE73K8I220110421. 
Such descriptions draw both an explicit link to poverty alleviation, and an implicit link (by mentioning the 
launch date and venue) to fighting terrorism. Some accounts are a bit more direct as to the latter link, 
stating (for example) that “the long-stalled round . . . was launched after the Sept. 11, 2001 [attacks] . . . .” 
Tom Barkley, U.S. Says Too Early to Declare Doha Round Dead, MARKETWATCH (Apr. 21, 2011), 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/us-says-too-early-to-declare-doha-round-dead-2011-04-21. But, it is 
unsurprising that explicit mention of Islamist extremism is not always made. Aside from concerns by some 
observers or commentators about offending Muslim constituencies by linking “Islam” with “extremism,” 
not every WTO Member stressed this link with equal vigor, either when the Round was launched, or during 
the subsequent history of the Round. 
54 Daniel Pruzin, WTO Members Give Up on Deliverables Pact, To Push for Work Program to 
Advance Doha, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1228, at XX (July 28, 2011) (emphasis added). 
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Declaration launching the Round, Ministers made explicit the first step in the link—
between trade liberalization and poverty alleviation:  
1. The multilateral trading system embodied in the World Trade 
Organization has contributed significantly to economic growth, 
development and employment throughout the past fifty years. We are 
determined, particularly in the light of the global economic slowdown, to 
maintain the process of reform and liberalization of trade policies, thus 
ensuring that the system plays its full part in promoting recovery, growth 
and development. We therefore strongly reaffirm the principles and 
objectives set out in the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, and pledge to reject the use of protectionism. 
2. International trade can play a major role in the promotion of 
economic development and the alleviation of poverty.  We recognize the 
need for all our peoples to benefit from the increased opportunities and 
welfare gains that the multilateral trading system generates. The majority 
of WTO Members are developing countries. We seek to place their needs 
and interests at the heart of the Work Programme adopted in this 
Declaration. Recalling the Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement, we 
shall continue to make positive efforts designed to ensure that developing 
countries, and especially the least-developed among them, secure a share 
in the growth of world trade commensurate with the needs of their 
economic development. In this context, enhanced market access, balanced 
rules, and well targeted, sustainably financed technical assistance and 
capacity-building programmes have important roles to play. 
 …. 
10. Recognizing the challenges posed by an expanding WTO 
membership, we confirm our collective responsibility to ensure internal 
transparency and the effective participation of all Members. While 
emphasizing the intergovernmental character of the organization, we are 
committed to making the WTO’s operations more transparent, including 
through more effective and prompt dissemination of information, and to 
improve dialogue with the public. We shall therefore at the national and 
multilateral levels continue to promote a better public understanding of 
the WTO and to communicate the benefits of a liberal, rules-based 
multilateral trading system.55 
                                                                                                                                                 
 Likewise, in March 2002, world leaders gathered in Monterrey, Mexico, for the United Nations 
International Conference on Financing for Development. That Conference articulated a goal of increasing 
economic assistance to poor countries as a way to help prevent future terrorists acts. See United Nations 
International Conference on Financing for Development, Mar. 18–22, 2002, Report of the International 
Conference on Financing for Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.198/11 (2002), available at http://daccess-
dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/392/67/PDF/N0239267.pdf?OpenElement.  
55 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration on the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) for 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, ¶10, WT/MIN (01)/DEC/1 (Nov. 20, 2001) (adopted Nov. 14, 2001) 
(emphasis added), available at 
http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN_searchResult.asp?RN=0&searchtype=browse&q1=%28@meta_Symbol+G
 
26 
 
 
 
Why not also make explicit in the Declaration the second, final step in the link, namely, 
from poverty alleviation to vulnerability to Islamist extremism? The answer is a matter 
for speculation. One possibility is to save face for Islamic countries, i.e., not to single 
them or the religion of Islam out as uniquely plagued with the problem of extremism, and 
thereby not foster Islamophobia. No matter, though, as this next step was obvious 
enough, and regrettably, the hysteria spread and still exists. 
 To deny the existence of the link at the launch of the Doha Round also is to ignore 
a strong, optimistic, and long-standing vision for international trade, summarized by the 
phrase “peace through trade.”56 The vision, championed by America’s longest-serving 
Secretary of State (from 1933 to 1944, under President Franklin Roosevelt), Cordell Hull 
(1871–1955), is that trade generates economic prosperity, and sooner or later, directly or 
indirectly, political democracy. In turn, people who are well off, or who have hope for a 
better future, are unlikely to want to overturn the status quo violently or support war with 
people in other well-off democracies. The vision is not uniquely American. Tanzania’s 
former President, Benjamin Mkapa, aptly summarized that “it is futile, if not foolhardy to 
think there is no link between poverty and terrorism . . . .”57 In turn, the former U.S. 
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Susan Rice, observed that Africa is the 
“world’s soft underbelly for global terrorism,” and VEOs seek to recruit from among its 
                                                                                                                                                 
üSCMü39+or+WTüLü432+or+WTüLü433+or+%22WTüMIN(01)ü17%22+or+(%22WTüMIN(01)%22*+
and+DEC+and+not+W)+or+(%22WTüMIN(01)ü%22*+and+not+W)%29+%26+%28@meta_Title+decisi
on*+or+declaration*+or+%22procedures+for+extensions+under+article+27.4%22%29. 
56 Kishore Mahbubani, Trade in the New Asian Hemisphere, in PEACE AND PROSPERITY THROUGH 
WORLD TRADE 6 (Fabrice Lehmann & Jean-Pierre Lehmann eds., 2010) (discussing the peace-through-
trade theory); see also, generally DANIEL GRISWOLD, MAD ABOUT TRADE: WHY MAIN STREET AMERICA 
SHOULD EMBRACE GLOBALIZATION (2009). 
57 Adam Lusekelo, Africa’s War on Terror Targets Poverty, BBC NEWS (Feb. 27, 2003), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2797405.stm. 
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“poor, disillusioned populations . . . .”58 
 America has not lost faith in the vision of peace through trade. To the present, it is 
part of the rhetoric of U.S. trade policy. It was a hallmark of that policy when the DDA 
was launched. That is, America viewed trade policy and multilateral trade liberalization 
as an important component of its national security strategy. Multilateral trade 
liberalization was one tool in the kit to be used in the Global War on Terror that had been 
thrust upon America. 
 There is no better evidence of this linkage—trade as an element of counter-
terrorism—than the official U.S. government report of the 9/11 Commission. It 
summarizes the relationship of underdevelopment and sense of hopelessness that goes 
with it to trade liberalization and counter-terrorism: 
 Economic openness is essential. Terrorism is not caused by 
poverty. Indeed, many terrorists come from relatively well-off families. 
Yet when people lose hope, when societies break down, when countries 
fragment, the breeding grounds for terrorism are created. Backward 
economic policies and repressive political regimes slip into societies that 
are without hope, where ambition and passions have no constructive 
outlet. 
 The policies that support economic development and reform also 
have political implications. Economic and political liberties tend to be 
linked. Commerce, especially international commerce, requires ongoing 
cooperation and compromise, the exchange of ideas across cultures, and 
the peaceful resolution of differences through negotiation or the rule of 
law. Economic growth expands the middle class, a constituency for further 
reform. Successful economies rely on vibrant private sectors, which have 
an interest in curbing indiscriminate government power. Those who 
develop the practice of controlling their own economic destiny soon desire 
a voice in their communities and political societies. 
 The U.S. government has announced [in May 2003] the goal of 
working toward a Middle East Free Trade Area, or MEFTA, by 2013. The 
United States has been seeking comprehensive free trade agreements 
                                                 
58 Africa and the War on Global Terrorism: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Africa of the 
Committee on International Relations, 107th Cong., 18 (2001) (testimony of Susan Rice, Assistant Sec’y of 
State and Consultant on African Affairs). 
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(FTAs) with the Middle Eastern nations most firmly on the path to reform. 
… Muslim countries can become full participants in the rules-based 
global trading system, as the United States considers lowering its trade 
barriers with the poorest Arab nations. 
Recommendation: A comprehensive U.S. strategy to counter 
terrorism should include economic policies that encourage 
development, more open societies, and opportunities for people to 
improve the lives of their families and to enhance prospects for their 
children’s future.
59 
 
To be clear, underdevelopment, of which poverty is a ubiquitous feature, is a condition in 
which extremist ideas simmer. Neither it generally, nor income deprivation specifically, 
leads inexorably to terrorism. There are intervening variables, as well as other causal 
variables. Deprivations of political and social rights, and religious freedoms, operate in 
either or both senses. 
 In other words, neither underdevelopment nor poverty is a necessary or sufficient 
condition for Islamist extremism. But, neither can they be ignored. They are repeatedly 
observed phenomena connected with this extremism. VEOs like Al Qaeda know it and 
exploit it to their advantage. As Professor Kevin J. Fandl rightly states: 
 Poverty is rampant in rank and file Muslim terrorists; however, it 
is not found in the leadership of these groups. So while the large majority 
of members of terrorist groups hail from impoverished areas in the Middle 
East and Southern Asia that do not afford sufficient opportunities for 
members’ self sufficiency, the wealthy leadership continue to belong “to an 
oldtradition in which self-serving elites seize upon and manipulate 
thegrievances of the poor.” By manipulating ideas and subsequently the 
minds of individuals, these power-hungry leaders are able to seize upon the 
lack of opportunity of these often impoverished and otherwise peaceful 
citizens, convincing them to rise up and take the lives of others and/or 
themselves in the name of the leadership’s cause—not Islam, but 
vengeance. … 
 …. 
… This conventional method of warfare [military means], while effective 
in pinpointing targets in complete darkness, will be useless in eliminating 
                                                 
59 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11 
COMMISSION REPORT—FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE 
UNITED STATES 378–79 (authorized ed., July 22, 2004) (bold emphasis in original, italics emphasis added). 
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the ideology that fuels terrorism. Terrorists are non-conventional actors 
using non-conventional means through amorphous concepts that cannot be 
identified, contained, or labeled. These are actors whose most potent 
weapon is the communication of ideas among masses of people awaiting 
an opportunity for a better life.60 
 
American trade negotiators involved in the launch of the Round, and the early years of 
that Round, knew it, too—that to attack poverty through appropriate new trade rules is to 
attack terrorism. If they did not, then why in May 2003 would the U.S. have launched its 
Middle East Free Trade Initiative (MEFTA), the stated goal of which is to stitch together 
countries in that region into a network of free trade and democracy?61 
 Accordingly, successive iterations of the U.S. National Strategy Report, an 
explanation and analysis of American national security strategy submitted by the 
President to Congress annually pursuant to Section 108 of the National Security Act of 
1947, have linked poverty alleviation and broader economic development to reducing the 
threat from Islamist extremism.62 President George W. Bush wrote in the 2002 National 
Strategy Report: 
[T]he United States will use this moment of opportunity to extend the 
benefits of freedom across the globe. We will actively work to bring the 
hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every 
corner of the world. The events of September 11, 2001, taught us that 
weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national 
interests as strong states. Poverty does not make poor people into 
terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption 
can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels 
within their borders. 
 The United States will stand beside any nation determined to build 
a better future by seeking the rewards of liberty for its people. Free trade 
and free markets have proven their ability to lift whole societies out of 
                                                 
60 Kevin J. Fandl, Terrorism, Development & Trade: Winning the War on Terrorism Without the 
War, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 587, 594, 599 (2004) (quoting Ken Booth & Tim Dunne, Worlds in 
Collision, in WORLDS IN COLLISION: TERROR AND THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL ORDER 9 (Ken Booth & Tim 
Dunne eds., 2002)) (emphasis added). 
61 For a discussion of MEFTA, see RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 694–95 (3rd ed. 2008). 
62 See 50 U.S.C. § 404a (2006). 
 
30 
 
 
poverty—so the United States will work with individual nations, entire 
regions, and the entire global trading community to build a world that 
trades in freedom and therefore grows in prosperity. . . .  
 ....  
 We are also guided by the conviction that no nation can build a 
safer, better world alone. Alliances and multilateral institutions can 
multiply the strength of freedom-loving nations. The United States is 
committed to lasting institutions like the United Nations, the World Trade 
Organization, the Organization of American States, and NATO [the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization], as well as other long-standing alliances.63 
 
Entitled “Ignite a New Era of Global Economic Growth through Free Markets and Free 
Trade,” Section VI of the 2002 National Strategy Report amplifies the theme of peace-
through-trade: 
A strong world economy enhances our national security by advancing 
prosperity and freedom in the rest of the world. Economic growth 
supported by free trade and free markets creates new jobs and higher 
incomes. It allows people to lift their lives out of poverty, spurs economic 
and legal reform, and the fight against corruption, and it reinforces the 
habits of liberty. 
 …. 
 The concept of “free trade” arose as a moral principle even before 
it became a pillar of economics. If you can make something that others 
value, you should be able to sell it to them. If others make something that 
you value, you should be able to buy it. This is real freedom, the freedom 
for a person—or a nation—to make a living. To promote free trade, the 
United States has developed a comprehensive strategy: 
● Seize the global initiative. The new global trade rounds we helped 
launch at Doha in November 2001 will have an ambitious agenda, 
especially in agriculture, manufacturing, and services, targeted for 
completion in 2005. The United States has led the way in 
completing the accession of China and a democratic Taiwan to the 
World Trade Organization. We will assist Russia’s preparations to 
join the WTO.64 
 
Manifestly, the Doha Round was not completed by the Hong Kong Ministerial 
Conference in December 2005, and while China and Taiwan acceded to the WTO in 
2001 and 2002, respectively, negotiations for Russia to join have yet to be finished. (As 
                                                 
63 PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA v–vi (2002), available at http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/USnss2002.pdf (emphasis added). 
64 Id. at 17–18 (emphasis on “Seize the global initiative” in original; other emphasis added). 
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for the remaining eight of the nine bullet-point elements in the comprehensive strategy, 
the U.S. made progress on some of them, but not in any enduring or conclusive manner, 
in the Bush and Obama Administrations.65) In the intervening years, as the Round has 
dragged on, trade negotiators—both American and foreign—have lost sight of the theme, 
not to mention the fervor, of believing trade liberalization to be a “moral principle.” 
 To be sure, in November 2001, not all WTO Members held exactly the same 
perspectives on the project on which they were about to embark as did the U.S. Some 
countries were slower to the mark to appreciate how drastically the world had changed 
after September 11, and thus to think about links between terrorism and trade. But, to one 
degree or another, the nexus of trade liberalization, poverty alleviation, and fighting 
Islamist extremism was perceptible. The former United States Trade Representative 
(USTR), Ambassador Susan Schwab, writes that: 
[T]he [Doha Round] talks have sought to promote economic growth and 
improve living standards across the globe—especially in developing 
countries . . . . 
 ....  
 When the Doha Round finally began in the wake of September 11, 
2001, negotiators continued to disagree over its objectives and how to 
achieve them. 
 The use of trade liberalization and reform to generate economic 
growth and help alleviate poverty formed the core of the initiative.66 
 
Ujal Singh Bhatia, the former Indian Ambassador to the WTO, notes that “[c]onsensus on 
launching the Round emerged under the extraordinary situation created by the 9/11 
                                                 
65 Those other eight elements are: pressing regional initiatives, moving ahead with bilateral free trade 
agreements, renewing the partnership between the executive branch and Congress on trade, promoting the 
connection between trade and development, enforcing trade agreements and laws against unfair trade 
practices, helping domestic industries and workers adjust, protecting the environment and workers, and 
enhancing energy security. See id. at 18–19.  
66 Susan C. Schwab, After Doha—Why the Negotiations Are Doomed and What We Should Do About 
It, 90 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 104, 104–06 (2011) (emphasis added). 
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events.” 67  That many if not most trade officials at the November 2001 Ministerial 
Conference in Doha had those events on their minds, and thought about how they might 
structure their good work to combat evil, is scarcely disputable. 
D. The World Has Not Changed 
 One of the oft-used arguments by the U.S. in the Doha Round, particularly in the 
later years of the Round, is that “the world has fundamentally changed since the Doha 
Round was launched in November 2001, with Brazil, China, India, and others becoming 
world-leading exporters in some sectors of the global economy over the past decade.”68 
Thus, American trade officials argue, the key question in the Round is “to what extent 
should the major emerging economies take on additional responsibilities to liberalize 
global trade in order to reflect their growing importance in the global economy[?]”69 This 
argument is not untrue, but rather is made in the wrong venue. 
 It is not untrue because the world has changed in the sense of the importance of 
major emerging powers. The likes of Brazil, India, and China are vastly more important 
to the U.S. and other developed countries than they once were. Between 1998 and 2001, 
less than half of the growth in world GDP came from outside of rich countries.70 Between 
2011 and 2014, the countries that are not rich, i.e., developing and (to a lesser extent) 
least developed countries, will account for 75 % of the addition to global GDP. That is 
why: 
America sees the Doha talks as its final opportunity to get fast-growing 
                                                 
67 Ujal Singh Bhatia, WTO Members are Lashed to the Mast of the Doha Round, FINANCIAL TIMES, 
May 16, 2011, at 8 (letter to the Financial Times) (emphasis added). Mr. Bhatia served as Ambassador 
from 2004–2010. 
68 Daniel Pruzin, WTO Chief Calls for Rethink on Doha Talks, Says Differences on Sectorals 
‘Unbridgeable,’ 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. ??, at 686 (Apr. 28, 2011). 
69 Id. 
70 See The Doha Round: Dead Man Talking, ECONOMIST, Apr. 28, 2011, at 81. This and the 
projected contribution to world GDP are from the International Monetary Fund. 
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emerging economies like China and India to slash their duties on imports 
of such [manufactured] goods, which have been reduced in previous 
[GATT] rounds but remain much higher than those in the rich world. It 
wants something approaching parity, at least in some sectors, because it 
reckons its own low tariffs leave it with few concessions to offer in future 
talks. But emerging markets insist that the Doha Round was never 
intended to result in such harmonization.71 
 
The emerging markets are right, and it is in relation to their point that the world has not 
changed.  
 In fact, even with the death of Osama Bin Laden in May 2011, much of the world 
has not fundamentally changed since November 2001 when the Doha Round was 
launched. Islamist extremism remains a global threat.72 The conditions of poverty, and a 
generalized sense of oppression, both of which incubate Islamist extremists, have not 
changed. Thus, when the U.S. offers up the argument that Brazil, China, India, and other 
emerging developing countries must offer concessions commensurate with their 
enhanced global commercial status, the U.S. is not wrong about their new status and what 
the consequences of it ought fairly to be. Rather, the U.S. is just making a reasonable 
argument in the wrong venue and betraying the very purpose on which it helped launch 
the Round: counter-terrorism. 
 The Doha Round never was intended for a re-balancing of trade concessions, 
although developing and even least developed countries never were told they would have 
no obligations whatsoever. That is, while the Round never was designed as a one-sided 
exercise whereby rich countries take on all market access and subsidy reduction 
commitments, and poor countries do nothing, it was intended to address the single 
                                                 
71 Id. (emphasis added). 
72 See, e.g., Daniel Dombey, Al-Qaeda ‘Still a Formidable Network,’ FINANCIAL TIMES, May 10, 
2011, at 3 (reporting that according to the U.S. State Department, Al Qaeda remains as deadly as ever, 
notwithstanding the demise of Bin Laden). 
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gravest threat facing all nations: terrorism, specifically, Islamist extremism. To be sure, 
no WTO Member saw the Round as a magic bullet that would end terrorism. But, many if 
not most of the Members appreciated the role trade liberalization could play in combating 
one of the conditions that spawns this extremism: poverty, or put more generally, a sense 
of oppression.  
 The fact that India is home to the largest concentration of Muslims in the world 
and that China has a sizeable Muslim population have not changed. What has changed, 
for those two countries, since November 2001, is they have been struck by Islamist 
extremism and have had to devote considerable military and security resources to fighting 
it. The “new” fact that China and India have had success in exporting does not alter the 
“old” fact that they are home to roughly 700 and 600 million poor people, respectively, 
who live in squalid conditions and have little stake in the world trading system, and many 
of them are Muslim. 
 Brazil, too, is beset with a large population of poor people, albeit non-Muslim. 
Yet, even with Brazil, the link with Islamist extremism may exist. Radical Islamist 
groups, such as Hezbollah, traffic pirated intellectual property goods (as well as narcotics 
and weapons), such as music CDs and movie DVDs. Such pirated goods have been found 
in South America and surely are attractive to poor people, who cannot afford authentic 
items. To what ends do the radical groups put their ill-gotten gains from the sale of 
counterfeit assets? The answer is not just social welfare projects they sponsor in 
impoverished places like South Lebanon, but also surely includes terrorist activities. 
III. Texts and Documents 
A. The December 2008 Draft Modalities Texts 
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 The course of evolution is perhaps less apparent in the world of international trade 
law than biology. Chronic Doha Round problems on agriculture and non-agricultural 
market access (NAMA) remained unresolved during the fall of 2008, summing to a list of 
issues needing convergence before a resurrection of the Round was more than the object 
of hope. Yet, none of the then-153 WTO Members appeared to have a vision that the 
extraordinary still was possible. None seemed to believe progress on details would lead to 
salvific resurrection of the moribund Round. 
 China, for example, did little else than call for realism and dampen expectations 
with Sun Zhenyu, its Ambassador to the WTO, stating in November 2008: 
One important thing for all Members is that they should be realistic, and 
also try to have a balanced outcome. . . . These [i.e., the Special Safeguard 
Mechanism (discussed below) and sensitive products in agriculture, and 
sectoral negotiations and preference erosion in NAMA (also discussed 
below)] are all very delicate issues, and eventually there must be a kind of 
balance. . . . Now everybody is in crisis . . . in order to get what we did not 
get in July [2008], we have to be more realistic on those issues. . . . If you 
raise the stake[s] at this stage, try to ask for more on the basis of July, that 
will probably not fly. . . .73 
 
Fortunately, two unsung heroes of the Round kept the faith that a resurrection could 
happen, and, that if it did, the world might be a little better place: the Chair of the 
Agricultural Negotiations, Ambassador Crawford Falconer of New Zealand, and the 
Chair of the Market Access Negotiations, Ambassador Luzius Wasescha of Switzerland. 
 These Chairmen issued new Draft Modalities Texts on 6 December 2008 in their 
                                                 
73 Chinese Ambassador Calls for Realism in WTO Trade Talks, CHINA VIEW (Nov. 28, 2008), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-11/28/content_10423758.htm; see also China, U.S. Have 
“Robust” talks on Turmoil, REUTERS, Dec. 4, 2008, available at 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2008/12/05/china-usa-idUKBJB00052620081205 (reporting on the 5th 
Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) talks between the U.S. and China, in which the two sides issued a 
bland reiteration of the importance of completing the Doha Round, with meaningful progress by the end of 
2008). 
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respective areas.74  If there is a resurrection of the Doha Round, then the terms and 
conditions in those Texts will be the setting for it.75 That is not to say Members will 
                                                 
74 See World Trade Organization, Committee on Agriculture, Special Session, Revised Draft 
Modalities for Agriculture, TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4 (Dec. 6, 2008) [hereinafter December 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text]; World Trade Organization, Negotiating Group on Market Access, Fourth 
Revision of Draft Modalities for Non-Agricultural Market Access, TN/MA/W/103/Rev.3 (Dec. 6, 2008) 
[hereinafter December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text].  
 Chairman Falconer also issued three documents covering issues on which major disputes 
remained, offering possible compromise solutions: 
(1) On Sensitive Products— 
 World Trade Organization, Committee on Agriculture, Special Session, Revised Draft Modalities 
for Agriculture Sensitive Products: Designation, TN/AG/W/5 (Dec. 6, 2008). 
(2) Also on Sensitive Products— 
 World Trade Organization, Committee on Agriculture, Special Session, Revised Draft Modalities 
for Agriculture Sensitive Products: Tariff Quota Creation, TN/AG/W/6 (Dec. 6, 2008). 
(3) On SSMs— 
 World Trade Organization, Committee on Agriculture, Special Session, Revised Draft Modalities 
for Agriculture Special Safeguard Mechanism, TN/AG/W/7 (Dec. 6, 2008). 
75 See World Trade Organization, WTO to Move Quickly on Wider Front in 2009 – Lamy (Dec. 17, 
2008), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news08_e/tnc_dg_stat_17dec08_e.htm. 
 Notably, using the December 2008 Texts as a basis for negotiations was India’s official position 
following the return to power of the Congress Party in the May 2009 general elections and appointment of 
a new Minister for Commerce and Industry—the Anand Sharma, replacing Kamal Nath. India was able to 
take that position with greater ease, and profess a renewed commitment to the Doha Round, because the 
election results permitted the Congress Party to shed its most left-wing, protectionist partners in the 
governing coalition. See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Members Set December 15–17 as Date for 2011 Ministerial 
Gathering, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1628, at XX (Oct. 28, 2010); Tripti Lahiri, New Delhi 
‘Breakthrough’ Sets Restart of Doha Round Ag, NAMA Talks for Sept. 14, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 
1191, at XX (Sept. 10, 2009); Serena Tarling & George Parker, New Delhi Ready to Resume Doha Round 
of World Trade Talks, FINANCIAL TIMES, June 23, 2009, at 6. 
 Likewise, the Group of 20 developing countries insisted ever since the Agriculture Text was 
issued that it is the “basis for resuming negotiations and represents the end-game in terms of the landing 
zones,” and has rejected a “selective reopening” of the Text. See Daniel Pruzin, New WTO Ag Negotiations 
Chair Walker Outlines Work Plans for Immediate Term, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 840, at XX (June 
25, 2009). Indeed, that insistence applies to both draft modalities agreements, covering agriculture and 
NAMA, and (as observed above) is held to by (inter alia) Brazil, China, and India, as they did not want to 
see back-sliding, or a return to square one, in Doha Round negotiations—an outcome they feared, perhaps 
wrongly, that the Administration of President Barack H. Obama sought. See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Members 
Vow to Press Forward with Intensified Talks on Doha Round, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 215, at XX 
(Feb. 10, 2011) (quoting Brazil’s Ambassador to the WTO, Roberto Azevedo, saying that any attempt to 
push far beyond the December 2008 texts might “backfire, risking to unravel the delicate network of trade-
offs we so carefully wove over the last nine years”); Daniel Pruzin & Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. Sought to 
Water Down Proposal for ‘Stock-Taking’ Meeting on Doha, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1673, at XX 
(Dec. 3, 2009); Tripti Lahiri, New Delhi ‘Breakthrough’ Sets Restart of Doha Round Ag, NAMA Talks for 
Sept. 14, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1191, at XX (Sept. 10, 2009). See also Daniel Pruzin, Lamy Sees 
Low-Profile ‘Stock-Taking’ Meeting as Frustration Over Doha Grows, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 248, 
at XX (Feb. 25, 2010) (reporting that while the U.S. was the most critical of the December 2008 Draft 
Texts on Agriculture and NAMA, most WTO Members agreed a final deal should not stray too far from 
them); Jonathan Lynn, Intensified Doha Talks to Resume this Month, REUTERS, Sept. 4, 2009, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/09/04/us-trade-doha-idUSTRE58310Q20090904 (noting that key 
trade ministers—albeit representing just 39 of the then 153 Members—agreed at a September 2009 meeting 
in New Delhi, in advance of the G-20 summit in Pittsburgh, to resume Doha Round talks on the basis of the 
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complete the Round based on each and every proposal in the Texts. To the contrary, the 
Texts almost surely will undergo revisions that vary from the insubstantial to the 
immense, depending on the topic.76 Indeed, following the November 2010 G-20 Summit 
in Seoul, Members pledged to redouble their efforts to agree to revised agriculture and 
NAMA texts, which they (not the Chairmen) promised to prepare, by April, or at least the 
middle of, 2011, with a view to signing the deal at the eighth WTO Ministerial 
Conference in Geneva in December 2011. 77  Members feared the window of 
opportunity—one of many during the interminable Round—to finish the Round would 
close in 2012 because of presidential elections in France, India, and the U.S. 
 While Brazil, China, and India argue these Texts ought not to be altered in any 
material way, the U.S. insists on significant changes.78 Some WTO Members, such as 
South Africa, have rejected them. Overall, as the Minister of Trade for New Zealand and 
former Chair of the Agriculture Negotiations, Tim Groser, remarked in June 2009: 
We’ve got agreement, not necessarily comfortable agreement, that you 
can’t [walk] away from seven years of text that’s been developed [for the 
Doha Round negotiations]…. There have been people wanting essentially 
to go back to square one. That was a recipe for disaster…. [Not building 
                                                                                                                                                 
December 2008 Texts, and quoting USTR Ron Kirk as saying “[i]t has never been our argument that we 
should start all over again or reopen them, but we have to have some idea of what those gaps and blanks 
are”); Gary G. Yerkey, India Plans to Host G-20 Trade Ministerial this September to Help Advance WTO 
Talks, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 841, at XX (June 25, 2009) (quoting Minister Sharma as saying 
USTR Ron Kirk agreed to build on the existing texts); Daniel Pruzin, New WTO Ag Chair Vows Fast 
Action to Revive Doha Round Farm Trade Talks, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. XX, at 568–69 (Apr. 30, 
2009); Daniel Pruzin, Ministers Pledge to Refrain from Imposing New Trade Barriers, Will Push for Doha 
Deal, 26 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. XX, at 180–81 (Feb. 5, 2009) (reporting the trade ministers of 
Brazil and Switzerland regard the December 2008 Texts as the basis for any deal). 
76 See Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. Cautions Lamy Against Pushing for Early Restart of WTO Trade Talks, 
26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 404, at XX (Mar. 26, 2009). 
77 See Daniel Pruzin, Officials Meet to Begin Preparations in Geneva for Accelerated Doha Talks, 
27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1874, at XX (Dec. 9, 2010); Daniel Pruzin, WTO Members Endorse Work 
Plan to Secure Doha Agreement in 2011, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1832, at XX (Dec. 2, 2010); see 
also World Trade Organization, Farm Talks To Aim for ‘Modalities’ in First Quarter of 2011 (Dec. 6 and 
10, 2010), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news10_e/agng_06dec10_e.htm. 
78 See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Ministerial Ends with a Whimper; Members to Review Doha Talks in 
Early 2010, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No.1638, at XX (Dec. 3, 2009). 
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on the December 2008 Agriculture Text, and presumably the NAMA Text 
as well, would be] either naiveté of the highest order or cynicism of the 
lowest order.79 
 
The point is the December 2008 Draft Texts on Agriculture and NAMA embody a final 
judgment Members must make—do they accept, with modifications as need be, the 
proposals for freeing up world trade in farm and manufactured products, or not? Only a 
“yes” answer leads to a resurrection. A “no” answer means final death of the Doha 
Round, at least in the sense of completion via a single undertaking, which is the approach 
of all previous multilateral trade rounds.80 
 The faith of Chairmen Falconer and Wasescha was tempered by realism, of 
course. The WTO Director-General Lamy decided not to call a meeting of trade ministers 
before year-end 2008, admitting there was no political will among key Members—
including, without naming them, China, India, the U.S., and EU—to make the 
compromises necessary to complete the Doha Round. 81  The Chairmen were under 
                                                 
79 Murray Griffin, Cairns Ministers Seek Rapid Re-Engagement on Doha; USTR Urges Openness to 
New Ideas, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No.  772, at XX (June 11, 2009). 
80 As of the end of the Seventh Ministerial Conference in Geneva, held from 30 November through 2 
December 2009, there were increasingly numerous and desperate calls, from rich and poor countries alike, 
to abandon the single undertaking and aim for separate, less ambitious deals on individual topics such as – 
● Disciplines on fishing subsidies. 
● Duty-free access for merchandise from the least developed countries. 
● Ending cotton subsidies. 
● Settlement of the Bananas dispute. 
● Trade liberalization for environmental goods and services. 
The U.S. continued to favor the single undertaking approach, as it was keen to see what it would “get” in 
return for what it “gave.” See Laura MacInnis, Calls Grow To Smash WTO Deal into Digestible Pieces, 
REUTERS, Dec. 3, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/12/03/us-trade-wto-deals-
idUSTRE5B229G20091203. Each of these topics, including the U.S. position calling for reciprocity, is 
explored more fully below. 
81 See World Trade Organization, Lamy Recommends No Ministerial Meeting By End of This Year 
(Dec. 12, 2008), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news08_e/tnc_dg_12dec08_e.htm; Daniel Pruzin, 
Lamy Says Spring G-20 Meeting Should Include Commitment to End Doha, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 
XX, at 144–45 (Jan. 29, 2009); Daniel Pruzin & Gary G. Yerkey, WTO’s Lamy Calls Off Doha Ministerial; 
Deal Up to Obama Team, U.S. Official Says, 25 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. XX, at 1766–77 (Dec. 18, 
2008); Roberta Rampton, “Many Gaps” Nix World Trade Deal Breakthrough: USTR, REUTERS, Dec. 12, 
2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/12/12/us-trade-wto-schwab-
idUSTRE4BB5BP20081212. 
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tremendous pressure to issue the December Texts. The Director-General hoped they 
might come up with the magic formulae needed to reconcile theretofore intractable 
differences. He also hoped that in 2009 he would secure re-appointment as Director-
General (which he did), and to some degree his success was bound to that of the Round.82 
 Yet, in a Member-driven organization such as the WTO, Chairmen Falconer and 
Wasescha hardly could impose solutions. Chairmen are neither scribes nor dictators. 
They occupy an uneasy position, being more than facilitators (though that is their 
technical description) but having no management authority. Their position can and does 
change, depending on the circumstances, in the large area between these extremes. Deals 
must come from the Members. 
 Thus, the Chairmen did their best to strike the right balance between capturing 
points of convergence among Members and suggesting possible solutions to reach 
consensus on outstanding disputes. If trade ministers did not reconvene for another go at 
a final deal, then at least the reason would not be the lack of revised negotiating 
documents, however modest, even trivial, the revisions might be. Both Chairmen 
                                                                                                                                                 
 For a comparative journalistic account of the political economy of China and India in light of 
global economic recession, see China and India: Suddenly Vulnerable, ECONOMIST, Dec. 13, 2008, at 15. 
For a briefing on Chinese economic reforms ushered in by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, see China’s Reforms: 
The Second Long March, ECONOMIST, Dec. 13, 2008, at 30–33. For a discussion of obstacles to Indian 
economic development, including labyrinthine politics, a creaky infrastructure, terrorist threats, and gross 
inequities, see A Special Report on India: An Elephant, Not a Tiger, ECONOMIST, Dec. 13, 2008, at 62. 
82 The unanimous, four-year re-appointment, effective 1 September 2009, occurred in April 2009 
after the WTO Members required Pascal Lamy to make a presentation on his vision for the future of the 
WTO, and engage in a question-and-answer session. See THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.wto.org. 
 With no others announcing their candidacy by the 31 December 2008 deadline, Lamy became the 
first uncontested selection in WTO history. See Daniel Pruzin, Lamy Secures Second Term at WTO Helm 
After No Challengers to Leadership Emerge, 26 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. XX, at 38 (Jan. 8, 2009); 
UPDATE 1—Lamy Only Candidate for Next Head of WTO, REUTERS, Jan. 5, 2009, available at 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2009/01/05/uk-trade-wto-lamy-idUKTRE5041VE20090105. Aside from an 
endorsement of his performance in the post, that fact may reflect the lack of other viable candidates, a 
reluctance among Members to engage in a contentious changing of the guard (especially amidst a difficult 
global economic environment), and a perception among Members that the position is a thankless one (at 
least in the present climate). 
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prefaced their December 2008 Draft Modalities Texts with the same caution: 
“[E]verything is conditional in the deepest sense.”83 About three months later, Chairman 
Falconer added a post-script to his Text. In March 2009, he announced his departure from 
his posts as Chairman and as New Zealand’s Ambassador to the WTO, to return to 
Wellington to serve as Deputy Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.84 
 While he was replaced by another New Zealander, Ambassador David Walker,85 
that post-script was an ominous portent: Having served as the Chairman since July 2005, 
few, if any, officials knew more about trade and agriculture, and had labored with greater 
tenacity and good cheer in the Doha Round, than Chairman Falconer. Another bad omen 
came in September 2009, when the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced 
Ambassador Walker was being reassigned to a different post effective early 2010, a date 
later put off to April 2011.86 Despite his heroic efforts, the two-year tenure of Chairman 
Walker was marked by little else than a stalemate over entrenched differences on major 
substantive issues and grinding, mind-numbing work on technical issues of templates 
WTO Members could use to list their final agricultural concessions and attendant data. 
 Following issuance of the Draft Modalities Texts in December 2008, negotiations 
proceeded, in fits and starts, as chronicled below. By early 2011, there was pressure from 
                                                 
83 December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, pmbl., at ¶ 2; December 2008 
Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 74, revision, ¶ 1. 
84 See Daniel Pruzin, Chair of WTO Farm Trade Talks to Leave in April, Will Return to New 
Zealand, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 408, at XX (Mar. 26, 2009). 
85 See Daniel Pruzin, Deal Reached on New Doha Agriculture Chair; New Zealander Walker to 
Succeed Falconer, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 507, at XX (Apr. 16, 2009); Daniel Pruzin, New 
Zealander Walker Set to Secure Ag Chair in Doha Talks, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 477, at XX (Apr. 
9, 2009). Interestingly, the Group of 33 developing countries, which includes India, opposed the 
appointment of Ambassador Guillermo Valles Galmés of Uruguay, because he had been critical in July 
2008 of the position taken by many developing countries in favor of a special agricultural safeguard 
mechanism (which is discussed below). See id. 
86 See Daniel Pruzin, Lamy Postpones Meeting Amid Continued Bickering Over ‘Deliverables’ 
Package, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 974, at XX (June 16, 2011); Daniel Pruzin, WTO Members to 
Begin Search for New Agriculture Negotiations Chair, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1336, at XX (Sept. 
9, 2010). 
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the WTO Director-General, Pascal Lamy, and certain Members, like the EU, on the 
Chairman of the respective negotiating groups to issue revised texts by Easter (24 April 
2011). 87  That way, the remainder of the year could be used to fill in schedules of 
commitments, and the Doha Round could be finished by the end of the year. Every 
meeting held among the Members, in various configurations, toward that end in January 
through early April 2011 failed. That is, no breakthrough agreement emerged. And, with 
heads of governments captivated by revolutions in the Arab World, and war in Libya, 
they paid little attention to the Round. The U.S., along with India and other Members, 
took the position that no new texts should be issued and that doing so would risk the 
appearance, if not reality, that the Chairs were imposing modalities agreements on the 
Members, contrary to the Member-driven way in which the WTO conventionally 
operates. Such texts would have no traction with domestic legislatures. 
 Following the work of his colleagues on the Draft Modalities Texts in Agriculture 
and NAMA, Ambassador Guillermo Valles Galmés of Uruguay, Chairman of the 
Negotiating Group on Rules, issued a revised Draft Consolidated Text on trade remedies, 
specifically, antidumping (AD), countervailing duties (CVDs), and fishing subsidies.88 
                                                 
87 See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Chairs to Issue Doha ‘Documents’ April 21, Lamy to Brief on NAMA 
Progress, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 609, at XX (Apr. 14, 2011). 
88 See World Trade Organization, Negotiating Group on Rules, New Draft Consolidated Chair Texts 
of the AD and SCM Agreements, TN/RL/W/236 (Dec. 19, 2008) [hereinafter December 2008 Draft Rules 
Text]. 
 The term of Mr. Galmés as Ambassador expired in May 2010, thus he had to step down as 
Chairman of the Rules Negotiations, a post he held since October 2004. In the first few months of 2010, no 
one expressed any interest in replacing him in this post, and several candidates rejected the possibility. See 
Daniel Pruzin, WTO Members Endorse Chair Lineup; Search on for New Doha Rules Talks Chair, 27 Int’l 
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. XX, at 255 (Feb. 25, 2010). By June, a taker had been found—Dennis Francis, the 
WTO Ambassador from Trinidad and Tobago—and WTO Members approved him in July, the fourth Rules 
Negotiations Chair since the Doha Round was launched in November 2001. Notably, Mario Matus of Chile 
had been identified as the leading candidate, but he drew objections because of the strong stance of his 
country in the rules negotiations. Chile favors abolition of zeroing, which the U.S. does not, and Chile 
favors strict disciplines on fishing subsidies, which Japan, Korea, and Taiwan do not. See Daniel Pruzin, 
WTO Members Approve New Rules Chair; U.S. Maintains Hard Line on Antidumping, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. 
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He did so about one week after issuance of the Agriculture and Modalities Texts. Vast 
tracts of the December 2008 Rules Text were identical to the previous iteration, which 
the Chairman had issued in November 2007. The new Rules Text had only one advantage 
over its predecessor: It identified clearly the points of disagreement among WTO 
Members and the range and depth of their disagreement. The disadvantage was 
unmistakable: The new Text deleted proposed drafting language on those points because 
that language had attracted neither consensus nor convergence toward consensus. 
 Confessedly, the December 2008 Draft Rules Text was dispiriting. It embodied no 
strong faith in the possibility of a Doha Round resurrection. Perhaps that was for good 
reason. In the preceding thirteen months since the earlier version, WTO Members had 
given the Chairman precious little to work with, in terms of a consensus on AD, CVD, or 
fishing subsidies. He had no choice but to drop proposed compromise language and 
replace it with an insert summarizing the ongoing fights. 
B. The April 2011 Documents 
 At the end of March 2011, the U.S. declared the gaps in the Doha Round had 
become unbridgeable.89 The Director-General admitted the talks had reached an impasse. 
Consequently, the Chairs abandoned the idea of issuing new negotiating texts. They 
resigned themselves to issuing, on 21 April 2011, “documents” that reflected progress in 
the Round since December 2008. 
 Thus, on 21 April 2011, for the first time in the history of the Round, the Chairs 
of all nine negotiating groups simultaneously summarized the work that had occurred to 
                                                                                                                                                 
(BNA) No. XX, at 1072–73 (July 15, 2010); Daniel Pruzin, WTO Set to Appoint New Chair for Doha 
Negotiations on Rules, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 887, at XX (June 17, 2010). 
89 See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Chairs to Issue Doha ‘Documents’ April 21, Lamy to Brief on NAMA 
Progress, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 609, at XX (Apr. 14, 2011). 
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date. The groups and associated “Documents” covered 
(1) Agriculture.90 
(2) NAMA.91 
(3) Services.92 
(4) Rules, which cover, not only the conventional trade remedies of AD and CVDs, 
but also the matter of fisheries subsidies and regional trade agreements (RTAs), 
specifically, transparency and systemic RTA issues.93 
                                                 
90 See World Trade Organization, Committee on Agriculture, Special Session, Negotiating Group on 
Agriculture—Report by the Chairman, H.E. Mr. David Walker, to the Trade Negotiations Committee, ¶ 
I.A.6, TN/AG/26 (Apr. 21, 2011) [hereinafter April 2011 Agriculture Document]. This Document also 
provides minor typographical corrections to the December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text. See 
April 2011 Agriculture Documents, supra ¶ I.D.49. 
91 See World Trade Organization, Negotiating Group on Market Access, Textual Report by the 
Chairman, Ambassador Luzius Wasescha, on the State of Play of the NAMA Negotiations, 
TN/MA/W/103/Rev.3/Add.1 (Apr. 21, 2011) [hereinafter April 2011 NAMA Document]; see also World 
Trade Organization, Trade Negotiation Committee, Report by the Director-General on His Consultations 
on NAMA Sectoral Negotiations, TN/C/14 (Apr. 21, 2011). 
92 See World Trade Organization, Council for Trade in Services, Special Session, Negotiations on 
Trade in Services—Report by the Chairman, Ambassador Fernando de Mateo, to the Trade Negotiations 
Committee, TN/S/36 (Apr. 21, 2011) [hereinafter April 2011 Services Document]. 
93 See World Trade Organization, Negotiating Group on Rules, Communication from the Chairman, 
TN/RL/W/254 (Apr. 21, 2011) [hereinafter April 2011 Rules Document]. 
 Concerning RTAs, see World Trade Organization, Negotiating Group on Rules, Negotiations on 
Regional Trade Agreements: Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements—Report by 
Ambassador Dennis Francis Chairman, Negotiating Group on Rules, TN/RL/W/252 (Apr. 21, 2011) 
[hereinafter April 2011 RTA Transparency Mechanism Document], and World Trade Organization, 
Negotiating Group on Rules, Negotiations on Regional Trade Agreements: Systemic Issues—Report by 
Ambassador Dennis Francis Chairman, Negotiating Group on Rules, TN/RL/W/253 (Apr. 21, 2011) 
[hereinafter April 2011 RTA Systemic Issues Document]. 
 As regards transparency, since 14 December 2006, the WTO has implemented on a provisional 
basis a General Council Decision Establishing a Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements 
See The World Trade Organization, General Council, The Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade 
Agreements, WT/L/671 (Dec. 14, 2006). Paragraph 23 of that Decision obligated WTO Members to debate, 
within the context of the Doha Round, whether the Decision should be made permanent. That is, Members 
had to consider whether the RTA transparency mechanism created by the 2006 Decision should be replaced 
by a permanent (and possibly modified) mechanism. See April 2011 RTA Transparency Mechanism 
Document, supra, at ¶¶ 1, 3. The Annex to the April 2011 Transparency Mechanism Document sets out the 
2006 Decision, with possible modifications in bracketed text. 
 The thrust of the 2006 Decision was to enhance the transparency of RTAs, particularly in view of 
their proliferation, through early announcements and notifications, subsequent reporting, and technical 
support. See April 2011 RTA Transparency Mechanism Document, supra, at ¶¶ 1–2 (on early 
announcement), 3–4 (on notification), 14–17 (on reporting), and 19 (on technical support for developing 
countries). The Annex to the Decision requires RTA parties to submit specific data about tariff concessions, 
MFN duty rates, preferential product-specific rules of origin, and import statistics, as well as information 
on services trade. The end result, at least in theory, should be improved compliance with disciplines on 
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(5) Intellectual Property (IP), in particular, multilateral notification and registration of 
geographic indications (GIs) for wines and spirits, extension of GI protection to 
non-alcoholic products, and protection of traditional knowledge and 
biodiversity.94 
                                                                                                                                                 
RTAs in GATT Article XXIV and GATT Article V. Other than the requirement that the WTO Secretariat 
provide technical support to developing and least developed countries to implement the Decision, 
particularly with respect to preparing and submitting data, there were no provisions tailored to poor 
countries. Likewise, there were no provisions to encourage formation of RTAs among poor or Muslim 
countries or to improve integration among such RTAs as do exist. 
 As for systemic issues posed by RTAs, the April 2011 RTA Systemic Issues Document merely 
recounted that discussions among WTO Members had focused on the “substantially all the trade” discipline 
in GATT Article XXIV:8(a)(i) (for customs unions) and XXIV:8(b) (for free trade agreements), and special 
and differential treatment for poor countries. See April 2011 RTA Systemic Issues Document, supra, at ¶¶ 
1–5. On the first issue, one-third of the proposals advocated a minimum benchmark to qualify as 
“substantially all the trade,” which would be based on bilateral trade (between proposed RTA partners), 
tariff lines covered (by the proposed RTA), or both, or would be based on a combined average of bilateral 
trade and tariff lines covered. Such proposals called for measuring the benchmark at the time a proposed 
RTA entered into force, and at the end of a transition period prescribed by the RTA. See April 2011 RTA 
Systemic Issues Document, supra, at ¶ 4. On special and differential treatment, Members debated whether 
any flexibilities they agreed to should be placed in GATT Article XXIV, the 1994 Uruguay Round 
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV, the 1979 Tokyo Round Enabling Clause, or both. 
That is, Members had reached consensus neither on the substance of flexibilities nor on their placement. 
 Thus, the Chairman reported: 
8. To conclude, it is clear that notwithstanding the mandate in Doha and the 
Ministerial Declaration in Hong Kong, China: 
(i) in essence, the objectives of various Members in these negotiations 
remain conceptually different;  and 
(ii) gaps persist in Members’ positions on all elements proposed. 
9. I reaffirm my advice to Members that unless they adopt a pragmatic, flexible 
and less doctrinaire approach to these negotiations it is unlikely that this impasse will be 
overcome. 
See id. at ¶¶ 8–9 (emphasis added). 
In light of their failure to reach agreement on these two issues, it was surprising that the Members 
contemplated a post-Doha Round work program on systemic issues – unless, of course, they sought to defer 
hard bargaining until after the Round. See id. at ¶ 6.  
94 The WTO issued three documents on 21 April 2011 dealing with IP and GI matters. See: 
(1) World Trade Organization, Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Special Session, Multilateral System of Notification and Registration of Geographical Indications 
for Wines and Spirits – Report by the Chairman, Ambassador Darlington Mwape (Zambia) to the 
Trade Negotiations Committee, TN/IP/21 (Apr. 21, 2011) [hereinafter April 2011 Geographical 
Indications Document].  
(2) World Trade Organization, Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Special Session, Attachment, Multilateral System of Notification and Registration of 
Geographical Indications for Wines and Spirits – Draft Composite Text, Revision, JOB/IP/#/Rev.1 
(Apr. 20, 2011) [hereinafter April 2011 Geographical Indications Draft Composite Text]. 
(3) World Trade Organization, General Council, Trade Negotiations Committee, Issues Related to the 
Extension of the Protection of Geographical Indications Provided for in Article 23 of the TRIPs 
Agreement to Products Other than Wines and Spirits and those Related to the Relationship 
between the TRIPs Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity—Report by the 
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(6) Environment.95 
(7) Development.96 
(8) Trade Facilitation.97 
                                                                                                                                                 
Director-General, WT/GC/W/633, TN/C/W/61 (Apr. 21, 2011) [hereinafter April 2011 TRIPs 
Article 2—CBD Document]. 
See also World Trade Organization, Intellectual Property: Geographical Indications Negotiations – 
Formal Meeting, Geographical Indications Draft Completed Swiftly But with 208 Differences (Mar. 3, 
2011), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news11_e/trip_ss_03mar11_e.htm (reporting on the status of 
the negotiations and production of the nine-page draft composite text).  
 The topic of geographical indications, while set in the context of intellectual property, also relates 
to agriculture. Though this topic is not addressed in the December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities 
Agreement, many geographically-indicated products are primary or processed farm products. See 
December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Agreement, supra note 74, at § V.B. 
 Negotiations on a proposed multilateral register for GIs pre-date the Doha Round, having 
commenced in 1997 under the auspices of Article 23:4 of the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, which states: 
4.  In order to facilitate the protection of geographical indications for wines, 
negotiations shall be undertaken in the Council for TRIPS concerning the establishment 
of a multilateral system of notification and registration of geographical indications for 
wines eligible for protection in those Members participating in the system. 
Quoted in RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND PRACTICE – 
DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT 533 (3rd ed. 2008). 
The fact these talks pre-date the Round (as do certain issues relating to the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services, discussed below), is shameful. It highlights how little progress WTO Members had made in well 
over a decade of negotiations on a reasonably focused issue. 
 Mention of the on-going GI negotiations was included in Paragraph 18 of the Ministerial 
Declaration launching the Doha Round, thereby folding them into the Round: 
18. With a view to completing the work started in the Council for Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (Council for TRIPS) on the implementation of 
Article 23.4, we agree to negotiate the establishment of a multilateral system of 
notification and registration of geographical indications for wines and spirits by the Fifth 
Session of the Ministerial Conference.  We note that issues related to the extension of the 
protection of geographical indications provided for in Article 23 to products other than 
wines and spirits will be addressed in the Council for TRIPS pursuant to paragraph 12 of 
this Declaration. 
Quoted in RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND PRACTICE – 
DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT 637 (3rd ed. 2008). 
 The GI topic is mentioned again in Paragraph 39 of the December 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial 
Declaration. For further discussion of the GI negotiations, see RAJ BHALA, DICTIONARY OF 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW (3rd ed. 2008) (entry for “Geographical Indication[s]”). 
95 See World Trade Organization, Committee on Trade and Environment, Special Session, 
Committee on Trade and Environment in Special Session – Report by the Chairman, Ambassador Manuel 
A. J. Teehankee, to the Trade Negotiations Committee, TN/TE/20 (Apr. 21, 2011) [hereinafter April 2011 
Trade and Environment Document]. 
96 See World Trade Organization, Committee on Trade and Development, Special Session, Special 
Session of the Committee on Trade and Development – Report by the Chairman, Ambassador Shahid 
Bashir (Pakistan), to the Trade Negotiations Committee, TN/CTD/26 (Apr. 21, 2011) [hereinafter April 
2011 Trade and Development Document]. 
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(9) Dispute Settlement.98 
As always had been true in the Round, the first four negotiating groups were the most 
important. Without a deal in them, a comprehensive Round, agreed to by all WTO 
Members as a single undertaking, was impossible. 
 Collectively, the April 2011 Documents gave a clear picture of what had been 
agreed to and, more importantly, what areas of disagreement remained. This picture was 
“vertical,” in the sense that the devilish details of proposals within each negotiating group 
could be seen. This picture also was “horizontal,” in the sense that the broad package, 
across all nine areas, could be appreciated. 
 The WTO Director-General, Pascal Lamy, characterized the Documents as both 
“impressive and realistic.” 99  Those adjectives were euphemisms. If they were 
“impressive,” then it was as much because of their cleverness in obfuscating simple trade 
liberalization issues with hideously complex rules, as it was for whatever economic gains 
they might happen to yield. As for the Documents being “realistic,” the more accurate 
assessment would be “depressing.” After a decade of negotiations, the Documents were 
long, convoluted regurgitations showing that nothing much had happened since the 
                                                                                                                                                 
97 See World Trade Organization, Negotiating Group on Trade Facilitation, Draft Consolidated 
Negotiating Text – Revision, TN/TF/W/165/Rev.8 (Apr. 21, 2011) [hereinafter April 2011 Draft Trade 
Facilitation Text]. 
98 See World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement Body, Special Session, Special Session of the 
Dispute Settlement Body – Report by the Chairman, Ambassador Ronald Saborío Soto, to the Trade 
Negotiations Committee, TN/DS/25 (Apr. 21, 2011) [hereinafter April 2011 DSU Report]. 
 Appendix A to the April 2011 DSU Report contained another Report by the Chairman, and Annex 
1 to Appendix A contained the July 2008 “Consolidated Draft Legal Text (proposed as a basis for further 
work).” Id. app. A, annex 1. (Both the Appendix A Report and the Draft DSU Text bore the TN/DS/25 
document coding number of the Report to which they were appended.) Also in April 2011, the Chairman 
issued Annex 2 to Appendix A, entitled “Thematic Overview,” which discussed various DSU reform issues 
(and which also bore the TN/DS/25 coding number). Id. app. A, annex 2. 
 Finally, at the same time, the Chairman published “Appendix B: Informal DSB Special Session 
Meetings (May 2010 to April 2010) – Chairman’s Summaries of Recent Work.” Appendix B (which bore 
the TN/DS/25 coding number) essentially contained minutes of meetings of the DSB on DSU reform. 
99 World Trade Organization, Trade Negotiations Committee, Cover Note by TNC Chair, TN/C/13 
(Apr. 21, 2011). 
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issuance of the December 2008 negotiating texts.100 Indeed, following twelve single-
spaced pages of discussion, the April 2011 Agriculture Document simply attached the 
December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text. Likewise, following twenty-two 
single-spaced pages of discussion, the April 2011 NAMA Document simply attached the 
December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text. 
 What also was “depressing” was the lack of agreement on the cause of stagnation. 
Lamy said the entire Doha Round was blocked by a “classic mercantilist issue: tariffs on 
industrial products, the bread and butter of WTO negotiations since their inception.”101 
True, sectoral negotiations within NAMA were a major obstacle. True also, some of the 
major trading powers behaved like mercantilists in these negotiations. But, as the Deputy 
USTR and Ambassador to the WTO, Michael Punke, indicated, by no means would the 
rest of the pieces of the Round fall into place if a NAMA deal were reached.102 Large, 
sometimes extraordinarily large, gaps remained on agriculture, services, and essentially 
all of the topics covered in the Round. 
 Thus, the roughly 600 pages of Documents highlighted the difference between 
“work” and “progress,” and between “motion” and “productivity,” that so often mars 
international organizations. The Director-General blatantly over-stated the strengths of 
the Documents in saying they represented “greater opportunities for the poorest [and] for 
the first time plac[ed] development at the heart of the global trading system.”103 In truth, 
the April 2011 Documents marked the fact the Round had “entered the most serious crisis 
                                                 
100 See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Chief Calls for Rethink on Doha Talks, Says Differences on Sectorals 
‘Unbridgeable,’ 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. XX, at 686 (Apr. 28, 2011). 
101 Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Criticizes WTO Chief Lamy’s Assessment of Doha Impasse, Says NAMA Not 
Only Issue, 28 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. XX, 724 (May 5, 2011). 
102 See id. 
103 World Trade Organization, Trade Negotiations Committee, Cover Note by TNC Chair, TN/C/13 
(Apr. 21, 2011). 
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since a failed ministerial meeting in July 2008, when trade ministers from key WTO 
member[s] came close to clinching a deal.”104 Moreover, the Documents could be faulted 
for their scandalous evasion of the purpose on which the Round was founded: fighting 
poverty, enhancing development, and thereby countering terrorism. 
 Perhaps one of the most glaring examples came from the Committee on Trade and 
Development. Pursuant to the DDA, this Committee was charged with considering how 
best to monitor and evaluate special and differential (S & D) treatment provisions in 
multilateral trade agreements. Such provisions, by definition, are supposed to offer more 
favorable treatment to developing countries, and still more favorable treatment to least 
developed countries, than to developed countries. After a decade of talks, the Committee 
had done little, as evident from the April 2011 Trade and Development Document. Its 
author, the Chairman of the Trade and Development negotiations, could not have been a 
stranger to the links between trade, poverty, and Islamist extremism: He was Ambassador 
Shahid Bashir of Pakistan. 
 Had the WTO Members reached a consensus on a “Monitoring Mechanism” by 
which to check the extent to which developed countries were implementing S & D 
treatment rules? No. They agreed the Mechanism should include, not only all GATT-
WTO texts and any Doha Round agreements, but also Ministerial and General Council 
Decisions.105 They also agreed the Mechanism should convene biannually.106 But, they 
could not agree on what they would do. That is, there was no clear consensus on what 
                                                 
104 Daniel Pruzin, WTO Chief Calls for Rethink on Doha Talks, Says Differences on Sectorals 
‘Unbridgeable,’ 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 686, at XX (Apr. 28, 2011). 
105 See World Trade Organization, Special Session of the Committee on Trade and Development, 
Report by the Chairman, Ambassador Shahid Bashir (Pakistan), to the Trade Negotiations Committee, ¶ 
(a), Annex 1, ¶ 2, TN/CTD/26 (Apr. 21, 2011) [hereinafter Monitoring Mechanism]. 
106 Id. at ¶¶ (c), (d), Annex 1, ¶¶ 9, 12. According to ¶ (d), and ¶¶ 9 and 12 of the Annex, WTO 
Members would reappraise the Mechanism three years after its operation, and thereafter as necessary. 
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“Monitoring” means, i.e., whether it is “meant to be an exercise in ‘transparency,’ 
overseeing the implementation of S & D provisions, or a permanent negotiating forum on 
S & D provisions, even after conclusion of the DDA.”107 In a proposed compromise, they 
waffled: “Monitoring” would not be a negotiating body, but it could make 
recommendations or proposals for other WTO bodies, and it will complement, not 
replace, other relevant WTO mechanisms.108 The Members also failed to make headway 
on S & D treatment proposals for specific GATT-WTO texts. In brief, the decade-long 
work of the Round negotiating group most obviously entrusted with managing the link 
between trade liberalization and poverty alleviation, by ensuring the existence and 
operation of development-friendly rules, was singularly unimpressive. 
 Scrambling to preserve some measure of credibility, in May 2011 Director-
General Lamy said negotiations on expanding the WTO Agreement on Government 
Procurement (GPA) might be part of a package of deliverable items at the December 
2011 Ministerial Conference.109 Never before had GPA negotiations been linked to or 
part of the Doha Round. He was stretching outside the Round for some victory to tout. 
Yet, with three major hurdles to cross, GPA negotiations were far from complete. 
 First, the U.S. and EU awaited a credible offer, with significant central and sub-
central government coverage, from China, so that China would be a party to the 
plurilateral accord. As part of its 11 December 2001 terms of accession to the WTO, 
China promised to join the GPA.110 But, it has been slow in working toward keeping its 
promise. China submitted its initial offer—the government entities that it scheduled under 
                                                 
107 Id. at ¶ (b). 
108 Id. at ¶ (b), Annex 1, ¶¶ 3-8. 
109 Daniel Pruzin, WTO’s Lamy Says Public Procurement Deal Could be in December Deliverables 
Package, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 846, at XX (May 26, 2011). 
110 Id. 
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the GPA positive-list approach—in December 2007. That offer was grossly inadequate, 
in terms of entities covered, and China revised it in July 2010. 
 To the chagrin of the U.S. and EU, the revised offer was insufficient. They called 
on China to expand the central government entities covered.111 They also asked China to 
include procurement by all subcentral governments in all of China’s twenty-two 
provinces and five autonomous regions, and in the four municipalities (Beijing, 
Chongqing, Shanghai, and Tianjin) under central government authority. The United 
States and EU also said China needed to include the twenty-three municipalities at the 
prefecture level. In respect of all these requests, the U.S. and EU noted that China should 
include subordinate agencies operating under the relevant entities. 
 Second, the EU demanded more ambitious offers of coverage from Canada, 
Japan, and Korea. With Japan, for example, the EU insisted it lower its thresholds for 
government construction contracts that would be subject to GPA disciplines.112 The EU 
also demanded Japan allow foreign suppliers to bid on procurement contracts issued by 
private Japanese railway operators. 
 Third, and most importantly, the U.S. had to open further its government 
procurement market. The U.S., said the EU, needed to schedule more central government 
entities and subject more state governments to GPA disciplines. (Thirteen states had not 
scheduled any of their official entities in the GPA: Alabama, Alaska, Georgia, Indiana, 
Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, 
Virginia, and West Virginia.) The U.S. also needed to reduce the competitive distortions 
created by its set-aside programs. That is, the EU wanted the U.S. to eliminate the 
                                                 
111 Id. 
112 Daniel Pruzin, Deal on Revised WTO Procurement Accord Will Depend on U.S., EU, Japan 
Trade-Offs, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 892, at XX (June 2, 2011). 
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exemption the U.S. inserted in the GPA from GPA disciplines for procurement schemes 
that require certain federal procurement contracts be awarded to small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs).113 Ironically given its much-ballyhooed interest in the environment, 
the EU also sought an end to U.S. procurement rules that prefer “green” firms that 
endeavor to protect the environment. 
 Until the U.S. and other countries enhanced their offers, the EU would adhere to 
strict reciprocity vis-à-vis such countries when fashioning its offers and awarding 
government procurement contracts. Thus, it would open up the EU procurement market 
to Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, but not to Canada, Japan, Korea, or 
the U.S.114 In sum, these three hurdles meant the likelihood of completing an accord to 
expand the GPA was low, at least in the short or medium-term.115 In turn, the difficulties 
manifest in the April 2011 Documents, on matters that properly were in the Round, could 
not be offset or covered up easily by a GPA deal. 
C. Technical Details as a Foundation for Thematic Appraisal 
 What follows in this Trilogy of law review articles is an analysis of the December 
2008 Draft Modalities Texts, along with the April 2011 Documents (where relevant). 
This analysis is at two levels, technical details and thematic appraisal: 
● Progress – 
 How, if at all, do the December 2008 Texts and April 2011 Documents differ 
from their immediate predecessors of July 2008? This question asks what 
                                                 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 The EU and U.S. could not even agree on what form a GPA deal, if reached, should take. The 
Europeans favored an entirely new accord, because of EU rules under the Treaty of Lisbon. The U.S. 
insisted on a revision to the existing GPA, because with its lack of fast-track trade negotiating authority, 
Congress might not pass a new accord. See id. 
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progress the WTO Members had made in the critical final six months of 2008, 
and what key areas of disagreement remained. 
● The Deal on the Table – 
 What is the possible consensus reflected in the December 2008 Texts and April 
2011 Documents? This question asks what deal is on the bargaining table for the 
Members to accept or reject, and thereby conclude the Round, one way or the 
other. 
The complexity of the terms and conditions compel a lengthy analysis—hence, the 
Trilogy. After all, ruminations and pontifications about the Round are bluster without 
strong grounding in legal fact. 
IV. Cutting Domestic Farm Subsidies 
A. Overview 
 In virtually all material respects, the December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities 
Agreement proved to be the same as its predecessor of July 2008.116 The new Text 
covered the familiar topics—the three dimensions of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture 
from the Uruguay Round (1986–1994), all of which needed reform, namely, domestic 
support, market access, and export subsidies.117 The December Text also identified the 
                                                 
116 This discussion is based on a paragraph-by-paragraph, line-by-line comparison of the December 
2008 and July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Texts, and the December 2008 Revised Draft Modalities 
for Sensitive Product Designation and Agriculture Special Safeguard Mechanisms [SSMs]. These texts are 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/chair_texts08_e.htm. It also is based on the 
unofficial explanation of these texts prepared by the Information and Media Relations Division of the WTO 
Secretariat. See WTO Secretariat, Unofficial Guide to the Revised Draft Modalities—Agriculture (Dec. 6, 
2008, corr’d Dec. 9, 2008), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/ag_modals_july08_e.htm 
[hereinafter Unofficial Guide to Revised Draft Modalities]. 
117 The Agreement on Agriculture is reprinted in a variety of sources, including BHALA, 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 1, at 247–73. For an analysis of the Agreement, see Raj Bhala, 
World Agricultural Trade in Purgatory, 79 N.D. L. REV. 691 (2003). 
 One notable issue unmentioned on which no rules were proposed in the December 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities text is tariff inversion (i.e., higher duties on raw materials than on processed 
products, a problem that is the mirror image of tariff escalation). 
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choices facing the WTO Members. Large swathes of it, aside from episodic formatting or 
stylistic improvements, were a verbatim repetition of the former document.118 
 By April 2011, nothing much had changed. Thus, in his April 2011 Document, 
Chairman Walker concluded:  
Members have not been in a position to substantively [sic] resolve matters, 
nor is there any discernable progress on these [ten categories of 
agricultural] issues [(1) Blue Box subsidies, (2) cotton subsidies, (3) 
Sensitive Products, (4) tariff caps, (5) tariff quotas, (6) tariff 
simplification, (7) Special Products, (8) Special Safeguard Mechanism, (9) 
Tropical Products, and (10) Preference Erosion] that be captured in [a new 
negotiating] text.119 
 
 If WTO Members agreed to the proposals, then they would implement them 
textually, as necessary, in part through corresponding changes made to the WTO 
Agreement on Agriculture.120 Conversely, if no Doha Round agreement were reached by 
the fall of 2012, then the Uruguay Round commitments for the United States would 
remain the guideposts for it in fashioning agricultural policy, particularly in respect of 
subsidies.121 (That is because American farm spending is set in roughly five-year cycles 
by agricultural legislation known as “Farm Bills,” with the 2008 Farm Bill—formally 
entitled the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 122 —setting appropriations 
through the end of 2012.) Other WTO Members undoubtedly faced similar issues of farm 
legislation timing in relation to outcomes from the Round. 
 Reducing agricultural subsidies, particularly in rich countries, had been a goal of 
the Doha Round since it commenced in November 2001. To achieve this aim in any 
                                                 
118 Generally speaking, the Annexes in the two documents (except as noted below) are identical or 
closely resemble one another. 
119 April 2011 Agriculture Document, supra note 90, ¶ I.A.6. 
120 December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 12, 18, 29, 34, 52–53, 128, 
146, 170, Annex M. 
121 Daniel Pruzin, Chief U.S. Ag Negotiator Admits Slow Progress in Doha Talks, Slams China, 27 
Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1542, at XX (Oct. 14, 2010). 
122  Pub. L. No. 110-234 (2008). 
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meaningful sense, negotiators focused their efforts on a five-part strategy: 
(1) Tiered formula reductions (meaning steeper cuts on higher levels) to, and binding 
limitations on, overall trade-distorting domestic support (OTDS), which is the 
sum total of subsidies in the Amber Box, Blue Box, and De Minimis subsidies.123 
(2) Tiered formula cuts to, and binding limitations on, domestic support in the Amber 
Box, or Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS), which is the most trade-distorting 
kind of subsidy (other than an outright export subsidy) because it is coupled with 
output, or it supports prices. 
(3) Cuts to, and binding limitations on, domestic support classified as “De Minimis” 
(i.e., subsidies that fall below thresholds defined in terms of a percentage of 
domestic agricultural output). 
(4) Cuts to, and binding limitations on, domestic support classified in the “Blue Box,” 
which contains subsidies tied to limits on output. 
(5) Binding limitations on Product-Specific Support (i.e., subsidies for individual 
products). 
Point (1) reflects an effort to impose discipline on all subsidies, regardless of their Box 
category. Points (2), (3), and (4) are designed to prevent box-shifting, whereby a WTO 
Member renders cuts to subsidies in one Box but not to support categorized in a different 
Box. Point (3) also aims to lower the de minimis threshold, thus lowering the exemption 
from cuts and subjecting more subsidies to reduction. Point (5) is supposed to prevent 
crop-shifting, whereby a Member imposes a cut on a subsidy to one product but not to 
support for another product. For the most part, on all these points, throughout 2008 there 
                                                 
123 Distortion, of course, is measured in relation to what occurs (in terms of prices and quantities), or 
would occur, in a competitive market (i.e., distortion is in relation to a free or nearly free trade 
equilibrium). 
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were few material changes to provisions in the negotiating texts.124 
                                                 
124 In January 2009, the United States notified the WTO of its domestic agricultural support 
expenditures for marketing years (MYs) 2006 and 2007. (MYs do not correspond with calendar years. 
Hence, for example, MY 2007 carried over into mid-2008, and even further for certain crops.) Those 
figures, with certain updates, are summarized as follows: 
● OTDS— 
 In MY 2006, $11.34 billion, and in MY 2007, $8.52 billion. The average for MYs 2002–-2005 
was $15.9 billion. The OTDS limit proposed for the United States (discussed in Table I, infra) is 
$14.46 billion. 
● Amber Box— 
 In MY 2006, $7.74 billion and in MY 2007, $6.26 billion. In MY 2008, the figure was $6.25 
billion. The Uruguay Round bound limit on Amber Box spending for the United States is $19.1 
billion. The proposed Doha Round cut (discussed in Table II, infra) would lower this limit by 60% 
to $7.64 billion. Interestingly, virtually all American Amber Box support went to two categories of 
products—dairy ($5.01 billion in MY 2007) and sugar ($1.23 billion in MY 2007). 
● De Minimis Support— 
 In MY 2006, for Product-Specific De Minimis Support, $171 million and in MY 2007, $237 
million. For Non-Product Specific De Minimis Support, in MY 2006, $3.6 billion and in MY 
2007, $2.02 billion. For both MY 2006 and 2007, U.S. De Minimis support was under the 5% limit 
(discussed infra). 
● Countercyclical Support— 
 In MY 2006, $1.49 billion and in MY 2007, $893 billion. The United States classified 
countercyclical payments in the Amber Box yet explained they were de minimis and thus exempt 
from Amber Box reduction commitments. 
● Cotton Subsidies— 
 In MY 2006, $1.37 billion and in MY 2007 $208 million. The United States classified cotton 
subsidies in the Amber Box. In MY 2006, over $1 billion of this support was not exempt from 
Amber Box reduction commitments. But, in MY 2007, the United States declared its cotton 
subsidies were de minimis because the $208 million figure fell below the de minimis threshold of 
5% of the total value of American cotton production (which was $5.2 billion). 
● Non- or Minimally-Trade Distorting (Green Box) Subsidies— 
 In MY 2006, $76.04 billion and in MY 2007, $76.16 billion. U.S. spending in the Green Box 
jumped from $58.3 billion in MY 2002 to $71.8 billion in 2005 and thereafter has essentially 
reached a plateau. Child nutrition and food stamp programs account for roughly two-thirds of 
American Green Box subsidies. 
Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Reports Less Trade-Distorting Subsidies for Farms in ’06-’07, But Increase Expected, 
26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 146, at XX (Jan. 29, 2009). 
Note the American classification of some subsidy schemes is the subject of deep skepticism in the 
WTO, particularly in light of the Appellate Body decision in United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton. 
Appellate Body Report, United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R (Mar. 21, 2005) 
(finding that U.S. cotton subsidies violated the Agreement on Agriculture and the SCM agreements). For a 
treatment of this case, see Raj Bhala & David Gantz, WTO Case Review 2005, 23 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 107 (2006). At the 12 March 2009 meeting of the Committee on Agriculture, Australia, Brazil, and Japan 
questioned whether the United States could rightly classify counter-cyclical support as non-product 
specific, as such support effectively requires recipients to produce, or eschew, certain crops. These three 
countries also cast doubt on whether direct payments to farmers are decoupled and thus properly classified 
by the United States in the Green Box because some funding depends not on fixed and unchanging base 
acreages and yields (but rather requires crops not to be produced on base acres). See Committee Focuses on 
Monitoring Agriculture Commitments, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Mar. 12, 2009), http://www.wto.org/english/ 
news_e/news09_e/ag_com_12mar09_e.htm [hereinafter Committee Focuses on Monitoring]. 
 By way of partial comparison, the EU lists the following figures as per its March 2009 and 
January 2011 WTO notifications: 
● Green Box Subsidies— 
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B. OTDS 
 For OTDS, on all key issues—namely, computation of the base level, tiered 
                                                                                                                                                 
 As reported in the January 2011 notification, €62.6 billion for MY 2007–2008 and €56.5 billion 
for 2006–2007, the largest share of which are payments under the EU Single Payment Scheme 
(discussed infra)—namely, €31 billion in 2007–2008. As reported in the March 2009 notification 
for MY 2006–2007, €37 billion, but included in this figure are Blue Box payments based on fixed 
areas and yield, or fixed livestock head, which are not subject to reduction under the Uruguay 
Round Agreement on Agriculture. For MYs 2004–2005 and 2005–2006, respectively, the figures 
are €24.4 and €40.3 billion. 
● Amber Box Subsidies— 
 For MY 2003–2004, the EU reported to the WTO in December 2006 it had spent €30.9 billion in 
Amber Box support (far below its annual spending limit of €67 billion, bound during the Uruguay 
Round) and €24.78 billion in the Blue Box. In its March 2009 notification, the EU again stated its 
Amber Box support for MYs 2004–2005 and 2005–2006, respectively, were €31.2 and €28.4. The 
commodity product categories to which the EU gave the largest Amber Box payments in MY 
2005–2006 were sugar (€7 billion), butter (€4.1 billion), apples (€2.8 billion), and olive oil (€2.6 
billion). Its subsidies for these products took the form of price support. In its January 2011 
notification, the EU said Amber Box spending dropped by 54%, from €26.63 billion in MY 2006–
2007 to €12.35 billion in MY 2007–2008. As in previous years, sugar and butter were the largest 
recipients of product-specific Amber Box support, so the large drop in such support was due 
mainly to cuts in sugar and butter subsidies: in sugar, a cut from €6.8 billion in MY 2006–2007 to 
€3.5 billion in MY 2006–2007 and in butter from €3.6 billion in MY 2006–2007 to €2.7 billion in 
MY 2007–2008. 
● Blue Box Subsidies— 
 According to the March 2009 notification, Blue Box support totaled €27.2 billion for MY 2004–
2005 and €13.4 billion for MY 2005–2006. In the January 2011 notification, the EU said Blue Box 
support declined by 9%, from €5.7 billion in 2006–2007 to €5.2 billion in 2007–2008. 
See Daniel Pruzin, EU Notifies WTO of Sharp Drop in Trade-Distorting Farm Subsidies, 28 Int’l Trade 
Rep. (BNA) No. 150, at XX (Jan. 27, 2011) [hereinafter Pruzin, EU Notifies WTO]; Daniel Pruzin, EU 
Issues New Farm Subsidy Notification; Trade-Distorting Support Remains Stable, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. 
(BNA) No. 344, at XX (Mar. 12, 2009) [hereinafter Pruzin, New Farm Subsidy Notification]; Daniel 
Pruzin, EU to Exempt $47 Billion from WTO Agricultural Subsidy Spending Caps, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. 
(BNA) No. 307, at XX (Mar. 5, 2009). 
 Note the clear pattern in the EU CAP of shifting support away from the Amber and Blue Boxes 
and into the Green Box. This pattern indicates the EU is positioning itself for a Doha Round agreement in 
which caps on Amber and Blue Boxes constrain its spending in those Boxes (i.e., it is restructuring the 
CAP to ensure its farmers continue to get support, but of the kind that does not violate anticipated new 
international limitations). 
 Conversely, the United States does not seem to be undertaking similar anticipatory structural 
reforms, and no optimistic inferences should be made from the above American figures. That is, just 
because these figures show a reduction in American farm subsidies does not mean the United States was 
ready to cut and bind its support at those lower levels. During MYs 2006–2007, commodity prices were at 
high levels. Especially because of counter-cyclical subsidies, farm support expenditures fall when prices 
are high, and vice versa. Commodity prices collapsed in 2008, and global economic recession deepened. 
(For example, between March and December 2008, soybean prices fell 20%, and corn prices dropped 25%. 
Both crops are covered commodities under American farm subsidy law.) Thus, American farm support 
spending, particularly counter-cyclical prices, is destined to rise. That is why the United States insists on 
significant headroom (i.e., subsidy cuts and caps that leave bound levels above actual expenditures). To use 
the academic jargon, at issue is future policy space for American farm legislation. Viewed in retrospect, the 
failed Ministerial meeting in July 2008 was a critical missed opportunity to clinch a deal on agriculture 
when farm product prices were high and subsidy payments low. See Committee Focuses on Monitoring, 
supra. 
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reduction formula, implementation period and staging, S & D treatment, recently acceded 
Members (RAMs), and other commitments—the deal on the table in December 2008 was 
the deal set out in Ambassador Crawford Falconer’s December 2007 Working Paper on 
Overall Reduction of Trade-Distorting Domestic Support: A Tiered Formula. The 
stability of the provisions throughout 2008 meant either the positions of Members had 
converged on essential elements of a deal on OTDS; or their positions had hardened, and 
they had not bridged any of their schisms. 
 In general terms, “OTDS” is the sum of support in the Amber Box, formally 
called “AMS,” defined below, plus De Minimis support and support in the Blue Box.125 
The December 2008 Text contained the same formulaic definition as did the December 
2007 Working Paper for the so-called “Base Level” for OTDS.126 That Level is critical. 
Reduction coefficients are applied to it under the tiered formula (discussed below). 
 That is, the Base Level is the starting point for making cuts. The higher that 
Level, then for any given percentage cut, the less ambitious the end result (in terms of 
decreases in trade-distorting farm subsidies). The formula established Base Level as the 
sum of three figures: 
                                                 
125  Conceptually, it should not be necessary to define “OTDS.” As its name (“aggregate” measure of 
support) suggests, the first figure, AMS, is supposed to capture the sum total of subsidies a Member 
provides to its farm sector. This figure does not do so, however, because (via the WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture), it excludes De Minimis and Blue Box payments. BHALA, supra note 1, at 1479–80 (for a 
broader treatment, see chapters 45 and 46). Hence, OTDS is closer to the truly aggregate measure of 
support that AMS ought to be, but for legally-permissible exemptions from AMS. To be sure, it is not 
perfectly all-inclusive. 
 Under certain Doha Round proposals, De Minimis and Blue Box subsidies would remain largely 
exempt from cuts. Including the second variable in OTDS reflected an effort to discipline, albeit modestly, 
the extent to which a WTO Member could exempt Product- and Non-Product Specific subsidies from cuts 
by dubbing them “De Minimis.” Similarly, under either alternative for the third figure (but most obviously 
under the second one), including the third figure in the calculation of OTDS, was an effort to subject at 
least a portion of Blue Box Payments to cuts. 
 In sum, the essence of the strategy in defining a Base Level was to cap OTDS. At no point in the 
Round did negotiators ever believe it would be economically viable, much less politically feasible, to 
eliminate all farm subsidies. 
126 See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 1–2. 
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 Base Level for OTDS =  Final Bound Total AMS 
      
     + 10% (Average Total Value of Production 
       in 1995–2000) 
     + the higher of either 
      5% (Average Total Value of Agricultural 
       Production in 1995–2000) 
      or 
      Blue Box payments127 
 where: 
The first figure on the right-hand side of the equation, “Final Bound Total AMS,” 
is the AMS a WTO Member sets out and binds in its Schedule associated with the 
Agreement on Agriculture. This figure consists of all Amber Box Support (i.e., subsidies 
not in the Blue Box and not De Minimis). That is, it is the Amber Box commitment 
ceiling. 
The second right-hand side figure, 10% of the Average Value of Production in 
1995–2000, consists of 5% of the Average Value of Production for Product-Specific 
Support that is in the Amber Box plus 5% of the Average Value of Production for Non-
Product Specific that is in the Amber Box. (These domestic subsidies are called, 
respectively, “Product-Specific AMS” and “Non-Product Specific AMS.” Of course, a 
                                                 
127 The formula sometimes is simplified to: 
Base Level for OTDS = Bound Level of Amber Box 
    + 
    15% of the Total Value of Agricultural Production 
where the 15% term consists of: 5% of Non-Product Specific De Minimis support, 5% of Product-Specific 
De Minimis Support, and 5% of Blue Box support. Unofficial Guide to Revised Draft Modalities, supra 
note 116, at 6. 
 
59 
 
 
certain percentage of these subsidies qualify as De Minimis. That percentage is not 
classified in the Amber Box as Total AMS subject to reduction commitments (i.e., it is 
not in the first figure but captured in the second figure).) That is, the term for the second 
figure—“Average Value of Production”—is a generic one encompassing both Product- 
and Non-Product Specific subsidies. 
Also in respect of the second figure, developing countries receive S & D 
treatment in the form of a 20% threshold (consisting of 10% each on Product- and Non-
Product Specific AMS). That treatment means poor countries would be entitled to include 
a higher percentage of this support in their OTDS, thus increasing their Base Level from 
which they are to make funding cuts. Developing countries could select either 1995–2000 
or 1995–2004 as the period in which to gauge average total value of agricultural output. 
The obvious choice would be to select the period in which the Base Level is highest so as 
to yield a higher Level and thereby reduce OTDS from a higher Base. The end result 
would be an elevated level of permissible OTDS expenditures. 
As for the third right-hand side figure, Members would have to include the higher 
of two figures: (1) 5% of the Average Total Value of Farm Production in 1995–2000 or 
(2) existing average Blue Box Payments. 
Manifestly, computing the Base Level OTDS would be intricate. Operationally, it 
would be impossible without accurate agricultural output and subsidy data from each 
Member. 
 As for cutting Base Level OTDS, between July and December 2008, essentially 
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the same critical figures in the tiered formula remained in place.128 Table I summarizes 
these figures as set out in the December 2008 Text, along with the various sorts of S & D 
treatment in that Text. The July 2008 Text identified ranges for OTDS reductions: 75% 
or 85% by the EU (in the Top Tier (i.e., $60 billion and above)), 66% or 73% by Japan 
and the United States (in the Second Tier (i.e., between $10 and $60 billion)), and 50% or 
60% by the rest of the developed countries (in the Third Tier (i.e., below $10 billion)). 
For each range, the December 2008 Text split the difference. The new Text called for 
reductions in OTDS of 80%, 70%, and 55%, respectively, in the three Tiers. WTO 
Members would be expected to ensure their actual applied levels of OTDS in each 
component of the formula (i.e., Product- and Non-Product Specific Amber Box and Blue 
Box support) do not exceed their bound OTDS levels.129 
TABLE I: 
REDUCTION COMMITMENTS ON OTDS IN 
DECEMBER 2008 DRAFT AGRICULTURE MODALITIES TEXT 
Base Level for 
OTDS 
 
(all figures in U.S. 
dollars) 
 
Top Tier Reduction 
Commitments 
(percentage cut 
required to Base 
Level OTDS) 
OTDS is over $60 
billion. 
Second Tier 
Reduction 
Commitments 
(percentage cut 
required to Base 
Level OTDS) 
OTDS is over $10 
billion and up to 
$60 billion. 
Third Tier 
Reduction 
Commitments 
(percentage cut 
required to Base 
Level OTDS) 
OTDS is $10 billion 
or less. 
                                                 
128 December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 3; Special Session of the 
Committee on Agriculture, Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture, ¶ 3, TN/AG/W/4/Rev.3 (July 10, 
2008) [hereinafter July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text]. 
 WTO Members would put their final bound OTDS figures in the appropriate part of their 
Schedules. Developing countries not required to make a reduction commitment would list only their Base 
Level OTDS in their Schedules. Two categories of Members would not have to list any OTDS figure in 
their Schedules: (1) a net food importing developing country that agreed not to sponsor Blue Box subsidy 
programs and (2) the five least developed countries—Cameroon, Congo (Brazzaville), Ghana, Nigeria, and 
Swaziland. See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 10. 
129 Id. ¶ 11; July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 11. 
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Reduction 
Coefficients for 
Developed 
Countries 
80% 
The EU is in this 
Tier. 
The Base Level for 
fifteen EU states is 
estimated at €110.3. 
The cut would mean 
a new annual 
spending cap of 
€22.06. 
70% 
The United States 
and Japan are in this 
Tier. 
The Base Level for 
the United States is 
estimated at $48.2 
billion. 
The cut would mean 
a new annual 
spending cap of 
$14.46 billion. 
55% 
 
Implementation 
Phases for 
Developed 
Countries 
The down payment 
is that one-third of 
cut must be made on 
the first day of the 
implementation 
period of any Doha 
Round agreement. 
Remaining cuts 
must be in equal 
annual installments 
over five years. 
Same as Top Tier The down payment 
is that 25% of cut 
must be made on the 
first day of 
implementation. 
Remaining cuts 
must be in equal 
annual installments 
over five years. 
Additional 
Reduction 
Commitments for 
Developed 
Countries? 
No Yes 
A developed 
country in the 
Second Tier with a 
high Base Level 
OTDS, meaning one 
equal to or above 
40% of the Average 
Total Value of its 
Agricultural 
Production (between 
1995–2000), must 
make an additional 
cut to its Base Level 
of OTDS. 
The additional cut 
must be one-half of 
the difference 
between the Top 
and Second Tier 
reduction 
percentages (e.g., 
with a difference of 
No 
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80% and 70%, then 
an additional cut of 
5% is required). 
Japan is in this 
category, meaning 
that it would make a 
75% cut to its Base 
Level OTDS. 
Reduction 
Coefficients for 
Developing 
Countries 
No cuts required for 
a developing 
country that has not 
made a bound AMS 
commitment. 
Otherwise, the 
percentage 
reduction is two-
thirds the 
commitment that 
applies to developed 
countries in the Top 
Tier. 
⅔ of 80% = 
53.33% cut 
No cuts required for 
a developing 
country that has not 
made a bound AMS 
commitment. 
Otherwise, the 
percentage 
reduction is two-
thirds the 
commitment that 
applies to developed 
countries in the 
Second Tier. 
⅔ of 70% = 
46.67% cut 
No cuts required for 
a developing 
country that has not 
made a bound AMS 
commitment. 
Otherwise, the 
percentage 
reduction is two-
thirds the 
commitment that 
applies to developed 
countries in the 
Third Tier. 
⅔ of 55% = 
36.67% cut 
Implementation 
Phases for 
Developing 
Countries 
The first installment 
must be a 20% cut. 
Thereafter, actual 
OTDS must be less 
than 80% of Base 
Level OTDS. 
Remaining cuts to 
OTDS must be 
made in equal 
annual installments 
over eight years. 
Same as Top Tier Same as Top Tier 
Reduction 
Coefficients 
NFIDCs— 
Such as Jordan, 
Morocco, Tunisia, 
and Venezuela 
No cuts required No cuts required No cuts required 
Reduction 
Coefficients for 
RAMs 
None, if RAM has 
not made a bound 
AMS commitment. 
Otherwise, 
essentially same as 
for developing 
Same as Top Tier Same as Top Tier 
 
63 
 
 
countries (i.e., two-
thirds commitment 
in relation to 
developed countries, 
other than United 
States, EU, and 
Japan). 
Implementation 
Phase for RAMs 
Same as for 
developing 
countries 
Same as for 
developing 
countries 
Same as for 
developing 
countries 
Reduction 
Coefficients for 
Newer RAMs—
Macedonia, Saudi 
Arabia, Ukraine, 
and Vietnam 
No cuts required No cuts required No cuts required 
Reduction 
Coefficients for 
Small, Low-Income 
RAMs with 
Transition 
Economies—
Albania, Armenia, 
Georgia, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Moldova, 
and Mongolia 
No cuts required No cuts required No cuts required 
 
 Left unchanged across the July and December Texts was a proposed down 
payment (i.e., an immediate cut) to OTDS of 33.3% by the top three subsidizers—the 
EU, Japan, and United States—and 25% by all other developed countries.130 Remaining 
OTDS cuts would be phased in equal annual installments over five years for developed 
countries. Also left the same was the provision that larger cuts would be expected of 
developed countries—namely, Japan—the OTDS in which is over 40% of the value of 
agricultural output as measured between 1995–2000.131 
                                                 
130 December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 5; July 2008 Draft Agriculture 
Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 5. 
131 December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 4; July 2008 Draft Agriculture 
Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 4. 
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 In December 2010, Japan came under criticism for trying to dodge the larger cut 
required of it under the “40 percent rule.” Japan told the WTO it forgot to include its 
mushroom sector when calculating the total value of its agricultural production between 
1995 and 2000.132 Including the mushroom sector raised the denominator (of the fraction 
in which OTDS is the numerator and the total value of agricultural output is the 
denominator) and thus lowered the fraction from over 40% to 39.7%. Therefore, Japan 
claimed, it would not have to make an additional 5% cut to its OTDS beyond the 70% 
required reduction. Japan asserted it would make a 75% cut, but only if it could protect 
additional agricultural products from proposed tariff cuts.133 That is, Japan linked its 
position on OTDS reductions to its demand for a sui generis rule that it be allowed to 
designate an additional 2% of its farm tariff lines as “Sensitive” beyond the 6% 
maximum allowed under the December 2008 Text.  
 As a practical matter, many poor countries lack the resources to provide 
significant subsidies to their farmers. From a legal perspective, the December 2008 Text, 
like its predecessor, assured poor countries with the means to provide agricultural 
subsidies that they would not automatically be subject to OTDS reduction commitments. 
Only developing countries with existing Amber Box reduction commitments (i.e., ones 
with a ceiling above the De Minimis level of domestic support and thus obligated to cut 
Amber Box support) would have to make cuts to OTDS.134 But, even those cuts would be 
                                                 
132 Daniel Pruzin, Japan Slammed at WTO over Attempt to Dodge Subsidy Reduction Commitment, 
27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1969, at XX (Dec. 23, 2010). 
133 Id. 
134 December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 6; July 2008 Draft Agriculture 
Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 6. A developing country would have an Amber Box reduction 
commitment if its ceilings exceeded the De Minimis levels. It thus would be obliged to reduce those 
ceilings. 
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two-thirds the amount for developed countries and could be phased in over eight years.135 
 All other developing countries would commit to staying within their base levels of 
support. Net food importing developing countries (NFIDCs)—such as Jordan, Morocco, 
Tunisia, and Venezuela—would not have to reduce their OTDS, though they would not 
be permitted to go above their Base Level OTDS. Least developed countries (for which 
sponsoring farm subsidies is financially improbable, if not impossible) would be entirely 
exempt from OTDS reduction commitments. 
 Regarding RAMs, the same rules for developing countries would apply to them. 
But, not all RAMs would be deemed alike. RAMs that had acceded to the WTO very 
recently or had low incomes would be exempt from OTDS reduction commitments.136 
Considered newer RAMs were Macedonia, Saudi Arabia, Ukraine, and Vietnam. The 
small, low-income RAMs with economies in transition were Albania, Armenia, Georgia, 
Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, and Mongolia. Mongolia was the new country on the list not 
only for OTDS purposes but also throughout the December 2008 Text. Mongolia acceded 
to the WTO on 19 January 1997.137 Its addition to the new 2008 Text suggested Mongolia 
had a successful campaign during the fall of 2008 for inclusion for special benefits. 
 On OTDS, therefore, the pattern of creating special rules for special sovereign 
interests is unmistakable—carving out RAMs from developing countries, then carving 
out newly acceded and low-income transitional RAMs from RAMs, and finally, tossing 
in Mongolia. To any one anointed country, the pattern is satisfying. From a systemic 
perspective, the ever-finer gradations of anointment are a ludicrous distortion of the 
                                                 
135 December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 7–8; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128,  ¶¶ 7–8. 
136 December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 9; July 2008 Draft Agriculture 
Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 9. 
137 FOOTNOTE NEEDED. 
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collective objectives of the Doha Round, explainable only by the pursuit of self-interest. 
 In historical context, this pattern heralded the end of the simple GATT-WTO S & 
D treatment classification system. In GATT Part IV (Articles XXXVI, XXXVII, and 
XXXVIII, which took effect in 1966) and the 1979 Tokyo Round Enabling Clause, the 
general distinction appeared between developed and less developed countries.138 In the 
1986–1994 Uruguay Round texts, the cohort of less developed countries was bisected 
into developing and least developed countries. Following the birth of the WTO on 1 
January 1995, and as the Doha Round evolved following its launch in November 2001, 
developed countries occasionally agreed to slot themselves into separate categories. 
Developing and least developed countries—collectively, poor nations—demanded the 
right to slot themselves into all sorts of novel, narrow categories. 
 At a micro level, some of the new lines and groupings have a plausible, 
development-oriented justification. At a macro level, the pattern is astonishingly abstruse. 
It belies the notion of a substantively meaningful, stylistically comprehensible, 
transparent, single undertaking in pursuit of trade liberalization. Nevertheless, the pattern 
for OTDS—the metastasizing of S & D treatment categories—is repeated throughout the 
December 2008 Agriculture and NAMA Texts. 
C. AMS (Amber Box) 
 On AMS (Amber Box) subsidies, there was little evolution throughout 2008. The 
December 2008 Text was based on the December 2007 Working Paper on Final Bound 
Total AMS: A Tiered Formula and established a tiered reduction formula along the lines 
                                                 
138 For a discussion of GATT Part IV and the Enabling Clause, see chapter 38 and 39 of RAJ BHALA, 
MODERN GATT LAW 1058–1108 (2005). 
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of the methodology used to cut OTDS.139 Table II summarizes the result, plus relevant 
attendant rules. 
 Under the tiered formula, the EU, which is in the highest tier of Amber Box 
support (over $40 billion), would have to cut these subsidies by 70%. Japan and the 
United States, which are in the middle tier of Amber Box support (between $15 and $40 
billion), would reduce Amber Box subsidies by 60%. The rest of the developed countries, 
which are in the lowest tier of Amber Box support (below $15 billion), would decrease 
their support by 45%. All rich countries would make a down payment of an immediate 
25% cut.140 Larger cuts would be expected of developed countries—namely, Japan—in 
which the AMS is over 40% of the value of agricultural production.141 Implementation 
and staging would be via six equal annual installments over five years, starting on the 
first day of that period.142 
 In keeping with traditional S & D treatment, the obligation on poor countries 
would be less than that on rich countries. Only developing countries with bound AMS 
levels would have to reduce those levels, and any such country with a total AMS level 
bound at or below $100 million would be exempt from any reduction commitments.143 In 
effect, the December 2008 Text maintained the De Minimis rule from the July Text for 
poor countries with low levels of Amber Box support, excepting them from the obligation 
to cut this support. Developing countries, along with older RAMs, would have a two-
                                                 
139 December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 13; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 13. 
140 December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 15; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 15. 
141 See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 14; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 14. 
142 December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 15; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 15. 
143 December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 16; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 16. 
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thirds reduction obligation and an eight-year phase-out period (nine equal annual 
installments commencing on the first day of implementation).144 
 Reflecting novel S & D treatment cohorts, NFIDCs (e.g., Jordan, Morocco, 
Tunisia, and Venezuela) would have no reduction obligations. 145  Newer RAMs—
Macedonia, Saudi Arabia, Ukraine, and Vietnam—would have no reduction obligations 
either. Small, low-income RAMs with economies in transition—namely, Albania, 
Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, and Mongolia (the latter being added in 
the December 2008 Text)—also would have no such obligations.146  Moreover, these 
RAMs would not have to include certain kinds of subsidies in their calculation of Total 
AMS. 
TABLE II: 
REDUCTION COMMITMENTS ON TOTAL AMS (THE AMBER BOX) IN 
DECEMBER 2008 DRAFT AGRICULTURE MODALITIES TEXT 
 
Bound Total AMS 
 
(all figures in U.S. 
dollars) 
 
Top Tier Reduction 
Commitments 
(percentage cut 
required to Bound 
Total AMS) 
Total AMS is over 
$40 billion. 
Second Tier 
Reduction 
Commitments 
(percentage cut 
required to Bound 
Total AMS) 
Total AMS is over 
$15 billion and up 
to $40 billion. 
Third Tier 
Reduction 
Commitments 
(percentage cut 
required to Bound 
Total AMS) 
Total AMS is $15 
billion or less. 
Reduction 
Coefficients for 
70% 
The EU is in this 
60% 
The United States 
45% 
 
                                                 
144 See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 16, 19; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 16, 19. These countries also would be given special 
consideration in calculating their AMS if they faced excessive rates of inflation or sudden, extraordinary 
rises in food prices relative to fixed external reference prices. December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities 
Text, supra note 74, ¶ 20; July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 20. 
145 December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 17; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 17. 
146 December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 19; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 19. 
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Developed 
Countries 
Tier. 
The Uruguay Round 
bound AMS level 
for the EU is €67.16 
billion.147 
The cut would drop 
this ceiling to 
€20.15 billion.  
and Japan are in this 
Tier. 
The Uruguay Round 
bound AMS level 
for the U.S. is $19.1 
billion. 
The cut would drop 
this ceiling to $7.64 
billion. 
Implementation 
Phases for 
Developed 
Countries 
The down payment 
would be a first 
installment cut of 
25%. 
That must be 
followed by equal 
annual cuts over 
five years. 
Same as Top Tier Cuts must be made 
in equal annual 
installments over 
five years. 
Additional 
Reduction 
Commitments for 
Developed 
Countries? 
No Yes 
A developed 
country in the 
Second Tier with a 
high Bound Total 
AMS, meaning one 
equal to or above 
40% of the Average 
Total Value of its 
Agricultural 
Production, must 
make an additional 
cut to its Total 
AMS. 
The additional cut 
must be the 
difference between 
the Top and Second 
Tier reduction 
percentages (e.g., 
with a difference of 
70% versus 60%, an 
additional cut of 
10% is required). 
Japan is in this 
Yes 
A developed 
country in the Third 
Tier with a high 
Bound Total AMS, 
meaning one equal 
to or above 40% of 
the Average Total 
Value of its 
Agricultural 
Production, must 
make an additional 
cut to its Total 
AMS. 
The additional cut 
must be one-half the 
difference between 
the Top and Second 
Tier reduction 
percentages (e.g., 
with a difference of 
70% versus 60%, 
then additional cut 
of 5% is required). 
                                                 
147 This cap has been raised to account for EU enlargement. For example, following the 1 January 
2007 accession of Bulgaria to the EU, the cap was raised by €500 million, and the new cap became €72.3 
billion. A 70% cut would imply a drop in the cap to €21.69. 
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category. 
Reduction 
Coefficients for 
Developing 
Countries 
No cuts required for 
a developing 
country that has not 
made a bound AMS 
commitment or has 
a bound level at or 
below $100 million. 
Otherwise, the 
percentage 
reduction is two-
thirds the 
commitment that 
applies to developed 
countries in the Top 
Tier. 
⅔ of 70% = 
46.67% cut 
No cuts required for 
a developing 
country that has not 
made a bound AMS 
commitment or has 
a bound level at or 
below $100 million. 
Otherwise, the 
percentage 
reduction is two-
thirds the 
commitment that 
applies to developed 
countries in the 
Second Tier. 
⅔ of 60% = 
40% cut 
No cuts required for 
a developing 
country that has not 
made a bound AMS 
commitment or has 
a bound level at or 
below $100 million. 
Otherwise, the 
percentage 
reduction is two-
thirds the 
commitment that 
applies to developed 
countries in the 
Third Tier. 
⅔ of 45% = 
30% cut 
Implementation 
Phases for 
Developing 
Countries 
Cuts must be made 
in equal annual 
installments over 
eight years. 
Same as Top Tier Same as Top Tier 
Reduction 
Coefficients for 
NFIDCs— 
Such as Jordan, 
Morocco, Tunisia, 
and Venezuela 
No cuts required No cuts required No cuts required 
Reduction 
Coefficients for 
RAMs 
None, if RAM has 
not made a bound 
AMS commitment 
or has a bound level 
at or below $100 
million. 
Otherwise, 
essentially same as 
for developing 
countries (i.e., two-
thirds the 
commitment as for 
developed countries, 
other than the 
United States, EU, 
and Japan). 
Same as Top Tier Same as Top Tier 
Implementation 
Phase for RAMs 
Same as for 
developing 
Same as for 
developing 
Same as for 
developing 
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countries countries countries 
Reduction 
Coefficients for 
Newer RAMs—
Macedonia, Saudi 
Arabia, Ukraine, 
and Vietnam 
No cuts required No cuts required No cuts required 
Reduction 
Coefficients for 
Small, Low-Income 
RAMs with 
Transition 
Economies—
Albania, Armenia, 
Georgia, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Moldova, 
and Mongolia 
 
No cuts required of 
Moldova, which is 
the only such RAM 
to have bound its 
Total AMS. 
No cuts required of 
Albania, Armenia, 
Georgia, Kyrgyz 
Republic, and 
Mongolia because 
they have not bound 
their Total AMS. 
In addition, this 
group of RAMs can 
exclude from their 
calculation of 
current Total AMS 
any (1) investment 
subsidy generally 
available to 
agriculture, (2) 
agricultural input 
subsidy, (3) interest 
subsidy to reduce 
financing costs, or 
(4) grant to cover 
debt repayment. 
Same as Top Tier Same as Top Tier 
 
 Beyond mandatory cuts to Total AMS, the December 2008 Text, like the 
December 2007 Working Paper and July 2008 Text on which it was built, called for 
limits on Product-Specific subsidies. 148  As its name connotes, a “Product-Specific” 
subsidy is direct support for a particular crop. The G-20 developing countries urged that 
                                                 
148 December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 21; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 21. 
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such limits be fixed for individual products, not capacious sectoral categories like 
“cereals” or “oilseeds.” That way, a WTO Member would not be able to spread Product-
Specific Support across multiple commodities or shift it among them within a broad 
designation. Accordingly, the December Text put restrictions on the amount of funds a 
WTO Member could channel to the direct support of a specific crop. 
 The basic limit for all developed countries other than the United States would be 
that Product-Specific Support must not exceed the average of that kind of support 
actually provided during the Uruguay Round implementation period. 149  That period 
corresponds to 1995–2000. The United States, however, received special dispensation as 
to the base period and calculation methodology.150 
 The U.S. Product-Specific Support limit would be the proportionate average of its 
(1) average actual Product-Specific AMS during 1995–2004 and (2) average actual Total 
AMS for 1995–2000. In other words, the United States alone could include more years in 
its base period to establish the ceiling on its Product-Specific Support. This sui generis 
calculation would help the United States raise that ceiling. Its calculation would depend 
on the total Amber Box support it gave to specific products in 1995–2000, as shared 
among products according to the average share during 1995–2004. The United States 
sought to include the additional years (2001–2004) because during them it had high 
Product-Specific expenditures. It scarcely needs mentioning that this special American 
exception is yet another instance of a WTO Member—this one, uniquely powerful—
negotiating out of naked self-interest regardless of broader systemic goals of the Doha 
                                                 
149 December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 22; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 22. 
150 See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 23; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 23. 
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Round, which include meaningful reductions to and restraints on per product farm 
subsidies. 
 For all developed countries, the implementation date by which limits on Product-
Specific Support would have to be reached was immediate. Full implementation would 
be expected right away. In practice, that would mean rich countries would have to make 
the cuts by the first day on which any Doha Round accord takes effect.151 
 Developing countries, too, would be obligated to establish limits on any Product-
Specific Support they provided. But, they would receive S & D treatment to do so, 
specifically in the manner in which they could calculate the cap on their Product-Specific 
AMS.152 Developing countries would have a choice among three alternatives in setting 
their limit: (1) average actual expenditures during 1995–2000 or 1995–2004, (2) twice 
the Product-Specific Support limit established in the Uruguay Round and set out in 
Article 6:4 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, or (3) 20% of the bound Total AMS 
for the relevant country. Obviously, a developing country would be inclined to choose the 
alternative offering the highest ceiling on subsidies it could channel to a specific crop. 
 The December 2008 Text maintained the flexibility of the December 2007 
Working Paper and July Text in respect of the limits on Product-Specific Support in the 
Amber Box.153 There were two possible scenarios in which the flexibility might be used. 
                                                 
151 See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 26; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 26. Under certain circumstances, phasing would be 
permitted. If the average Product-Specific AMS in the two most recent years for which WTO notifications 
were available exceeded scheduled Product-Specific AMS limits, then cuts to reach the applicable limit 
could be made in three equal annual installments (with the starting point for implementation being the 
lower of the average figure from those two years or 130% of the scheduled Product-Specific support 
limits). 
152 See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 27–28; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 27–28. 
153 See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 24–25; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 24–25. 
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First, suppose actual Product-Specific Support of a WTO Member during the relevant 
base period was below the De Minimis level (as Article 6:4 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture defines this level). Then, the limit would be set at that level. This flexibility 
meant the status quo ante of the Uruguay Round limit set in Article 6:4 would be ratified 
and become the new cap. The December Text clarified that in this scenario, a Member 
would not be obliged to set its Product-Specific AMS limit at a level lower than the De 
Minimis level in the base period.154 
 Second, suppose actual support provided by a WTO Member, after the relevant 
base period, rose above the De Minimis level. Then, the limit for that Member would be 
the average amount of Product-Specific subsidization by the Member in the two most 
recent years before adoption of the Doha Round agreements. Here again, the status quo 
ante would be ratified, effectively rewarding large spenders—ones that had spent, 
following the Uruguay Round, above their De Minimis thresholds. They got an 
entitlement to offer Product-Specific Support in the future at past high levels (subject 
only to their overall bound OTDS and Total AMS levels). The key point is they would 
not have to worry about including Product-Specific expenditures above the De Minimis 
threshold in Total AMS and subjecting the overage to reduction commitments. For past 
excessive spending, they got a “pass.” 
D. De Minimis Subsidies 
 De Minimis thresholds are important. Expenditures up to them need not be 
included in the calculation of Total AMS. As the rubric connotes, De Minimis support 
consists of subsidies in the Amber Box, but which are in small amounts. Consequently, 
                                                 
154 Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 25 (final sentence), 
with July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 25. 
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they are not subject to the cuts required of AMS. Lowering the thresholds means 
reducing expenditures previously considered insignificant, and thereby exempt from cuts. 
From the Uruguay Round, those thresholds are defined in terms of Product-Specific and 
Non-Product-Specific Support, with different limits for developed and developing 
countries (and none for least developed countries). 
 For developed countries (as laid out in Article 6:4(a) of the WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture), the De Minimis level of Product-Specific Support was 5% of the total value 
of output of the basic agricultural product in question. Their De Minimis level for Non-
Product Specific Support also was 5%, but of the total value of agricultural production of 
all commodities. The December 2007 Working Paper identified as a possible target 
reducing these 5% limits by at least 50% through five equal annual installments (using 
1995–2000 as the base period). The December 2008 Text followed the pattern laid out in 
the Working Paper and was a nearly verbatim repetition of the relevant provisions in the 
July 2008 Text.155 The obligation on developed countries would be to cut immediately 
the thresholds in half, to 2.5% of the value of domestic agricultural production (down 
from 5%), and thus reduce both the theoretical level and actual expenditure amount 
considered insignificant. Table III summarizes the proposed rules on De Minimis 
subsidies. 
 
TABLE III: 
LIMITATIONS ON DE MINIMIS SUBSIDIES IN 
DECEMBER 2008 DRAFT AGRICULTURE MODALITIES TEXT 
                                                 
155 Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 30, with July 2008 
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 30. 
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Developed Countries— 
Limitation on De Minimis Support in 
Article 6:4(a) of WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture 
Product-Specific Support: 
Cap of 5% of total value of production of 
the basic agricultural product in question 
Non-Product Specific Support: 
Cap of 5% of the total value of all 
agricultural production 
Developed Countries— 
Limitation on De Minimis Support in 
December 2008 Text 
 
50% cut on both caps— 
Product-Specific Support: 
New cap of 2.5% of total value of 
production of the basic agricultural product 
in question 
Non-Product Specific Support: 
New cap of 2.5% of the total value of all 
agricultural production 
Developed Countries— 
Implementation Period 
Immediate 
Developing Countries— 
Limitation on De Minimis Support in 
Article 6:4(b) of WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture 
Product-Specific Support: 
Cap of 10% of total value of production of 
the basic agricultural product in question 
Non-Product Specific Support: 
Cap of 10% of the total value of all 
agricultural production 
Developing Countries— 
Limitation on De Minimis Support in 
December 2008 Text 
 
Cut of two-thirds of the amount for 
developing countries (i.e., ⅔ of 50%, or 
33⅓% reduction to both caps)— 
Product-Specific Support: 
New cap of 6⅔% of total value of 
production of the basic agricultural product 
in question 
Non-Product Specific Support: 
New cap of 6⅔% of the total value of all 
agricultural production 
Developing Countries— 
Implementation Period 
Three years 
Special Categories of Developing 
Countries— 
(1) Developing countries that have not 
bound their Total AMS 
(2) Developing countries that allocate 
almost all of their subsidies to 
subsistence and resource-poor farmers 
(3) NFIDCs (such as Jordan, Morocco, 
Tunisia, and Venezuela) 
No cuts required 
Older RAMs 
(with a bound AMS and De Minimis Level 
of 5%) 
Cut of one-third of the amount for 
developing countries (i.e., ⅓ of 50%, or 
16⅔% reduction of the 5% cap)— 
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Limitation on De Minimis Support in 
December 2008 Text 
 
Product-Specific Support: 
Approximately 3.8% of total value of 
production of the basic agricultural product 
in question 
Non-Product Specific Support: 
Approximately 3.8% of the total value of 
all agricultural production 
Older RAMs— 
Implementation Period 
Five years 
Newer RAMs— 
Macedonia, Saudi Arabia, Ukraine, and 
Vietnam 
No cuts required to De Minimis Support 
caps 
Small, Low-Income RAMs with 
Transition Economies— 
Albania, Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Moldova, and Mongolia 
No cuts required to De Minimis Support 
caps 
 
 For developing countries (as laid out in Article 6:4(b) of the Agreement on 
Agriculture), the De Minimis levels were double that of developed countries—for 
Product-Specific Support, 10% of the total value of output of the basic agricultural 
product in question, and for Non-Product Specific support, 10% of the total value of 
agricultural production of all commodities. The December 2007 Working Paper called for 
these 10% limits to be lowered by at least two-thirds of the cuts agreed upon for 
developed countries (using the 1995–2000 base period). Developing countries would 
have an extra three years (i.e., at least eight years) to reduce their De Minimis support. 
The December 2008 Text, like its predecessor of July, stuck to these figures.156 
 Three categories of developing countries would not have to make any reductions 
in De Minimis support levels or spending: (1) developing countries that had not bound 
their Total AMS; (2) developing countries that allocated almost all of their subsidies to 
subsistence and resource-poor farmers; and (3) NFIDCs (e.g., Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, 
                                                 
156 December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 31; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 31. 
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and Venezuela). For these developing countries, the existing Uruguay Round De Minimis 
levels would continue to apply.157 Likewise, newer RAMs—Macedonia, Saudi Arabia, 
Ukraine, and Vietnam—would have no obligations to cut De Minimis thresholds or 
spending.158 Small, low-income RAMs with economies in transition—Albania, Armenia, 
Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, and Mongolia—also would be free from any 
obligations in respect of De Minimis cuts. A final category of RAMs—the older RAMs 
that had bound Total AMS commitments and existing De Minimis Levels of 5% (for 
Product- and Non-Product Specific Support)—would have a modest obligation—namely, 
to cut their thresholds by one-third of reduction figure for developed countries, with an 
extra five years in which to implement the cut.159 
E. Cutting Blue Box Subsidies but Expanding the Blue Box 
 The December 2008 Text followed verbatim the July Text as to proposals for the 
Blue Box, which in turn were sourced in the relevant December 2007 Working Papers. 
On this topic, too, no real evolution had occurred in a year. That was true for both the 
expanded definition of the “Blue Box” and the disciplines on Blue Box expenditures 
concerning an overall cap and Product-Specific limits. Table IV summarizes these 
proposals for this Box. Likewise, the April 2011 Agriculture Document indicated no final 
agreement on the proposals.160 
 Uruguay Round negotiators (in Article 6:5 of the Agreement on Agriculture) 
defined the Blue Box only in terms of product-limiting support (i.e., payments to farmers 
                                                 
157 December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 32; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 32. 
158 December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 33; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 33. 
159 December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 33 (last sentence); July 2008 
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 33 (last sentence). 
160 See April 2011 Agriculture Document, supra note 90, ¶ 9. 
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to set aside acreage (or livestock) from cultivation). In other words, the traditional 
understanding of the “Blue Box” was it contained direct payments to farmers based on 
the size of the area they cultivate or the number of livestock they raise, but which are not 
a reward for more output. Rather, they are production-limiting (i.e., these payments are 
designed to circumscribe over-production). 
 The December 2008 Text maintained the earlier proposal to expand this 
traditional definition and include counter-cyclical payments in the Blue Box.161 Such 
payments are direct payments to farmers that do not require limits on production, but 
which are based on fixed bases and yields (or for livestock, fixed head) in the past. The 
amount of these payments varies with a prescribed benchmark for a relevant world 
market or target price. The intuitive idea underlying them is to protect the income of 
farmers if prices fall; thus, the larger the fall (the “cycle”), the higher the subsidy 
payment (the “counter” to insulate the farmer from the “cycle”). That is, a farmer is 
compensated when the price of a covered commodity tumbles below a fixed reference 
price, and the compensation varies directly with the magnitude of the fall. 
TABLE IV: 
EXPANDED DEFINITION OF, AND LIMITATIONS ON, BLUE BOX SUBSIDIES IN 
DECEMBER 2008 DRAFT AGRICULTURE MODALITIES TEXT 
 
Definition of Blue Box in Article 6:5 of 
WTO Agreement on Agriculture 
Production set-aside payments 
Expanded Definition in December 2008 
Text 
Production set-aside payments plus 
counter-cyclical payments 
Limitation on Blue Box Support in WTO 
Agreement on Agriculture 
None, and all Blue Box payments are 
exempt from AMS and thereby from 
                                                 
161 December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 35–37; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 35–37. 
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reduction commitments to AMS. 
Developed Countries— 
Overall Limitation on Blue Box Support 
in December 2008 Text 
2.5% of the average total value of 
agricultural production during the 1995–
2000 base period 
Special lower threshold for countries like 
Norway that put 40% or more of their 
trade-distorting support in the Blue Box 
Developed Countries— 
Implementation Period for Overall 
Limitation 
Immediate 
Developing Countries and RAMs— 
Overall Limitation on Blue Box Support 
in December 2008 Text 
5% of the average total value of 
agricultural production during the 1995–
2000 or 1995–2004 base period 
Developing Countries and RAMs— 
Implementation Period for Overall 
Limitation 
Immediate 
Developed Countries other than the 
United States— 
Limitation on Product-Specific Support 
in the Blue Box in December 2008 Text 
Average value of support provided to the 
product in question, at an individual 
product level, during the 1995–2000 base 
period 
Special Rule for the United States— 
Limitation on Product-Specific Support 
in the Blue Box in December 2008 Text 
110% (or 120%) of the average product-
specific amount associated with the 
maximum permissible expenditure under 
the 2002 Farm Bill 
Developed Countries 
(United States and all others)— 
Implementation Period for Product-
Specific Blue Box Limitations 
Immediate 
Developing Countries and RAMs— 
Limitation on Product-Specific Support 
in the Blue Box in December 2008 Text 
Same as for developed countries (other 
than the United States) but flexibility for 
“important crops” (ones accounting for 
more than (1) 25% of the average total 
value of farm production and (2) 80% of 
the average bound Total AMS during the 
base period). A developing country or 
RAM can shift these crops irreversibly into 
Product-Specific support in the Blue Box, 
even if the shift causes the country or RAM 
to exceed its overall Blue Box cap 
Developing Countries— 
Implementation Period for Product-
Specific Blue Box Limitations 
Immediate 
 
 The United States unabashedly championed the expanded definition. Recent farm 
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legislation included counter-cyclical payments. The United States wanted the ability to 
move them from the Amber Box to the Blue Box, and thereby immunize these payments 
from reduction commitments to Total AMS (which includes Amber Box, but not Blue 
Box, spending). However, a WTO Member could not take advantage of both sides of the 
Box: it could put either set-aside payments or counter-cyclical support in the Box, but not 
both. Nonetheless, the clear proposal was to expand the Blue Box to include counter-
cyclical payments, along with production-limiting support, but Members would have to 
choose whether to utilize one or the other kind of Blue Box payment. 
 To offset this expansion, there had to be a limit on Blue Box expenditures. 
Otherwise, a Member could engage in abusive Box-shifting, essentially playing with 
colors by taking support programs out of the Amber Box, where they would be subject to 
reduction commitments, and sticking them in the Blue Box, where they would be 
protected from such cuts. Critically, the Texts also made clear Blue Box payments count 
in OTDS and thereby are subject at least to cuts under the tiered OTDS formula. 
Moreover, the December 2008 Draft Text kept the two caps suggested in the July Text.  
 First, Blue Box support would be limited to 2.5% of the value of agricultural 
production for developed countries and 5% for developing countries.162 This limit meant 
the maximum amount of Blue Box spending a Member could exclude from its calculation 
of Total AMS would be 2.5% of the average total value of its agricultural production 
(with 1995–2000 as the base period). In essence, no more than 2.5% of the value of its 
farm output could be put in the Blue Box and excluded from AMS reduction 
commitments. Any additional amount in that Box would be subject to cuts. Thus, for 
                                                 
162 December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 38–39, 48; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 38–39, 48. 
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example, the EU cap would be about €7 billion—still a whopping amount in absolute 
terms.163 
 A further restraint would be demanded of Members (such as Norway) that put an 
exceptionally large percentage—namely, 40% or more during the 1995–2000 base 
period—of their trade-distorting support in the Blue Box. Their limit would not be 2.5% 
of the total value of their farm output. Rather, it would be a relatively lower threshold, 
computed by applying the same percentage reduction commitment they use for Total 
AMS (70%, 60%, or 45%) to their base-period Blue Box spending. They would have to 
reach this limit within two years. 
 Developing countries and older RAMs would receive S & D treatment. The limit 
on their overall Blue Box support would be 5% of the average total value of agricultural 
production (using either 1995–2000 or 1995–2004 as the base period).164 If a developing 
country or RAM elected to transfer subsidies into the Blue Box from a component of 
AMS (e.g., the Amber Box), then it could select as its base period the most recent five-
year period for which data are available. 
 Second, there would be limits on Blue Box spending set on a product-by-product 
basis. That is, the December 2008 Text maintained the same restrictions on Product-
Specific Blue Box spending as set out in the July Text. Here, as with Total AMS, the 
United States got preferred treatment. For all Members other than the United States, 
including developing countries and RAMs, the Text mandated a Product-Specific limit 
                                                 
163 Pruzin, New Farm Subsidy Notification, supra note 124, at XX. This estimate is based on 
production figures for MYs 2005–2006. 
164 December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 48; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 48. 
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equal to the average value of support to the product in question during 1995–2000.165 In 
other words, past should be prologue so that there would be no back sliding. Whatever 
had been spent in the Blue Box on a particular crop during the Uruguay Round 
implementation period should be the future cap. But, the same past period limiting the 
rest of the world would not constrain the United States. 
 The United States successfully turned its domestic legislative position into a sui 
generis international legal obligation. The United States could set its Product-Specific 
Blue Box limit at 110% (or, possibly, 120%, depending on the outcome of negotiations) 
of the average Product-Specific amount for the crop in question. That is, the United 
States would have headroom of 10% (or possibly 20%) above the average amount it had 
spent under its previous farm legislation, the 2002 Farm Bill.166 Specifically, the United 
States could compute its Product-Specific amount for a crop as a proportionate average of 
(1) the maximum permissible expenditures allowed in its 2002 Farm Bill and (2) 2.5% of 
the average total value of its farm production.167 Put simply, if a bit simplistically, the 
limits the United States established for itself in a high spending period, 2002–2007, under 
the 2002 Farm Bill, would be its international legal constraints. 
 To create flexibility, any WTO Member could exceed its Product-Specific Blue 
                                                 
165 December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 40, 47; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 40, 47. Suppose a WTO Member had not made payments 
specifically to a particular crop, and its Blue Box programs consisted only of set aside payments during the 
entirety of the 1995–2000 base period. Then, that Member would use as its Product-Specific limit in the 
Blue Box the average level of support during a consecutive three years within that period. See December 
2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 41; July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, 
supra note 128, ¶ 41. 
166 December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 42; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 42; Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. 
L. No. 107-171, 116 Stat. 134 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 7901 (2006)) (conservation provisions of 
the 2002 Farm Bill were codified in Title 16 of the U.S.C.). 
167 December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 42, 47; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 42, 47. 
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Box spending limit.168 If it did, then it would have to reduce irreversibly its Product-
Specific AMS cap on a one-for-one basis. That is, for every dollar a Member spent in the 
Blue Box on a crop that exceeded its Product-Specific Blue Box cap, the Member would 
have to reduce its Product-Specific AMS limit. The penalty for excess would be more 
stringent if the crop were cotton. Then, the ratio would be two-to-one (i.e., for every one 
dollar of excess Blue Box support to cotton, the Product-Specific AMS on cotton would 
have to fall by two dollars). In effect, a Member could shift spending on specific 
commodities from the Amber to Blue Box, and exceed Product-Specific Blue Box caps, 
but not without lowering Amber Box caps. And, it would have to respect the overall Blue 
Box limit. 
 On Product-Specific Blue Box limits, developing countries would get S & D 
treatment for important crops.169 “Important crops” would be defined as ones accounting 
for more than (1) 25% of the average total value of farm production and (2) 80% of the 
average bound Total AMS during the base period. For such crops, a developing country 
could shift irreversibly Product-Specific support into the Blue Box, even if the shift 
caused it to exceed its overall Blue Box cap. Presumably, the shift would occur from the 
Amber Box and immunize the subsidy from cuts to Total AMS. 
F. Green Box 
                                                 
168 December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 43–46; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 43–46. 
169 December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 49–50; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 49–50. 
 For a developing country with no Product-Specific entitlement to a Blue Box limit for a particular 
product, and no support in the Amber Box for that product, the December 2008 Text, like its predecessor in 
July, offered the following rule: such Members could schedule a Blue Box limit for an individual 
agricultural product but only if the total support for that product does not exceed 30% of the overall Blue 
Box limit (and a single product limit of 10%). For least developed countries and NFIDCs, the limit on all 
Product-Specific Blue Box support would be 75% of the overall Blue Box limit (and 25% for any single 
product). December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 50; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 50. 
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 Green Box support takes the form of non- or minimally-trade distorting schemes 
such as agriculture research, disease control, environmental protection, regional 
assistance, restructuring aid, and direct payments to farmers not linked to the amount or 
type of crop grown or livestock raised. On Green Box support, there were no new 
insights in the December 2008 Text. That Text contained the familiar idea about 
amending the WTO Agreement on Agriculture to tighten criteria for developed countries. 
The criteria should ensure that income support payments, to qualify for the Green Box, 
are decoupled and based on a fixed and unchanging base period of production. They 
should be sufficiently nuanced to consider structural adjustment and regional assistance 
programs (e.g., government intervention to fight rural poverty or hunger) and food 
stockpiling purchases at above-market prices by developing countries from farmers with 
low incomes or few resources. As always, Green Box programs would remain exempt 
from reduction commitments. That is because they are not (or are only minimally) trade 
distorting, as per Article 6:1 and Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture.170 
                                                 
170 Therefore, the pledges by President Barack H. Obama to cut American farm subsidies in the fiscal 
year (FY) 2010 budget (which started 1 October 2010) did not help jump-start the Doha Round agriculture 
talks. That would have been true even if Congress had implemented all of them. Those cuts were to direct 
payments to farmers, which are categorized in the Green Box insofar as they are decoupled from output or 
prices. Specifically, the FY 2010 proposals were: 
● Phase out over three years direct payments to any farmer with annual sales revenue of more than 
$500,000. (Under the 2008 Farm Bill, there are two income caps: subsidies are barred to farmers 
who earn more than (1) $500,000 in adjusted gross income (AGI) or (2) $750,000 in farm-related 
income. As of 2009, about one-third of all American farmers obtain a direct payment from the 
U.S. government, regardless of whether they produce any output.) The proposed change would 
save the U.S. government $85 million in FY 2010, $480 million in FY 2011, and a total of $9.765 
million in FYs 2010–2019. 
● Restrict commodity program payments to $250,000 per farmer per year. 
● Eliminate the obligation of the federal government to pay for the storage costs of cotton that is 
under loan to the Department of Agriculture. Cotton is the only crop for which the U.S. 
government subsidizes storage costs, and these payments have a negative effect on the amount of 
cotton available on the market. This change would save the U.S. government $570 million over 
ten years. 
● Reduce subsidies for crop insurance premiums. 
● Decrease funding for the Market Access Program (MAP) of the Department of Agriculture by 
20% a year and shifting the priority of MAP. Under MAP, American brands of farm products are 
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 The lack of new insights meant rules on monitoring and surveillance of actual or 
purported Green Box programs, which are essential to prevent abuse, still were 
undefined. For example, to calculate decoupled income support, what fixed base period 
should be used? What assurances should be required of developed countries that they 
transfer only non-distorting subsidies into the Green Box? Similarly, what assurances 
should be obtained from them that their Green Box programs are budget neutral (to 
prevent an overall increase in farm subsidies)? These questions continued to be of 
particular interest to developing countries, such as Argentina and India, concerned about 
abusive box-shifting by developed countries.171 
G. Cotton Subsidies 
 Since 1991, the U.S. government has spent in excess of $50 billion on cotton 
subsidies and averaged $3 billion annually in expenditures in the first decade of the new 
millennium.172 The subsidy schemes take the form of direct payments, export subsidies, 
market assistance loans, and price supports. Of the subsidies, 73% go to 10% of 
American cotton producers, and 25% of the payments go to the top 1% of American 
                                                                                                                                                 
promoted overseas. Funding would be cut for that kind of promotion, and emphasis would be 
placed on marketing generic American products in foreign countries. 
Gary G. Yerkey, President’s Proposed Cut in Farm Subsidies Seen Sending “Positive Signal” to WTO 
Talks, 26 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 306, at 306–07 (Mar. 5, 2009). 
 In fact, these proposals were at best inconsequential in respect of prodding the Doha Round 
toward a conclusion. Precisely the opposite moves—shifting subsidies out of the Amber and Blue Boxes 
and into the Green Box, as the EU has done in its 2003 and 2008 reforms to the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP)—would increase the flexibility of the United States in the negotiations and thereby boost the 
prospects for the Round. See Roberta Rampton, Obama Farm Subsidy Cut Won’t Revive Doha: Experts, 
REUTERS, Feb. 25, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/02/25/us-usa-agriculture-trade-
idUSTRE51O6ES20090225. Between MY 2006–2007 and MY 2007–2008, EU Green Box spending 
increased by 11%, from $77.25 to $85.59 billion (€56.5 to €62.6 billion). Pruzin, EU Notifies WTO, supra 
note 124, at XX. Under the Single Payment Scheme (SPS), which is a cornerstone of the CAP reforms, the 
EU provides support to farmers decoupled from the amount or type of crop they grow or livestock they 
raise. In MY 2007–2008, the largest share of EU Green Box subsidies were in the SPS category: $42.38 out 
of $85.59 billion (€31 out of €62.6 billion), or about half of all such subsidies. See id. at xx. 
171 See David Haskel, Argentina, India Call for Green Box “Budget-Neutrality” Assurances, 25 INT’L 
TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 922, at XX (June 19, 2008). 
172 Brazil’s Victory in Cotton Trade Case Exposes America’s Wasteful Subsidies, WASH. POST, June 
3, 2010, at A16. 
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farmers.173 In other words, the support goes not so much to small cotton farmers as to 
large, wealthy operators. None of these operators is as poor as their competitors in the 
Cotton Four countries—Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Chad. Few (if any) of them are 
as efficient either: the U.S. Department of Agriculture admits the average cost of 
production of one pound of raw cotton in America is seventy-three cents, but just twenty-
one cents in Burkina Faso, and the Congressional Research Service states that a sizeable 
proportion of American cotton production is not commercially viable, but possible only 
through subsidies.174 
 Thus, at the launch of the Doha Round in November 2001, no issue was more 
obviously tied to the hope that trade liberalization could be a strategy for counter-
terrorism than the end of cotton subsidies: 
In 2001, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks on the United States, a new series 
of multilateral trade negotiations began, known as the Doha Round. The 
thinking was that a fairer system might reduce the possibility of attacks 
like those on New York and Washington. One of the aims of the Doha 
Round was to set new global trading rules which would stimulate growth 
and wealth in underdeveloped countries. One way of doing this would be 
to reduce tariffs and subsidies, so creating a “level playing field.” The 
cotton subsidies were seen quickly as a litmus test. It seemed obviously 
iniquitous to many of the negotiators that poor people who actually 
produce cotton very cheaply should in effect be punished by richer people 
who produced it at higher cost. It is a problem which, so far, the Doha 
Round has failed to solve.175 
 
Many farmers in the Cotton Four countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali) are 
Muslim, and between 36–80% of the population in those countries lives below the 
                                                 
173 See KEVIN WATKINS, CULTIVATING POVERTY: THE IMPACT OF U.S. COTTON SUBSIDIES ON 
AFRICA 23 (2002), available at www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/policy/trade/downloa ds/bp30_cotton.pdf. 
174 See Kevin C. Kennedy, The Doha Round Negotiations on Agricultural Subsidies, 36 DENV. J. 
INT’L L. & POL’Y 335, 343–44 (2008). 
175 Mark Doyle, Campaigners Urge U.S. and Europe to Cut Cotton Subsidies, BBC, Nov. 14, 2010, 
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11753215 (emphasis added). 
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poverty line.176 The Cotton Four fare at the bottom in the world in respect of access to 
water, child and maternal mortality, and illiteracy.177 The strategy, then, is obvious: help 
reduce the vulnerability of these farmers and broader populace to poisonous messages 
from Islamist extremists by giving them a greater stake in the global trading system. 
 This concept of peace-and-security-through-trade is not manifest in any cotton 
subsidy provision of any draft Agriculture Text. The December 2008 Text tracked 
identically the language on domestic support for cotton in the July Text.178 (For the most 
part, the provisions in the July Text were unchanged from the February 2008 Text.) The 
formula for cotton subsidy cuts was proposed by the Cotton Four countries and 
incorporated into the negotiating texts by then-Chairman Crawford Falconer because no 
other WTO Member had offered a credible counter-proposal. 179  Under it, Members 
would be obliged to use to reduce their cotton subsidies as follows: 
 Rc = Rg + (100 – Rg) x 100 
     3 x Rg 
 where: 
 Rc  = Reduction percentage specifically applicable to cotton 
 Rg  = Reduction percentage generally applicable to AMS 
 1995–2000 = Base period during which to measure cotton subsidies, 
                                                 
176 See Cent. Intelligence Agency, Benin, WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publication 
s/the-world-factbook/geos/bn.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2012); Cent. Intelligence Agency, Burkina Faso, 
WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/uv.html (last visited 
Feb. 20, 2012); Cent. Intelligence Agency, Mali, WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/ 
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ml.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2012); Cent. Intelligence Agency, 
Chad, WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cd.html (last 
visited Feb. 20, 2012). 
177 See Watkins, supra note 173, at 7. 
178 December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 54–55; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 54–55. 
179 See Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Cotton Subsidy Compliance May Have Small Impact on Raising Prices, 
Study Says, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 618, at XX (Apr. 29, 2010). 
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    and from which to cut 
The difference in the figures for Rc and Rg is the mathematical expression of the legal and 
policy desire to impose a deeper cut on cotton subsidies than on support for other 
agricultural products. 
 As an illustration, suppose the Amber Box reduction percentage, Rg, for the 
United States is 60%. Using this formula, the percentage cut the United States would 
have to apply to its cotton subsidies would be 82.2%: 
 82.2 = 60 + (100 – 60) x 100 
     3 x 60 
The exact value for Rc had yet to be agreed, and the values for Rg had yet to be finalized. 
 The key point, in terms of potential poverty alleviation, is that Rc is not 100. To 
the chagrin of the Cotton Four countries, which are heavily dependent on the crop for 
export revenues, as well as to larger developing countries that produce significant cotton, 
such as India, it was a dead certainty Rc would not be 100. Nevermind that 10 million 
people in Central and West Africa depend on cotton for their livelihood. The United 
States simply would not agree to eradicate its cotton subsidies, notwithstanding the 
entreaties of poor countries or studies from NGOs like Oxfam. 
 Here, then, is a linkage the United States knew, but ignored, despite it being laid 
out not only by NGOs but also by Cotton Four representatives at WTO meetings, 
including the September 2003 Cancún Ministerial Conference: American cotton subsidies 
suppress or depress world market cotton prices. To be sure, the United States is not alone 
to blame. No fewer than nine economic studies show world cotton prices would be 
between 2% and 28% higher than market prices if government subsidies provided by the 
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United States, EU, and China were eliminated.180 A tenth study showed:181 
● If the above proposal is not implemented, and instead the regular draft provisions 
on agriculture subsidy cuts apply to cotton, then (using 1998–2007 as the 
reference period) American cotton production would fall by just 4%, and world 
cotton prices would rise by only 2.5%. 
● If the above proposal is implemented, whereby sharper cuts are imposed on cotton 
subsidies than would be the case under the regular provisions to cut farm support, 
then American cotton production would decline by 9%, and world cotton prices 
would rise by an average of 6% (again compared to the 1998–2007 reference 
period). 
In other words, under either scenario the “hit” to American cotton output is not dreadful, 
but the difference in the impact on global cotton prices is marked. 
                                                 
180 Jonathan Lynn, WTO Cotton Deal Will Do Little for Africa—Expert, REUTERS, July 15, 2009, 
available at http://af.reuters.com/article/maliNews/idAFLF45116320090715. 
 Oxfam calculated that between 1995 and 2002, world cotton prices were depressed by 50%, to 
levels lower than at any period since the Great Depression. See Watkins, supra note 173, at 8, 28. 
181 See Pruzin, supra note 179, at XX. This study was prepared by Professor Mario Jales of Cornell 
University and published in April 2010 by the International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development 
in Geneva. 
 This study also forecast the impact on American cotton production and global cotton prices (as 
against the 1998–2007 reference period) of compliance by the United States with the 2005 Appellate Body 
decision in favor of Brazil in the celebrated Cotton case: 
(1) a drop in output of 7% and increase in prices of 3.5% if the United States eliminated all cotton 
subsidies (including counter-cyclical payments, Step 2 and GSM-103 export credit guarantee 
payments, and marketing loan programs); or 
(2) a negligible effect on production and 0.7% increase in world cotton prices with partial compliance 
by the United States (through eliminating the Step 2 and GSM-103 export credit guarantees and 
amending the fee schedules under the Supplier Credit Guarantee Program). 
Id. Partial compliance occurred, albeit in stages, as the United States (1) ceased accepting new applications 
for GSM-103 export credit guarantees in July 2006, (2) repealed the Step 2 scheme in August 2006, and (3) 
revised the fee schedules under the GSM-102 export credit guarantee scheme in April 2010. See id.; see 
also Daniel Pruzin, USDA Hikes Export Credit Fee Rates to Fulfill Commitments in Cotton Dispute, 27 
Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 634, at XX (Apr. 29, 2010). 
 But, because the United States did not comply fully with the ruling, it paid compensation to 
Brazil—in effect, protection money to shield American cotton farmers from losing all subsidies ruled 
illegal by the Appellate Body. The amount, $147 million per year, staved off retaliation by Brazil against 
the United States. See Alan Beattie, WTO Members Scramble to Salvage Crumbling Trade Talks, FIN. 
TIMES, June 13, 2011, at 6. 
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 An eleventh study, issued in November 2010 by Fairtrade, an NGO, said the 
roughly $1 billion rich countries spend on cotton subsidies depress the income of cotton 
farmers in the Cotton Four by 10%, or $147 million in annual revenue.182 Conversely, 
Fairtrade pays premium prices for organic agricultural products, including cotton. 
Farming families use the extra income to send their children to school (with an 
enrollment rate of 95%, compared to the national average in the Cotton Four of 43%),183 
and Fairtrade has allowed the farming communities to build medical clinics. To be sure, 
the National Cotton Council, which represents American cotton producers, responds that 
cotton subsidies help over 340,000 people in several poor southern states of the United 
States.184 The European Commission makes a similar argument in respect of Greece and 
Spain. But, by no stretch of the imagination are the American or European cotton farmers 
either as poor as or more numerous than their counterparts in the Cotton Four countries. 
 For the Cotton Four countries, the key nexus is that adverse price effects drive 
marginal farmers in poor countries off the land into city slums. They take up positions 
like lorry-driving. If and when some of them engage in risky sexual behavior, they catch 
and spread the HIV/AIDS virus in West African cities. Many of those erstwhile farmers 
happen to be as-yet moderate Muslims, not Al Qaeda or Taliban adherents. That fact 
makes the connection between cotton subsidies, poverty reduction, vulnerability to 
extremist messages, and national security all the more poignant. 
 Even if these farmers are not driven off the land, quite possibly their income is 
reduced, so they cannot afford private-school tuition for their children. They are left with 
little choice but to send their kids to the free Islamic schools, some of which are 
                                                 
182 Doyle, supra note 175. 
183  Id. 
184 Id. 
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subsidized by Saudi interests, and not all of which teach either marketable skills or 
messages that serve America’s national security. It takes nearly no imagination to see the 
disconnect between the December 2008 Text in respect of cotton subsidies, on the one 
hand, and the original purposes of the Doha Round concerning boosting development and 
thereby reducing vulnerability to extremism, on the other hand. 
 Nevertheless, following the July 2008 Text, the United States specifically avoided 
committing even to an 82.2% cut, as well as eschewing tabling any counter-proposal. 
Indeed, “U.S. officials have described the African proposal as unacceptable, arguing the 
general provisions on reducing farm subsidies would already reduce U.S. cotton subsidies 
by 50 percent.”185  In April 2009, Prosper Vokouma, Ambassador to the WTO from 
Burkina Faso, revealed that the Cotton Four countries tried to engage the United States in 
a cotton deal during the Ministerial meeting in July 2008, offering five different 
proposals. 186  The United States refused to negotiate, saying that resolution of other 
agricultural questions, plus NAMA issues, must occur first before it would make a final 
decision on cotton subsidy reductions.187 The Director-General, Pascal Lamy, appeared to 
                                                 
185 Pruzin, supra note 179, at xx. 
186 Daniel Pruzin, African Cotton Growers Say Crisis Continues in Absence of Doha Deal, 26 Int’l 
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 591, at 591–92 (Apr. 30, 2009). 
187 See id. The United States has argued the Cotton Four has failed to take advantage of high world 
market cotton prices, as in July–August 2008, when they hit approximately $1.54 per kilogram. (They were 
about $1.10 per kilo in April 2009.) The United States urges that domestic reforms are needed in the Cotton 
Four to put farmers there in a better position to benefit from high cotton prices. The United States also 
points out that between 2004 and 2008, the acreage allocated in the United States to cotton has fallen by 
40%, the lowest level in twenty-five years, and usage of cotton by American mills is at the lowest level 
since the 1880s. 
 However, there are three weaknesses in the American argument. First, a decision to plant cotton 
must be taken by a farmer a year in advance, especially if that farmer is poor and needs to arrange loans to 
finance the planting. A spike in cotton prices, as occurred in July–August 2008, is difficult to forecast a 
year in advance. Second, the overall picture of the world cotton market is one of glut. Annual cotton 
production is 25 million metric tons, but 2 million tons are held in reserve. This stock results from 
subsidization in the United States and other rich countries. Third, production of cotton has fallen in Africa, 
too, between 2006 and 2008 from 2 to 1 million metric tons annually and in Burkina Faso from 750,000 to 
400,000 metric tons. See id. at xx. 
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do nothing to move the United States from this rather self-defeating, and even heartless, 
position other than make public pronouncements about the importance of finding an 
eventual solution. The April 2011 Agriculture Document confirmed that “not all 
Members are in a position to agree to the text as drafted but no new contributions, 
technical or substantive, have been forthcoming to date.”188 
 The Cotton Four countries foresaw exactly the “squeeze play” they perceived the 
United States was using against them: negotiate a nearly comprehensive arrangement on 
agriculture and NAMA, save for cotton subsidy cuts, and then present fait accompli a 
deal on those cuts to the Cotton Four. The Cotton Four would be under enormous 
pressure from all other WTO Members to acquiesce to the deal. Doing so would mean 
completion of the Doha Round. Conversely, no matter how bad the deal, the Cotton Four 
would not have the political and economic clout to hold out for its interests and block 
completion.  
 As a final technical matter, the December 2008 Text contained the same limit as 
its predecessor on Blue Box cotton subsidies. Such subsidies—for example, counter-
cyclical payments to cotton farmers—would be restricted to one-third of the limit 
established by applying the above formula. That is, one-third of the amount resulting 
from application of Rc would be the cap on Blue Box support for cotton. As for the period 
in which to implement reductions to cotton subsidies, it would be one-third as long as the 
usual implementation period.189 Developing countries (that had Amber and Blue Box 
commitments) would have an obligation to reduce cotton subsidies equal to two-thirds 
                                                 
188 April 2011 Agriculture Document, supra note 90, ¶ 9. 
189 December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 56; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 56. The reference to “the implementation period” in this 
paragraph is unclear. 
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that for developed countries and would get a longer (albeit unspecified) time for 
implementing the cuts.190 
 Ironically, it is not even clear that application of an 82.2% cut would help the 
Cotton Four countries.191 The cut would be based on cotton subsidies notified to the 
WTO during the 1995–2000 base period. However, the figures notified by the United 
States for that period exclude a variety of cotton subsidy programs, including some the 
Appellate Body held were in violation of WTO rules in the famous Brazil Cotton Case.192 
By one estimate, the actual total amount of American cotton subsidies during the base 
period was $1.74 billion; but the United States notified only $623 million, and an 82.2% 
cut would drop them to about $111 million yet leave the other non-notified programs 
intact. 
 Following publication of the April 2011 Agriculture Document, the United States 
response to criticisms of its position in Doha Round cotton subsidy negotiations was a 
combination of denial and accusation. First, the United States insisted its cotton subsidies 
had tumbled because of recent increases in the world market price for cotton. That is, a 
sizeable portion of its cotton support took the form of counter-cyclical payments, but the 
price for such payments had not been triggered. The obvious rebuttal to this argument 
was that as soon as market conditions changed sufficiently—and, sooner or later, they 
would—the counter-cyclical payments would be triggered. What the Cotton Four and 
least developed countries required was a complete cut to American subsidies, made 
                                                 
190 December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 56–58; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 56–58. 
191 See Lynn, supra note 180 (reporting on the work of Abdoulaye Zonon of the Centre d’Analyse des 
Politiques, Economiques et Sociales (CAPES) in Burkina Faso). 
192 See Appellate Body Report, United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R (Mar. 
21, 2005) (complaint by Brazil). This case is discussed in Raj Bhala & David Gantz, WTO Case Review 
2005, 23 ARIZ. J. INT’L  & COMP. L. 107 (2006). 
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permanent through a meaningful, bound commitment. 
 Second, the United States faulted China for its cotton subsidies and for starting or 
expanding trade-distorting cotton subsidy schemes. Intoned Deputy USTR and U.S. 
Ambassador to the WTO, Michael Punke, in May 2011 stated: 
“If people wish to discuss cotton, [then] everyone’s cotton programs must 
be on the table.” . . . “If we are going to have a discussion about cotton, 
[then] it must be a comprehensive discussion about all forms of market 
distorting practices.” . . . “We would need to discuss both direct 
subsidization and other practices such as import licenses, sliding tariff 
scales, and reserves management—that produce very substantial levels of 
effective support for domestic cotton producers.”193 
 
The United States accused China of failing to adhere to the commitment it made when 
acceding to the WTO on 11 December 2001—namely, capping its cotton subsidies at or 
below 8.5% of the total value of domestic cotton production.194 Moreover, argued the 
United States, China had failed to notify the WTO of its cotton (and other farm support) 
programs since 2006 (with 2004 being the last marketing year (MY) covered) and that 
notification was incomplete. 195  Based on estimates from the International Cotton 
Advisory Committee, which is located in the United States, China gave $1.95 billion in 
subsidies for cotton production in the 2008–2009 MY and $1.96 billion in the 2009–2010 
MY.196 
                                                 
193 Daniel Pruzin, WTO: WTO Chief Warns Members Not to Get Stuck on ‘Deliverables’ Package, 
Says LDCs Priority, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 886, at XX (June 2, 2011) (quoting Michael Punke). 
194 See Pruzin, supra note 54, at XX. 
195 See Daniel Pruzin, China to Submit New Subsidy Notification, Says U.S. Claims Exaggerated on 
Wind Power, 28 Int’l Trade Reporter (BNA) No. 984, at XX (June 16, 2011). The 2006 notification was the 
only one China submitted since it acceded to the WTO on 11 December 2001. In October 2009, China 
promised a new notification that would chronicle subsidies from the central government to agriculture and 
industry between 2005 and 2008. But, as of July 2011, China failed to produce this notification. China’s 
2006 notification covered the years 2001–2004, but it failed to include support from regional, provincial, or 
local governmental entities. That notification listed seventy-eight central government subsidy programs for 
agricultural and industrial producers but gave expenditure details on only twenty-nine of those programs, 
most of which pertained to agriculture and rural development.  See id. at xx. 
196 Daniel Pruzin, WTO: U.S., Others Stress Quick Decision Needed on Content of WTO 
‘Deliverables’ Package, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1063, at XX (June 30, 2011). 
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 Nevermind the fact Mr. Punke represented an Administration headed by a 
President whose ethnic paternal roots lay in Sub-Saharan Africa and who professed a 
desire to rebalance American foreign policy toward greater solidarity with the Third 
World. Cotton subsidies, for the Administration of President Barack H. Obama, were a 
matter of commercial self-interest and market access to, if not rivalry with, China. After 
all, with a sizeable share of textile mills and apparel factories, China is the largest cotton 
market in the world, and American cotton farmers want those production facilities to use 
American cotton.197 Thus, the Ambassador faulted China for reneging on its obligation to 
notify, since 2004, the WTO of its agricultural subsidies, including its support for cotton. 
 China countered with the contention that American cotton subsidies reached $3 
billion annually, thus depressing world market prices by 13% and injuring both Chinese 
and African cotton farmers.198 Moreover, despite the unlevel playing field created by 
American subsidies, the share of world imports of subsidized American cotton accounted 
for by China rose from 17% in 1999 to 43% in 2005.199 Amidst this familiar Doha Round 
pattern of accusation followed by counter-accusation, the interests of the Cotton Four 
countries, and the direct link between those interests to fighting poverty and terrorism, 
were lost. 
V. Enhancing Agricultural Market Access Through Tariff Cuts 
                                                 
197 See Pruzin, supra note 193, at XX. China is losing its comparative advantage, owing to rising 
labor costs. Almost half of all EU garment imports, and 41% of America’s garment imports, come from 
China (as of June 2011). Good Darning, Vietnam: Rising Costs in China Are Sending More Buyers to 
South-East Asia, ECONOMIST, June 2, 2011, at 78, available at http://www.economist.com/node/18775499/. 
But, increasingly, garment factories are shifting to Cambodia and Vietnam, where labor costs are lower 
than in China. Thus, Vietnam ranks as the second largest source of garments for the United States. If and 
when Cambodia, Vietnam, Indonesia, and other members of the Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) create regional supply chains (for example, whereby Indonesia, which produces denim, can 
export it duty free to Vietnam, which does not make denim, for jeans to be sewn in Vietnam), then China’s 
advantage may erode further.   
198 Pruzin, supra note 193, at XX. 
199 Id. at xx. 
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A. Tiered Tariff Reductions 
 It comes as a surprise to non-trade professionals that marked discrepancies exist 
in average most favored nation (MFN) tariffs maintained by developed countries on 
industrial versus agricultural products. The reason is clear enough: over a half-century of 
GATT trade rounds have yielded substantial reductions in industrial tariffs, but 
agricultural tariffs have fallen far less dramatically because major players such as the 
United States, EU, and Japan have protected their farm sector. Canada is a case in point: 
as of 2007, its average MFN tariff on industrial products was 3.8%, but its average farm 
tariff was 22.4%.200 The Doha Round was an opportunity to reduce this discrepancy. Yet, 
in all substantive respects on market access, the December 2008 Text was an exact 
reincarnation of its predecessor of July 2008. That predecessor, in turn, was grounded on 
a January 2008 Working Paper. So, as with most other areas of agricultural negotiations, 
little changed in 2008. Table V below summarizes the key proposals in the Texts 
designed to boost opportunities for agricultural exporters around the globe. 
 The basic strategy is to reduce farm tariffs according to a tiered formula. That is 
the same approach used to cut OTDS and Total AMS. Cuts would be made to bound ad 
valorem tariffs, and any non-ad valorem duty would be converted to its ad valorem 
equivalent (AVE) rate using the May 2005 Paris Methodology. 201  For developed 
                                                 
200 Daniel Pruzin, Canada Touts Its Commitment to Global Trade Liberalization Through Tariff Cuts, 
27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 679, at XX (May 6, 2010). 
201 December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 59–60; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 59–60. 
 The Paris Methodology is memorialized in a WTO document, Committee on Agriculture Special 
Session, Draft Possible Modalities on Agriculture, TN/AG/W/3, Annex A (July 12, 2006), available at 
www.wto.org. 
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_searchResult.asp?searchmode=simple&ziptype=&c2=@meta_Symbol&c3=
@meta_Title&c4=@Doc_Date&o4=%3E%3D&c5=@Doc_Date&o5=%3C%3D&c6=@meta_Serial_Num
&c8=@Derestriction_Date&c9=@Derestriction_Date&q4=2006%2F01%2F01&q5=2006%2F12%2F31&a
lertyearmsg=First+select+a+year&WTOYear=2006&q2=%28G%2FAG%2FNG%2FW*+or+TN%2FAG%
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countries, implementation would occur in six equal annual installments over five years, 
the first installment being due on the date of entry into force of any Doha Round 
agreements. For developing countries, the implementation would be eleven equal annual 
installments across a decade. Thus, poor countries would have twice as long as rich ones 
to phase in reductions to their farm tariffs (i.e., to protect their farmers from foreign 
competition). 
TABLE V: 
TIERED REDUCTIONS TO AGRICULTURAL TARIFFS IN 
DECEMBER 2008 DRAFT AGRICULTURE MODALITIES TEXT 
 
Category of WTO 
Member 
 
Tariff Band, 
Reduction 
Commitments, and 
Implementation 
 
Developed 
Countries 
Developing 
Countries, 
SVEs, 
Countries entitled 
to SVE-like 
Treatment, 
Venezuela, and 
Suriname 
Older RAMs, 
Newer RAMs, 
and 
Small Low-Income 
RAMs with 
Economies in 
Transition 
Tier 1 
(Highest Band of 
Existing Bound 
Over 75% 
 
Over 130% 
 
Same as developing 
country band 
                                                                                                                                                 
2FW*+or+TN%2FAG%2FGEN%2F*%29&crn_current_page=1&ct=DDFEnglish,%20DDFFrench,%20D
DFSpanish. 
This Methodology was agreed to in May 2005 at a meeting in Paris by the WTO Members to 
compute AVEs. It uses average prices of a commodity (the specific duty on which is being transformed 
into an AVE) during 1991–2001 as a basis for conversion. The computation also is affected by recent 
prices, or import values, of a commodity. The dramatic rise in commodity prices in 2008 caused agriculture 
importing and exporting countries to shift their positions on tariff simplification. 
 For much of the Doha Round, agricultural importers such as the EU, Switzerland, and Japan 
sought to limit the number of tariff lines subject to conversion. They hoped to maintain roughly 60% of 
their specific duties (i.e., they did not want to convert more than 40% of their specific duties into AVEs). 
Conversely, agricultural exporters, like Australia, Argentina, and Uruguay demanded the importing 
countries convert a high percentage—such as 90%—of their tariff lines. With the spike in world 
commodity prices, the WTO Members reversed their roles. That was because the Paris Methodology would 
yield far higher AVEs than before the spike. Thus, importing countries became eager to convert 90% or so 
of their tariff lines while exporting countries wanted them to limit conversions to a small number of lines. 
See Daniel Pruzin, Ag, NAMA Chairs Give Bleak Assessment of Prospects for Doha Round Breakthrough, 
25 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1567, at 1567–68 (Nov. 6, 2008). 
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Agricultural 
Tariffs) 
Cut to Bound 
Agricultural Tariffs 
in Tier 1 
70% Two-thirds of the 
cut required of 
developed 
countries (i.e., a 
46 ⅔% cut). 
SVEs may 
moderate cuts by 
a further ten 
percentage points 
(i.e., a 36 ⅔% 
cut). 
Some countries, 
such as Bolivia, 
Congo, Côte 
d’Ivoire, and 
Nigeria, could use 
the SVE 
flexibility. 
Suriname would 
bind its tariffs, on 
a line-by-line 
basis, at the 
average figure of 
countries in its 
region after they 
cut their tariffs 
using the tiered 
formula used by 
developing 
countries. 
No cuts required of 
newer RAMs (i.e., 
Macedonia, Saudi 
Arabia, Tonga, 
Ukraine, and 
Vietnam). 
No cuts required of 
small, low-income 
RAMs with economies 
in transition (i.e., 
Albania, Armenia, 
Georgia, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Moldova, 
and Mongolia). 
All other RAMs may 
moderate the cuts they 
would otherwise have 
to make under the 
tiered formula used by 
developing countries 
by up to eight 
percentage points, and 
may exempt from cuts 
any bound duty equal 
to or below 10%. 
Tier 2 
(Upper Middle Tier 
(i.e., Middle Band 
of Existing Bound 
Agricultural 
Tariffs)) 
50% to 75% 
(above 50% but 
less than or equal 
to 75%) 
80% to 130% 
(above 80% but 
less than or equal 
to 130%) 
Same as developing 
country band 
Cut to Bound 
Agricultural Tariffs 
in Tier 2 
64% Two-thirds of the 
cut required of 
developed 
countries (i.e., a 
42 ⅔% cut). 
SVEs may 
moderate cuts by 
a further 10% 
Same special rules as 
above 
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(i.e., a 36 ⅔% 
cut). 
Tier 3 
(Lower Middle Tier 
(i.e., Lower Middle 
Band of Existing 
Bound Agricultural 
Tariffs)) 
20% to 50% 
(above 20% but 
less than or equal 
to 50%) 
30% to 80% 
(above 30% but 
less than or equal 
to 80%) 
Same as developing 
country band 
Cut to Bound 
Agricultural Tariffs 
in Tier 3 
57% 
 
Two-thirds of the 
cut required of 
developed 
countries (i.e., a 
38% cut). 
SVEs may 
moderate cuts by 
a further 10% 
(i.e., a 28% cut). 
Same special rules as 
above 
Tier 4 
(Lowest Band of 
Existing Bound 
Agricultural 
Tariffs) 
0% to 20% 
(above 0% but 
less than or equal 
to 20%) 
0% to 30% 
(above 0% but 
less than or equal 
to 30%) 
Same as developing 
country band 
Cut to Bound 
Agricultural Tariffs 
in Tier 4 
50% 
 
Two-thirds of the 
cut required of 
developed 
countries 
(i.e., a 33 ⅓% 
cut). 
SVEs may 
moderate cuts by 
a further 10%  
(i.e., a 23 ⅓% 
cut). 
Same special rules as 
above 
Minimum Overall 
Average Cut on 
Bound Tariffs 
54% None None 
Maximum Overall 
Average Cut on 
Bound Tariffs 
None 36% 
(including 
reductions to 
tariffs on 
Sensitive 
Products). For 
Venezuela, 
maximum overall 
average cut would 
be 30%. 
None 
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Implementation 
Period 
Equal annual 
installments over 
five years 
Equal annual 
installments over 
ten years 
Not applicable to 
newer RAMs or small, 
low-income RAMs 
with economies in 
transition (because 
they have no tariff 
reduction 
commitments). 
For all other RAMs, 
an additional two 
years beyond the 
implementation period 
for developing 
countries. To avoid 
overlap with accession 
commitments on any 
farm product, 
implementation of 
Doha Round tariff cuts 
would begin one year 
after the end of the 
implementation of 
their accession 
commitment on that 
product. 
 
 As for the tiers into which to categorize developed country tariffs, there would be 
four of them: 0%–20%, 20%–50%, 50%–75%, and above 75%.202 Cuts would be made to 
existing bound tariff rates, with each rate slotted into the appropriate tier. The higher the 
pre-reduction rate, the higher the tier into which that rate would be slotted. In turn, 
steeper cuts would apply to tariffs in the higher tiers. The reductions would be 50%, 57%, 
64%, and 70%, respectively, in the four tiers, with the result that cuts would be non-linear 
and lead to some degree of rough harmonization across WTO Members. The December 
2008 Text altered slightly the last figure. The July Text specified a range of 66%–73%, 
and the new Text embodied the midpoint. 
                                                 
202 December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 61; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 61. 
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 Flexibilities abounded in the December 2008 Text. First, the obligation to cut 
agricultural tariffs incumbent on developing countries would be two-thirds as onerous as 
on developed countries. 203  That would be true across all tiers of tariffs. The tiers 
themselves would be defined more generously than for developed countries; specifically, 
tariff tiers for developing countries would be wider in range and ascend to a higher 
zenith. Instead of a minimum average cut on final bound tariffs of 54%—which would be 
the rule for developed countries—there would be a maximum overall average cut, 
inclusive of Sensitive Products, required of developing countries.204 That maximum (i.e., 
a maximum average of all reductions in farm tariffs) for developing countries would be 
36%. Put simply, rich countries would have to cut their farm tariffs by at least 54%, but 
could do more. Poor countries would have to do no more than cut their tariffs by 36%, 
but could do less. 
 In itself, this simple distinction between exhorting developed countries to do more 
and limiting the onus on developing countries was in keeping with the broad 
development-oriented purpose of the Doha Round. But, the delineation did not stop there. 
The December 2008 Text introduced five further distinctions among developing 
countries; the first of which was between Venezuela and all others.205 Venezuela would 
                                                 
203 December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 63; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 63. 
204 December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 62, 64; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 62, 64. If a developed country, after cutting all farm tariffs 
including on Sensitive Products and accounting for tariff escalation and tropical products, had an overall 
average cut of less than 54%, then it would be obligated to make an “additional effort . . . proportionately 
across all bands to reach that target [54%].” Id. ¶ 62. Conversely, if an SVE designated goods as “Special 
Products” (discussed below), then its maximum average cut would fall to 2%. See id. ¶¶ 65, 130, 157, 
Annex A. 
205 See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 64 n.10. SVEs are WTO 
Members that, between 1999 and 2004, accounted for a tiny average share of global trade, specifically, no 
more than (1) 0.16% of total trade, (2) 0.1% of industrial product trade, and (3) 0.4% of world agricultural 
trade. See id. ¶ 157. The higher figure on farm trade reflects the reality that most SVEs specialize in 
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have a ceiling maximum overall average cut of 30% (i.e., it would have to hit a less 
ambitious target than that expected of other developing countries). 
 Second, small, vulnerable economies (SVEs)—about forty five WTO Members—
would be entitled to temper cuts to their farm tariffs by a further ten percentage points.206 
That is, in comparison with developing countries, SVEs could moderate their tariff cuts 
by ten ad valorem percentage points. Some countries, while not technically SVEs, could 
avail themselves of SVE-type treatment. 207  Those countries would include Bolivia, 
Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, and Nigeria. Consequently, over half of developing countries 
would be eligible for smaller cuts than normally required for such countries. 
 Third, Suriname would be singled out for special treatment. 208  That was an 
innovation in the December 2008 Text, albeit one that adduced the spreading of 
preferences. Instead of applying any tiered-tariff reduction formula, Suriname would 
rebind its agricultural tariffs at the average bound level of other designated countries in 
its region after they had applied the relevant tiered tariff cuts. Those countries would be 
the CARICOM (Caribbean Community) states—Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, 
Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent 
and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago. These neighboring countries would apply 
the SVE formula. Suriname would bind its tariffs, on a line-by-line basis, at the average 
figure in its neighborhood. 
 Fourth, older RAMs would be entitled to moderate the cuts to agricultural tariffs 
                                                                                                                                                 
commodities, not manufactured items. See also id. ¶159 (noting SVE provisions are scattered about the 
December 2008 Text). 
206 December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 65; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 65. 
207 See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 65 n.11 (third and fourth 
sentences). Paragraph 157 of the December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text set out the SVE 
criteria, and Annex I listed countries satisfying these requirements. See id. (first sentence). 
208 See id. ¶ 65 n.11. 
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they otherwise would be obliged to make under the tiered-formula. They would be treated 
like developing countries. But, they could deviate from the cuts incumbent on those 
countries by up to eight percentage points.209 In other words, in each tariff tier, the cut for 
developing countries would be two-thirds that for developed countries, and the cuts for 
older RAMs would be two-thirds that for developed countries minus eight ad valorem 
percentage points. Older RAMs also could exempt from a tariff cut on any existing bound 
tariff at or below 10%. RAMs would have an extra two years, beyond the implementation 
period for developing countries, to phase in farm tariff cuts.210 In the event that their 
Doha Round market access commitment overlapped with their accession commitment on 
a particular farm product, they would commence the cut one year after they had finished 
implementing their accession commitment.211 That way, no RAM would be making two 
sets of cuts (under an accession commitment and under the Doha Round tiered formula) 
simultaneously. 
 Fifth, for newer RAMs, no reductions to agricultural tariffs would be required.212 
That also would be true for small, low-income RAMs with economies in transition. The 
December 2008 Text identified the newer RAMs as Macedonia, Saudi Arabia, Tonga, 
Ukraine, and Vietnam. The small, transitional RAMs were Albania, Armenia, Georgia, 
Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, and Mongolia (the last one added by the December Text). 
B. Sensitive Products Designations 
                                                 
209 December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 66, 70; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 66, 70. 
210 December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 69; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 69. 
211 December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 68; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 68. 
212 December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 67; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 67. 
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 Every WTO Member has certain sectors they are not willing to open to free trade. 
The goods from these sectors are “Sensitive Products,” and they are “Sensitive” for an 
admixture of economic, political, social, and cultural reasons. The relative proportions 
among the reasons vary depending on the Member and Product. The WTO does not, and 
cannot, dictate what the criteria must be to designate a good as a “Sensitive Product.” 
But, it also cannot allow every Member to make an unlimited number of designations. 
Were that to occur, the trade-liberalizing effects of subsidy and tariff cutting obligations 
would be more than offset by protecting Sensitive Products from those obligations. 
 Thus, a key exercise in multilateral farm trade negotiations during much of the 
Doha Round concerned rules on Sensitive Products and corollary provisions on enhanced 
market access for Sensitive Products through expanded tariff rate quotas (TRQs). The 
December 2008 Text was similar, albeit not identical, to the July 2008 Text. The 
predecessor drew largely on the May 2008 Text. Hence, not much had changed on the 
topic in nearly eight months. Table VI below summarizes the proposed rules. 
 Sensitive Product designations were the starting point. Any developed country 
would have the right to designate up to 4% of its total agricultural tariff lines as 
“Sensitive.”213 That was a modest change from the range of 4% to 6% in the July Text. 
Developing countries would receive S & D treatment. 
TABLE VI: 
TREATMENT OF SENSITIVE PRODUCTS IN 
                                                 
213 December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 71; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 71. 
 A “tariff line” is a product as it is defined in lists of tariff rates. The product can be sub-divided, 
and the extent of subdivisions is reflected in the Harmonized System (HS) of product classification. See 
RAJ BHALA, DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 452–53 (2008); Info. & Media Relations Div., 
WTO Secretariat, Unofficial Guide to the Revised Draft Modalities—Agriculture, WORLD TRADE ORG., 2 
(Dec. 6, 2008, corr’d Dec. 9, 2008), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/ag_modals_dec08_e.pdf. 
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DECEMBER 2008 DRAFT AGRICULTURE MODALITIES TEXT 
 
Sensitive Product 
Rule 
 
Category of WTO 
Member 
 
Percentage of 
Total Agricultural 
Tariff Lines that 
can be designated 
as Sensitive 
Deviation from the 
Full Tariff 
Reduction under 
the Tiered 
Formula 
(Partial tariff cut is 
applied to bound 
MFN rate imposed 
on above-quota 
imports of the 
Sensitive Product) 
 
Required 
Expansion of In-
Quota Volume 
Threshold on TRQ 
(Access 
Opportunity) 
Developed 
Countries 
(including RAMs 
and SVEs, if 
applicable) 
4% Tariff cut may 
deviate from the full 
reduction by: 
⅓, ½, or ⅔ 
 
The greater the 
deviation from the 
full cut, the greater 
the access 
opportunity 
required: 
One-third deviation 
(imposition of two-
thirds of the full cut) 
requires 3% access 
opportunity 
One-half deviation 
(imposition of one-
half the full cut) 
requires 3.5% 
access opportunity 
Two-thirds 
deviation 
(imposition of one-
third of the full cut) 
requires 4% access 
opportunity 
Developed 
Countries with 
more than 30% of 
their Tariff Lines in 
the Top Tier (Final 
Bound MFN Rate 
of over 75%) 
6% Same as above Same as above but 
must increase access 
opportunities for 
each deviation by an 
additional ½% of 
domestic 
consumption 
Developing One-third more than Same as above Obligation to 
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Countries 
(including RAMs 
and SVEs, if 
applicable) 
developed countries 
(i.e., 5.33%) 
expand access 
opportunity is ⅔ the 
amount as for 
developed countries 
(above). 
Domestic 
consumption used to 
estimate in-quota 
TRQ threshold 
excludes 
consumption by 
subsistence farmers 
of their own 
produce. 
Alternative complex 
options whereby 
less-than-formula 
tariff cuts are made 
with no 
corresponding 
access opportunity 
required. 
Developing 
Countries with 
more than 30% of 
their Tariff Lines in 
the Top Tier (Final 
Bound MFN Rate 
of over 130%) 
(including RAMs 
and SVEs, if 
applicable) 
One-third more than 
developed countries 
(i.e., 7.33%) 
Same as above Same as above for 
developing 
countries 
 
 
 
That was a modest change from the range of 4 to 6% in the July Text. Developing 
countries would receive S & D treatment. 
TABLE VI: 
TREATMENT OF SENSITIVE PRODUCTS IN 
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DECEMBER 2008 DRAFT AGRICULTURE MODALITIES TEXT 
 
Sensitive Product 
Rule 
 
Category of WTO 
Member 
 
Percentage of 
Total Agricultural 
Tariff Lines that 
can be designated 
as Sensitive 
Deviation from the 
Full Tariff 
Reduction under 
the Tiered 
Formula 
(Partial tariff cut is 
applied to bound 
MFN rate imposed 
on above-quota 
imports of the 
Sensitive Product) 
 
Required 
Expansion of In-
Quota Volume 
Threshold on TRQ 
(Access 
Opportunity) 
Developed 
Countries 
(including RAMs 
and SVEs, if 
applicable) 
4% Tariff cut may 
deviate from the full 
reduction by: 
⅓, ½, or ⅔ 
 
The greater the 
deviation from the 
full cut, the greater 
the access 
opportunity 
required: 
One-third deviation 
(imposition of two-
thirds of the full cut) 
requires 3% access 
opportunity 
One-half deviation 
(imposition of half 
the full cut) requires 
3.5% access 
opportunity 
Two-thirds 
deviation 
(imposition of one-
third of the full cut) 
requires 4% access 
opportunity 
Developed 
Countries with 
more than 30% of 
their Tariff Lines in 
the Top Tier (Final 
Bound MFN Rate 
of over 75%) 
6% Same as above Same as above, but 
must increase access 
opportunities for 
each deviation by an 
additional ½% of 
domestic 
consumption 
Developing One-third more than Same as above Obligation to 
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Countries 
(including RAMs 
and SVEs, if 
applicable) 
developed countries 
(i.e., 5.33%) 
expand access 
opportunity is two-
thirds the amount as 
for developed 
countries (above). 
Domestic 
consumption used to 
estimate in-quota 
TRQ threshold 
excludes 
consumption by 
subsistence farmers 
of their own 
produce. 
Alternative complex 
options whereby 
less-than-formula 
tariff cuts are made 
with no 
corresponding 
access opportunity 
required. 
Developing 
Countries with 
more than 30% of 
their Tariff Lines in 
the Top Tier (Final 
Bound MFN Rate 
of over 130%) 
(including RAMs 
and SVEs, if 
applicable) 
One-third more than 
developed countries 
(i.e., 7.33%) 
Same as above Same as above for 
developing 
countries 
 
 With remarkable candor, the December Text and April 2011 Agriculture 
Document hastened to add explicitly that Canada and Japan did not agree to the 4% 
limitation.214 Canada demanded a limit of 6%, and Japan 8%.215 Canada was concerned 
about its supply management system, which meant it had dairy and poultry products it 
                                                 
214 See April 2011 Agriculture Document, supra note 90, ¶¶ 12–13; December 2008 Draft Agriculture 
Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 71 n.*. 
215 See World Trade Organization, Committee on Agriculture, Special Session, Revised Draft 
Modalities for Agriculture Sensitive Products: Designation, TN/AG/W/5 ¶ 4 (Dec. 6, 2008). 
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sought to designate as Sensitive that would exceed the 4% limit.216 Japan made a similar 
calculation in respect of its sensitivities, such as cereals, grain, and rice. 217  Japan 
hardened its position in December 2010, when it made an otherwise obligatory 75% in its 
OTDS conditional on permission for it to pick an additional 2% of its agricultural tariff 
lines (i.e., 8% of them) as Sensitive.218 
Evidently, neither Canada nor Japan was satisfied with a dispensation designed to 
placate them. 219  That dispensation was WTO Members with high farm tariffs, i.e., 
countries with more than 30% of their tariffs in the top tier of 75% ad valorem or more, 
could designate an additional 2 percentage points of their farm tariff lines as Sensitive—
in effect, 6% (or so it appeared from the December Text). But, they would have to 
expand TRQs by an additional 0.5% of domestic consumption beyond the required access 
opportunity amounts (explained below).220 
 To the surprise of many Members, in October 2009, the U.S. signaled a possible 
                                                 
216 See Press Release, Market Wire, Minister Ritz Takes Strong Stand on WTO Agriculture 
Negotiations (Dec. 7, 2008), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/12/07/idUS85756+07-Dec-
2008+MW20081207. 
217 See Toshio Aritake, WTO: WTO Chief Lamy Urges Japan’s Officials to Contribute to Doha 
Round’s Completion, 26  Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 282, at 282 (Feb. 26, 2009). 
218 See Daniel Pruzin, Japan Slammed at WTO Attempt to Dodge Subsidy Reduction Commitment, 27 
INT’L TRADE REP. 1969 (2010). 
219 Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 71 (second 
sentence), 75, with July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 71 (second sentence), 
75.  
 The 2% flexibility also applied to another category of developed countries: if they were 
disproportionately constrained in making Sensitive designations (specifically, in respect of the number of 
tariff lines they could select, because they were scheduling them at the six-digit level of Harmonized 
System (HS) classification), then they could increase their entitlement by 2%. See id. 
220 Chairman Falconer proposed yet more flexibility for Canada—and presumably Japan—to consider 
in his Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture Sensitive Products: Designation. Essentially, it was an 
option for Canada to designate more than 4% of its tariff lines as Sensitive if it expanded its TRQs by more 
than 4% of domestic consumption. See World Trade Organization, Committee on Agriculture, Special 
Session, Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture Sensitive Products: Designation, ¶ 6, TN/AG/W/5  (Dec. 
6, 2008). Specifically, each Sensitive line above the 4% threshold would require a TRQ increase of 5.5% of 
domestic consumption, and all of the Sensitive lines under the 4% limit would require an additional 0.5% 
increase, to 4.5%. The other option would be a TRQ expansion of 5% on all lines Canada designated 
Sensitive. However, the Chairman conceded that the option would not be acceptable to Japan. See id. ¶ 7. 
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change in its position on the number of agricultural tariff lines that a developed country 
could designate as Sensitive.221 Traditionally, the Americans championed the argument to 
limit the number of such lines. But, perhaps under pressure from domestic agricultural 
constituencies that viewed the December 2008 Draft Text as more “give” than “got,” the 
U.S. indicated it might seek to expand the key number to 6%. That is, it might insist that 
any developed country have the right to designate up to 6% of farm tariff lines as 
Sensitive. Whether the U.S. actually would designate 6% of its lines would depend on a 
cost-benefit analysis: was the benefit of the designation worth the cost of expanding 
TRQs on those lines? While the likes of the EU, Japan, and Korea welcomed the idea, 
Australia, Brazil, and Uruguay were deeply troubled by it. 
 Setting aside the disagreement on the percentage of farm tariff lines that may be 
designated as Sensitive, the next step concerned agreement on the appropriate tariff cuts 
to Sensitive Products. These Products would be subject to the tiered reduction formula, 
like any other agricultural good. However, they would be shielded from the full force of 
the cuts under that formula. All WTO Members would be entitled to deviate from the 
formula, for Sensitive Products, by one-third, one-half, or two-thirds. 222  That is, in 
reverse order, respectively, their obligation to cut tariffs on Sensitive Products would be 
only one-third, one-half, or two-thirds that of the normal cut: 
(1) The smallest deviation from the formula, one-third, would mean imposing a tariff 
reduction that is two-thirds as severe as called for by the formula. (Hence, the 
                                                 
221 See Daniel Pruzin, Senior WTO Negotiators Downbeat After Week of Talks on Doha Round, 26 
Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1457, at XX (Oct. 29, 2009); Daniel Pruzin, Agriculture: Trading Partners 
Concerned by U.S. Shift on Sensitive Products in Doha Farm Talks, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1413, 
at XX (Oct. 22, 2009). 
 
222 December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 73; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 73. 
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access opportunity, discussed below, is the least onerous—3%.) 
(2) The medium deviation from the formula, one-half, would mean imposing a tariff 
reduction that is one-half as severe as called for by the formula. (Hence, the 
access opportunity, discussed below, is moderate—3.5%.) 
(3) The largest deviation from the formula, two-thirds, would mean imposing a tariff 
reduction that is only one-third as severe as called for by the formula. (Hence, the 
access opportunity, discussed below, is the most onerous—4%.) 
In contrast to the July Text, the December Text made clear each Member would be free 
to choose the degree of deviation but would have to apply that degree to all of its 
Sensitive Products (or, at least to all of them within a broad category).223 It could not, for 
example, derogate by one-third for some Sensitive Products yet by two-thirds for others. 
C. Sensitive Products and Access Opportunities Through TRQ Expansion 
 To compensate exporters of products designated Sensitive by importing countries, 
the importing countries—having availed themselves of the entitlement to derogate from 
the full agreed-upon cuts—would have to yield something. That “something” proved to 
be a monstrously complicating factor in Doha Round negotiations. Essentially, Members 
agreed the compensation would take the form of a required minimum imported quantity 
of the Sensitive Product, defined in terms of an in-quota TRQ volume threshold, and 
technically called an “access opportunity.” That is because, typically, imports under a 
TRQ are duty-free, or face only a low duty, if they fall within the in-quota threshold. 
Raising that threshold would mean a larger volume of merchandise would enter the 
importing country with little or no duty. Above-quota (i.e., over- or out-of-quota) imports 
                                                 
223 Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 73 (last sentence), 
with July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 73. 
 
113 
 
 
would continue to face a high rate of duty. However, the normally-applicable tiered tariff 
cuts, as modified by partial shielding through a Sensitive Product designation, would 
apply to the out-of-quota rate. 
 The essence of the trade-off in the December 2008 Text would be a lower cut to 
the bound MFN tariff on a Sensitive Product than otherwise required under the Doha 
Round tiered reduction formula. That partially-reduced tariff would affect the over-quota 
levy on Sensitive Product imports. But, there would be an appropriate increase in the in-
quota threshold. Imports under this raised threshold would get zero or low-duty 
treatment, which of course is part and parcel of a TRQ. In sum, two movements would 
occur in respect of a Sensitive Product: 
(1) The in-quota threshold would be raised, but the low or zero-duty treatment would 
remain unchanged. 
(2) The tariff cuts would be applied to the out-of-quota bound MFN rate, albeit with 
less than full force. 
The movements would be coordinated, indeed directly related to one another. Greater 
access opportunity (by virtue of the in-quota threshold increases) would be the requisite 
compensation for greater tariff cut derogation (in respect of the duty applicable to out-of-
quota shipments). Therein lay the trade-off. 
 Thus, the ostensibly simple compensatory arrangement was a proportionate 
percentage TRQ expansion.224 Specifically, in exchange for shielding 4% of its tariff 
lines from full tariff cuts, a developed country that— 
(1) Selected the maximum deviation of two-thirds would have to expand the in-quota 
                                                 
224 December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 74; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 74. 
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volume threshold for Sensitive Product imports by 4% of domestic consumption. 
(2) Selected the minimum deviation of one-third would have to expand the in-quota 
volume threshold for Sensitive Product imports by 3% of domestic consumption. 
(3) Selected the middle degree of deviation of one-half would have to expand the in-
quota volume threshold for Sensitive Product imports by 3.5% of domestic 
consumption. 
There would be a direct relationship between deviation from agreed-upon tariff 
reductions and in-quota TRQ volume expansion for Sensitive Products: The greater the 
deviation, the greater the expansion. 
 Stated differently, TRQ expansion would be akin to a sliding scale. Members 
would pick the point on the scale they wished to sit based on the extent to which they 
protected Sensitive Products from the full force of Doha Round cuts to farm tariffs. A 
Member against cutting tariffs fully on a Sensitive Product would have a great onus to 
expand the quota threshold on that product. Conversely, a Member willing to reduce 
tariffs nearly fully on a Sensitive Product would have less of an obligation to expand the 
corresponding quota threshold. The TRQ expansions would apply on an MFN basis, and 
would be phased in, essentially across a three-year period.225 
 What if a WTO Member designates a good as Sensitive but does not have a TRQ 
                                                 
225 December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 82; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 79. 
 The precise details of the phase-in would be as follows. The first installment of a TRQ expansion 
would occur on the first day of implementation of any Doha Round agreement. It would have to be an 
expansion at least equal to one quarter of total domestic consumption. The subsequent three-quarters of that 
total would be added to the in-quota TRQ threshold in three steps at the end of each subsequent 12 month 
period. See id. (second and third sentences). 
 In the event normal imports are comparatively large, a developed country could provide a reduced 
access opportunity. Specifically, if the existing bound TRQ volume already represents 10 percent or more 
of domestic consumption, then the access opportunity obligations would be reduced by 0.5 percent for each 
deviation. If that volume is more than 30 percent of domestic consumption, then the obligation to expand 
TRQ volumes would be lowered by 1 percent for each deviation. See id. ¶ 77. 
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established for it? Typically, Sensitive Products are protected by TRQs, but would a 
Member be barred from designating a new good as Sensitive, and creating a TRQ for it? 
Like its predecessor, the December 2008 Text left that question unanswered. It laid out 
the options. Either, 
(1) No tariff line could be designated as Sensitive unless it already was subject to a 
TRQ before the Round commenced in November 2001; or 
(2) Any product could be designated as such, regardless of its pre-Round status.226 
The two basic alternatives were radically different. The first option inclines Members 
members toward free trade. By disallowing Sensitive designations but for the existence of 
a TRQ, the first option restricts drastically farm goods the Members could designate as 
Sensitive. 
 In contrast, the second option creates much more policy space for protection. 
Establishing new TRQs is the way to create this space. A new TRQ would embody the 
familiar trade-off on a newly-designated Sensitive Product between (1) a lower duty 
imposed on in-quota shipments, and (2) a smaller tariff cut on the bound duty for out-of-
quota shipments. 
 Unsurprisingly, the options reflected sharp battle lines between the U.S. and other 
major powers, which favored the first option, and China, India, and other developing 
countries, which favored the second option. On this issue, as a major exporting power, 
Brazil sided with the first group. Brazil argued the TRQ provisions should not permit 
WTO Members to establish new TRQs on farm products that they had not protected 
during the Uruguay Round. This opportunity could be a “black box in which any product 
                                                 
226 December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 83; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 80. 
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could get in, with serious consequences for our interests in the markets of the rich 
nations.”227 Brazil was particularly concerned developed countries might create TRQs for 
ethanol, of which it is the world’s largest exporter.228 
 The December 2008 Text contained nearly the same S & D treatment rule for 
developing countries as set out in the July Text. They could designate up to one-third 
more tariff lines, i.e., 5.33% of their lines, as Sensitive than developed countries.229 (A 
developing country that had more than 30% of its products in the top tier of the tariff 
cutting formula, i.e., above 130%, could designate an extra 2 percentage points of its 
tariff lines as Sensitive, for a total entitlement of roughly 7.33%.) The deviations that 
developing countries could take from the tiered tariff cuts would be the same as for 
developed countries. That is, developing countries could apply a cut that is one-third, 
one-half, or two-thirds as severe as otherwise would be required under the formula. 
 Expansion of in-quota TRQ volumes for developing countries would be two-
thirds as great as developed countries. 230  (Numerically, the expansion figures for 
developing countries would be 2.67%, 2.33%, and 2%, respectively, for the maximum, 
moderate, and minimum deviation choices on the sliding scale.) The end result would 
mean foreign farm products would hit the quota ceiling more quickly, and exhaust the 
duty-free or low-duty allotment faster, in a developing country than in a developed 
country (ceteris paribus, i.e., assuming all other factors were equal). Domestic 
                                                 
227 David Haskel & Ed Taylor, NAMA Final Draft Text Still Inadequate After Changes, Argentina 
Tells MERCOSUR, 25 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1047, at 1047 (July 17, 2008) (quoting Brazilian 
Foreign Minister Celsio Amorim). The Foreign Minister holds the senior-most trade portfolio in the 
Brazilian government. 
228 See id. 
229 Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 72, 78, with July 
2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 72, 78. 
230 December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 72, 78; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 72, 78. 
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consumption data on which that expansion would be based would exclude consumption 
by subsistence farmers of their own produce. Developing countries would get longer 
phase-in periods.231 
 Neither of the two extreme options garnered a consensus. Hence, some kind of 
compromise between them was needed. A possibility sketched out by Chairman Falconer 
in December 2008 was that a limited number of tariff lines not currently subject to TRQs 
could be declared Sensitive, and subject to a TRQ. But, the limits would have to be fairly 
tight:232 
(1) The number of such lines could not exceed one percent of the farm tariff lines of 
the Member concerned. 
(2) The 1% would be deducted from the maximum entitlement of Sensitive Product 
tariff lines to which the Member was entitled (i.e., if the limit on Sensitive 
Product designations were 4%, then the remaining entitlement would be 3%). 
(3) The above-quota volume threshold (i.e., the access opportunity) for a newly 
created TRQ would have to be raised by an additional 2% of domestic 
                                                 
231 The December 2008 Text endeavored to clarify an alternative preferential rule for developing 
countries. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 78–81, with July 
2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 78. The alternative consisted of three 
complicated options on Sensitive Products. Instead of following the scheme of taking on obligations two-
thirds as onerous as for developed countries, a developing country could forgo TRQ expansion and simply 
impose a less severe tariff cut on Sensitive Products than otherwise would be required of them under the 
tiered formula, with an extended period for implementing the cuts. The three options concerned the degree 
of deviation from full tariff reductions under the tiered formula, and the implementation period to make the 
cuts. Briefly put, under the alternative three options, developing countries could specify a good as Sensitive 
without granting it any TRQ access, so long as they imposed the full tariff cut on that good over an 
implementation period 3 years longer than normal (or made one-quarter of the normal tariff cut, but in a 
period 2 years shorter than normal). 
232 See World Trade Organization, Committee on Agriculture, Special Session, Revised Draft 
Modalities for Agriculture Sensitive Products: Tariff Quota Creation, TN/AG/W/6 (Dec. 6, 2008), ¶¶ 1–5. 
Adjustments to these limits might be made if there has been significant historical trade in the Sensitive 
Product at issue such that trade in that Product would be “manifestly and artificially restrain[ed]” Id. ¶ 6. 
Essentially, the access opportunity would be added to the historical trade figure for the Product concerned. 
If that adjustment did not work, then a sui generis solution would have to be devised. See id. ¶¶ 6–7. 
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consumption beyond the otherwise obligatory expansion.233 
(4) The in-quota tariff rate of the newly designated Sensitive Product would have to 
be zero. 
(5) The TRQ on the new and indeed all Sensitive Products must be applied on an 
MFN basis. 
Norway managed to obtain S & D treatment for itself in the proposal. For three product 
categories, Norway designates as Sensitive at the HS 7-digit level, Norway could provide 
an additional access opportunity of just 0.5%, rather than 2%, of domestic consumption 
for the entire TRQ governing the three products.234 What the categories were was not 
evident from the relevant document, Attachment Ai, Part G. 
 Even this proposal did not garner a consensus. Thus, the April 2011 Agriculture 
Document stated that “views remain divided on whether such flexibility should be 
afforded.” That is, there was no agreement on whether a WTO Member could designate a 
new product as Sensitive if it had no TRQ in place for the product.235 
D. Disaggregation of Sensitive Products and Data to Measure TRQ Expansion 
 A critical but technical question concerned the extent to which WTO Members 
could disaggregate product categories in making their Sensitive Product designations. For 
example, could a Member identify cheese as Sensitive, or must it be more precise and 
designate sub-categories like cheddar cheese, or perhaps hard cheese? Likewise, should it 
be allowed to designate wheat, or must it pick durum wheat? 
                                                 
233 See World Trade Organization, Committee on Agriculture, Special Session, Revised Draft 
Modalities for Agriculture Sensitive Products: Tariff Quota Creation, TN/AG/W/6  (Dec. 6, 2008), ¶¶ 1–5; 
December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 74. 
234 See World Trade Organization, Committee on Agriculture, Special Session, Revised Draft 
Modalities for Agriculture Sensitive Products: Tariff Quota Creation, TN/AG/W/6 (Dec. 6, 2008), ¶ 8. 
235 See April 2011 Agriculture Document, supra note 90, ¶ 18. 
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 On the one hand, the more detailed the designation, the more focused the 
protection to the Sensitive Product and the less the risk other products will be shielded in 
part from full tariff reductions. On the other hand, the more detailed the designation, the 
more difficult it is to get domestic consumption data.236 These data are essential to gauge 
the new or expanded TRQs. 
 All Members are supposed to maintain data at the 6-digit level under the 
Harmonized System (HS) of tariff classification maintained by the World Customs 
Organization (WCO). (That is, HS codes are harmonized among all Members at the 4- 
and 6-digit level, but not the 8- or 10-digit level.) More precise Sensitive Product 
designations would require data at the 8-digit level (e.g., cheddar or hard cheese, or 
durum wheat), which many countries—even as large as Brazil—do not have. When data 
on domestic consumption in a product sub-category are unavailable, then a proxy must be 
found. One controversial proxy is to estimate domestic consumption using trade figures, 
specifically, import data. A related problem is that products in close sub-categories may 
be substituted. Cheddar and hard cheese may compete with one another. 
 Thus, the bottom-line question is how domestic consumption should be estimated 
when Sensitive Products are designated with great precision. The December 2008 Text, 
like its predecessor in July, addressed this question through Annex C, accompanied by an 
“Attachment A” and “Attachment Ai.” Even to the most seasoned international trade 
professionals, these documents contained monstrous complexities of TRQ expansion 
                                                 
236 In the fall of 2009, WTO Members spent an enormous amount of time and effort compiling and 
checking these data, as well as data on values of production, which are necessary to calculate and 
implement rules on domestic support reductions. See, e.g., World Trade Organization, Negotiators Focus 
on Data Gaps in Farm Trade Talks (Nov. 20, 2009), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news09_e/agng_16nov09_e.htm. Their investment adduces what 
should be an obvious point: the more technically complex a trade rule is, the more likely it will require time 
and effort to marshal data to ensure that rule is properly followed. This point mitigates in favor or simpler 
rules. 
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calculations. These nearly unfathomable details represented a so-called Consensus 
Approach worked out in April 2008 and left largely unchanged thereafter. 
 Attachment A concerns Sensitive Product categories. This Attachment identifies 
the agricultural product categories WTO Members intend to designate as Sensitive. 
Attachment Ai—called “Partial Designation Modalities for Sensitive Products” and 
occupying 16 pages—addresses the problem of estimating domestic consumption for 
such Products. Unhelpfully, however, Attachment Ai was scarcely more comprehensible 
in the December 2008 Text than in the July Text. 
 As before, both Attachments presumed domestic consumption would be the 
yardstick to determine the extent to which quota sizes for Sensitive Products would need 
to be expanded. Generally, for a good declared Sensitive at the detailed HS 8-digit level, 
the expansion would depend on estimated consumption of the broader HS 6-digit level 
category in which that Sensitive Product is classified. The thrust of Attachment A and Ai 
was to explain how domestic consumption would be calculated for Sensitive Products, 
particularly in light of the fact consumption would have to be estimated using a proxy, 
namely, trade figures. 
 Attachment A laid out, at the 6-digit level, the product categories that could be 
designated as Sensitive. Two other Attachments (B and D) explained precisely how to 
calculate domestic consumption for each Sensitive Product category. The methodology 
consisted of two steps. Every product category that a Member could designate as 
Sensitive would have some “Core” Products and some “Non-Core” Products. Core 
Sensitive Products would be raw or basic farm goods. Non-Core Products would consist 
of (1) farm products that have a low amount of processing, and (2) farm products that are 
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highly processed. For instance, the broad product category of wheat has twenty-eight 
products at the HS 6-digit level, including two basic grains that are Core, some products 
that have undergone modest processing, like wheat flour, and still other products that are 
highly processed, such as bread and pasta.237 
 Reading Attachments A and Ai shows how trade negotiations devolve from high-
minded, well-intentioned free trade aspirations to stunningly abstruse, product-by-product 
protectionism. The Attachments speak of a “two step partial designation methodology.” 
Yet, nowhere do they clearly indicate “Step 1” or “Step 2.” They continue with special 
rules for TRQ expansion for dairy products that are all but impenetrable, except (perhaps) 
to their drafter and Canada, the Member especially eager to protect its supply 
management system from the full-force of any Doha Round tariff cuts. That said, the 
basic goal of the two steps, respectively, would be to calculate domestic consumption for 
each broad category (e.g., wheat) and then estimate consumption of products at a detailed 
sub-category level (e.g., wheat flour). 
 Accordingly, in Step 1, consumption would be estimated at the HS 6-digit level. 
That is, for each detailed Sensitive Product type, consumption would be a percentage of 
consumption in the relevant broad product category. The percentage would depend on the 
share of trade of the detailed product in the broad category. That percentage would be 
adjusted to give a higher weighting to Core Products (e.g., 67%) than to Non-Core 
Products (e.g., 23%). This adjustment would ensure Core Products, which are more 
heavily traded than Non-Core Products, would account for at least 90% of each HS 6-
digit category. In Step 2, consumption would be estimated at the HS 8-digit level. The 
                                                 
237 See World Trade Organization, Unofficial Guide to the Revised Draft Modalities-Agriculture, 
(Dec. 6, 2008 corr’d Dec. 9, 2008) at 12, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/ag_modals_dec08_e.pdf. 
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percentage of consumption at the 6-digit level would be adjusted, using the import data of 
the WTO Member in question, at the 8-digit level. 
 The end result would be a percentage figure for domestic consumption of a 
detailed Sensitive Product. In other words, for every detailed product sub-category (8-
digit level), consumption would be some percentage of consumption of the broad product 
category (6-digit level) in which the detailed product appears. The percentage would 
depend on the share of the sub-product in the broad product category. That percentage 
would be adjusted to ensure Core Products account for 90% or more of the consumption 
in the broad category. That is because they are the most heavily traded kind of 
agricultural good. 
 In turn, the estimate of domestic consumption of a Sensitive Product sub-category 
would be used to set the expansion of the in-quota threshold of a TRQ for that Product. 
That is, this estimate would establish the quota size—the access opportunity—whenever 
a Member designates a sub-category as a Sensitive. 
 However, to make matters yet more complicated, special variations on these two 
steps would apply to certain Sensitive Products, particularly dairy (eggs and milk), fruit, 
and vegetables. Moreover, special rules—set out in Annex C and Attachment Ai to the 
December 2008 Text—deal with the possibility that estimates of domestic consumption 
might result in an in-quota TRQ threshold that is too small. These rules establish a 
minimum quota size, or floor, in the event the trade data used as a proxy for domestic 
consumption consists of unusually low figures. 
 Not surprisingly, how the aforementioned criteria would operate in practice 
remained a mystery to most Members, even after months of study and contemplation. 
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The April 2011 Agriculture Document acknowledged the mass confusion, albeit in the 
tortured language of Geneva bureaucrats: “There is a sense that the operability of criteria 
. . . is difficult to conceive in the abstract,” and “further factual clarification,” including 
on products for which consumption data is used as a proxy for trade volumes was 
needed.238 
E. Maximum Tariff Levels (Caps) 
 Like the July 2008 Text, the December 2008 Text dealt with an issue related to 
Sensitive Products and TRQ expansion, namely, the maximum bound MFN tariff level a 
WTO Member could maintain on a Sensitive Product. Ought there to be a tariff cap on 
high-tariff developed countries (specifically, on rates charged on above-quota shipments 
of the Product)? The answer on which most Members settled was “yes.” They also agreed 
a high-tariff country should make a so-called extra payment. But, countries with high 
farm tariffs, like Japan and Switzerland, disagreed.239 The high-tariff Members, which 
banded together in the Group of 10 (G-10), opposed a tariff cap and, if there had to be 
one, likely wanted a broad exemption to it.240 
 Suppose after applying all of its Doha Round tariff cut obligations to agriculture 
products under the tiered tariff formula, including any deviations for Sensitive Products, a 
developed country still sought to keep some of its Sensitive Product tariff lines bound at 
ad valorem rates of over 100%. To be sure, the number of such lines would not exceed 
4%—the total number of lines that a developed country could designate as Sensitive. 
And, the 100%-plus duty would be the over-quota rate for a TRQ on a Sensitive Product. 
                                                 
238 See April 2011 Agriculture Document, supra note 90, ¶ 19. 
239  See Daniel Pruzin, Week of WTO “Crunch” Ag Talks Ends with No Decision on Next Step, 25 Int’l 
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1707, at xx (Dec. 4, 2008). 
240  See Pruzin, supra note 221, at 1457. 
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The developed country would have to apply to all of its Sensitive Products an additional 
TRQ expansion of 0.5% of domestic consumption. That one-half percent would be the 
extra payment, in exchange for keeping such high duty rates.241 
 The extra payment reflected the aspirations of poor countries. They argued no 
developed country should have an agricultural duty rate above 100%. However, if they 
could not push through a lower cap, then at least they could urge an extra payment. The 
trade-off, in other words, was that a developed country could maintain an above-quota 
duty rate in excess of 100% on a good it designated as Sensitive if it applied to that good 
a TRQ expansion of 0.5% greater than the expansion requirement for Sensitive Products 
with duty rates below 100%. Put simply, a rich country could exceed a 100% tariff rate, 
albeit with a supra-generous increase in quota volume. Precisely whether that generosity 
would matter, when the above-quota rate was stuck above 100%, was uncertain. 
 As for a duty rate over 100% on a non-Sensitive Product, the general rule 
proposed was that such instances would be limited to no more than 1% of tariff lines 
beyond the usual entitlement for Sensitive items. (That is, if a developed country were 
entitled to designate up to 4% of lines as Sensitive, then it could not have duty rates in 
excess of 100% on more than 5% of its non-Sensitive lines. The December 2008 Text 
eliminated the range of 1–2% set out in the July Text.)242 Members affected—Iceland, 
Japan, Norway, and Switzerland243—would have to pay compensation to the rest of the 
Membership for the privilege of maintaining a tariff rate above 100% on a non-Sensitive 
Product. That compensation would consist of: 
                                                 
241  December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 76; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 76. 
242  Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 76, with July 2008 
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 76. 
243  See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 76 n.15. 
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(1) Expansion of the TRQs on all their Sensitive Products by an additional 0.5% of 
domestic consumption, or 
(2) Acceleration of tariff reductions by two years faster than the normal 
implementation, or 
(3) Addition of ten percentage points to the tariff cuts it is obliged to make. (The 
December Text boosted this figure from five, which the July Text contained.)244 
Briefly put, the December 2008 Text retained (and modestly strengthened) incentives to 
eradicate tariffs above 100%. 
 Yet, that Text did not require their elimination. On this point, the fundamental 
question of whether any Member should be allowed to maintain a tariff in excess of 
100% ad valorem, there was no agreement. So, the April 2011 Agriculture Document 
characterized the views of the WTO Members as “remain[ing] sharply divided.”245 
 What about developing countries—would they have a tariff cap? The December 
2008 Text contained the same answer as its predecessor. Developing countries would 
have a cap of 150%, which was one-third more than the developed country limit.246 
Presumably, they would also make an extra payment, albeit a less onerous one than 
required of developed countries. 
F. Tariff Escalation 
 On how to reduce tariff escalation, the December 2008 Text was a verbatim 
repetition of the July Text. The July Text was premised on Texts from February and May 
2008 and a January 2008 Working Paper on Tariff Escalation. Not much had occurred in 
                                                 
244  Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 76 (last sentence), 
with July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 76 (last sentence). 
245  See April 2011 Agriculture Document, supra note 90, ¶ 16. 
246  Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, at ¶ 76 n.14, with July 
2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, at ¶ 76 n.12. 
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negotiations during 2008. Like its predecessor, the December 2008 Text included special 
provisions for commodity-dependent producing countries in the event the adverse effects 
of tariff escalation were not mitigated by the agreed-upon tiered tariff cutting formula247 
and a provisional list of products (in Annex D) vulnerable to tariff escalation.248 
 Tariff escalation occurs if a processed product has imposed on it a duty rate 
significantly above the unprocessed product. “Significance” is defined as an escalation of 
more than five percentage points (i.e., the tariff rate on a processed product is more than 
five ad valorem percentage points than on the primary product related to it).249 The effect 
of tariff escalation is to protect processing operations, typically in rich countries, against 
providers of raw materials and intermediate goods, which usually are in poor countries. 
Tariff escalation discourages the establishment of vertically integrated industries in poor 
countries, leaving them dependent on rich countries for finished products. 
 The December 2008 Text contained a reasonably straightforward strategy to 
combat tariff escalation.250 It would apply to all developed countries and—on a voluntary 
basis—any developing country that happened to have escalated tariffs. The strategy 
                                                 
247  Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 91–102, with July 
2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 88–99. In brief, these provisions covered (1) the 
methodology to help commodity-producing countries deal with tariff escalation on items of interest to 
them, including appropriate tariff escalation reductions, (2) elimination of non-tariff measures affecting 
trade in commodities, (3) joint action under GATT Article XXXVIII (which concerns such action) by 
WTO Members to help these producing countries, including the adoption of inter-governmental commodity 
agreements, (4) the relationship of GATT Article XX(h) (which exempts those arrangements from normal 
GATT obligations) to arrangements by commodity-dependent producing countries, and (5) technical 
assistance to improve world markets for commodities and the adoption and implementation of inter-
governmental commodity agreements. 
248  Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 84, with July 2008 
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 81. 
249  Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 87, with July 2008 
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 84. 
250  Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 85–90, Annex D, 
with July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 82–87, Annex D. If the tariff 
reduction on a tropical product (discussed below) were larger than the tariff cut under the escalation rules, 
then the tropical reduction cut would be applied. See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, 
supra note 74, ¶¶ 85–90, Annex D; July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 82–87, 
Annex D.   
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would not apply to any Sensitive Products. 
 Instead of imposing the tariff reduction to the final bound MFN rate in the band in 
which a processed product (benefitting from tariff escalation) belongs, that escalated 
processed product would be subject to the cut of the next highest tier from the tier it is in. 
Thus, suppose an escalated product attracts a 60% tariff. It is in the second-highest tier 
(tariffs between 50–75%), and the tariff is cut by 64%. However, as an escalated product, 
it is re-classified—bumped up—into the highest tier (tariffs over 75%). The consequent 
tariff cut is 70%. What if the escalated product already is in the highest tier? Then, the 
tariff cut would be an additional six percentage points (i.e., a cut of 76% to the tariff). 
 Interestingly, the above strategy would not apply in full if doing so would reduce 
the tariff of the processed product to below the primary product.251 Consequently, the 
strategy would mitigate tariff escalation but not create tariff inversion (the occurrence of 
a higher tariff on the primary than on the processed good). If tariff inversion were to 
occur by applying the strategy, then the cut would be moderated so as to produce tariff 
equivalence (the same duty rate on the primary and processed good).252 
G. Tariff Simplification 
 Tariff simplification provisions in the December 2008 Text were nearly identical 
to the contents of the July Text. Both texts laid out the obvious prohibition against 
                                                 
251  Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 88, with July 2008 
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 85. 
252  A development in the Doha Round negotiations that occurred in December 2009 illustrates the 
complexity of many issues at stake in the Round. The EU said it would revise its “Meursing Table.” The 
EU uses this Table to determine the customs duty owed on certain processed agricultural products, such as 
biscuits, cakes, and confectionaries. That duty is based on the composition of the products, with tariffs 
being defined according to the level of milk fat, protein, starch, and sugar in the processed product. 
Stunningly, under the Table, there are 27,720 possible combinations of tariffs. The EU offered to reduce 
that figure to under 300—still a large matrix of possibilities, but a 90 percent cut from an outrageous 
number. See Chair Plans Fortnights on Substance in Early 2010, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Dec. 11, 2009), 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news09_e/agng_07dec09_e.htm. 
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binding a tariff in a form that is more complex than its current one.253 However, the 
December Text created two stark options for WTO Members.254 As indicated in the April 
2011 Agriculture Document, the Members had yet to choose between these options.255 
 First, Members could agree all bound MFN tariffs must be expressed as simple, 
ad valorem tariffs. In other words, “tariff simplification” would apply to 100% of the 
bound tariff lines in the schedules of every Member. Second, Members could decide that 
simplification should apply to at least 90% of the bound rates in the schedules of a 
developed country. For the residual unconverted tariff lines, a developed country would 
have a year after implementation of any Doha Round agreement to decide on how to 
achieve simplification and reach 100% coverage. The EU managed to retain special 
dispensation. The EU would need to have only 85% of its tariff lines expressed as ad 
valorem rates within five years of implementation and could keep 5% of its lines as 
compound tariffs (i.e., a hybrid of a specific duty, which is a levy on a per unit basis, and 
an ad valorem tariff). 
 Under either alternative, Members would use the May 2005 Paris Methodology to 
convert non-ad valorem tariffs into their AVEs. An implementation period had yet to be 
set but presumably would be upon, or within a year or so after, the entry into force of any 
Doha Round accords. Also under both options, any developing country simplifying its 
tariff schedule would have an additional two years to complete the process. No tariff 
simplification obligations would be imposed on least developed countries. Critically, 
under either option all simplified bound tariffs must not increase the level of protection 
                                                 
253  Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 103, with July 2008 
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 100. 
254  Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 104–08, Annex N, 
with July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 101–04, Annex N. 
255  See April 2011 Agriculture Document, supra note 90, ¶¶ 21–25. 
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over their original complex form. 
H. Tariff Quotas 
 TRQs are used in more contexts than just the protection of Sensitive Products. 
Yet, in all contexts, TRQs provide protection that can be greater than a simple ad 
valorem tariff. An ad valorem tariff, unless it is set at a prohibitively high level, does not 
block imports. A TRQ can have that effect if the in-quota threshold is low, the above-
quota duty is high, and the administration of the scheme is not transparent. Accordingly, 
the reduction of duties associated with TRQ, and the improvement of TRQ 
administration, were topics addressed in the December 2008 Text. 
 The relevant provisions in the December Text were nearly identical to their 
counterparts in the July Text, with modest substantive and stylistic changes. The 
provisions applied to all TRQs, whether or not they protected a Sensitive Product. The 
new Text set out eight basic rules. 
 First, all developed countries must slash their bound in-quota MFN tariffs by 
50%, or to a rate of 10%. (So, 10% would be the ceiling in-quota tariff on any TRQ.) 
That would be true for all TRQs, whether or not they protected a Sensitive Product. The 
July Text had listed a range of 50–70%, and a rate of 0–15%.256 Thus, the December Text 
chose the low end of the range and a high end for the rate—both less ambitious choices 
from the perspective of free trade. The bindings would be in ad valorem form. The new 
Text provided greater provision than its predecessor on implementation of the cuts: 
reductions to in-quota tariffs on all TRQs would be phased in on the same schedule as 
                                                 
256  Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 109, 114, with July 
2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 105. If a TRQ covered two or more tariff lines 
that were Sensitive Products, and thereby subject to expansion requirements under the rules for those 
Products, then the reduction would commence with the lowest of the bound in-quota rates applicable to the 
lines under the single TRQ. 
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expansions of in-quota volume thresholds for TRQs on Sensitive Products. The 
maximum in-quota tariff on the first day of implementation would have to be 17.5%. 
Notably, reductions of in-quota tariffs would not count for the purposes of calculating 
average farm tariff cuts under the tiered tariff reduction formula. 
 Second, for all developed countries, low in-quota rates would have to be 
eliminated. Specifically, if the in-quota MFN rate already was bound at or below 5%, 
then a developed country would have to reduce it to zero. The developed country would 
have to do so by the end of the first year of implementation. 
 Third, Switzerland—obviously a developed country—would get S & D treatment 
in two respects.257 It would not be obligated to reduce to 10% the bound in-quota tariffs 
on two lines of bread cereals. It also would not be obligated to cut to zero its in-quota 
tariff for two specific tariff lines covering wine. However, to compensate bread and wine 
cereal exporters, Switzerland would have to provide new market access opportunities 
equal to 1% of domestic consumption. The sui generis rules for Switzerland were in the 
December, but not July, Text, implying it had lobbied effectively in the fall of 2008 on 
behalf of the interested domestic industries. 
 Fourth, developing countries would get S & D treatment.258 They would have to 
reduce their bound in-quota MFN tariffs by 15%, which essentially represented an 
obligation one-third as onerous as on developed countries. However, developing 
countries would not have to reduce their tariffs to a set rate, even if that would produce a 
lower duty rate, nor would they have to cut to zero rates that already were at or below 
5%. There would be no cap on the level of their in-quota rates. Similarly, as an 
                                                 
257  See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 109 n.19. 
258  Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 111, with July 2008 
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 105. 
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innovation in the December 2008 Text, if a tariff line protected by a TRQ is a Special 
Product (discussed below) designated by a developing country for no tariff cut, then the 
country would not have to cut its in-quota rate at all.259 
 Fifth, SVEs would get even more generous S & D treatment than developing 
countries. They would be treated like developing countries (as above). But, they would be 
obliged to reduce their bound in-quota MFN tariffs by just 7.5%. There would be no cap 
on the level of their in-quota rates. Similarly, as an innovation in the December 2008 
Text, SVEs would not have to reduce the in-quota tariff on any Special Product, 
regardless of whether they had slated that Product for a zero tariff cut.260 Venezuela 
would be treated as an SVE for these purposes. 
 Sixth, RAMs also would get enhanced S & D treatment.261 Older RAMs would be 
entitled to reduce their bound in-quota MFN tariffs by one-third of the percentage of the 
cut required of developing countries. They would not need to reduce any in-quota rate at 
or below 15%. The July Text set that threshold at 10%. Hence, the December Text moved 
in favor of the RAMs and away from trade liberalization. Newer RAMs—Macedonia, 
Saudi Arabia, Tonga, Ukraine, and Vietnam—would have no reduction obligations. For 
this purpose, it appears Venezuela was treated as a newer RAM. Likewise, small, low 
income RAMs with economies in transition—Albania, Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Moldova, and Mongolia—would have no such obligations. 
 Seventh, if a TRQ is not operational, then a WTO Member—whether it is a 
                                                 
259  Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 111 (last sentence), 
with July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 105. 
260  Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 112, with July 2008 
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 105. 
261  Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 113, with July 2008 
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 105. 
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developed or developing country—should consider eliminating that TRQ. 262  This 
provision was an innovation in the December 2008 Text. “Non-operational” means the 
bound MFN in-quota rate equals or exceeds the above-quota rate. A Member that agreed 
to eradicate non-operational TRQs would be rewarded by a less onerous obligation to cut 
tariffs on its remaining operational TRQs. Specifically, it would be permitted to cut the 
in-quota rates by 50%, or to a threshold of 8% (2 percentage points less than the normal 
10%). 
 And finally, the December Text contained the identical proposed rules on TRQ 
administration set out in the July Text.263 They explained that this administration would 
be deemed an instance of import licensing under the WTO Agreement on Import 
Licensing Procedures.264 They also laid out requirements on publication of information 
about TRQs, processing applications for licensing to import under a TRQ, TRQ fill rates, 
and ways to improve market access if the volume of imports persistently is less than the 
quota (i.e., the TRQ under-fill problem where there is less than full utilization of the in-
quota threshold). 
I. SSGs 
 The general safeguard remedy against fair foreign trade, first established in GATT 
Article XIX and refined in the WTO Agreement on Safeguards, has a long history and 
plenty of underlying justifications.265 Newer, and perhaps more obviously protectionist, 
                                                 
262  Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 110, with July 2008 
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 105. 
263  See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 115–25; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 106–16. In both Drafts, Annex E contained details about a 
proposed TRQ underfill mechanism. 
264  This Agreement is reprinted in a variety of sources, including BHALA, supra note 1, Supp., 
Document 26, at 423–30. 
265  Those justifications are set out in BHALA, supra note 1, ch. 37, and BHALA, supra note 138, at  
939–52. 
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are special safeguards (SSGs) targeted at specific kinds of products. Article 5 of the 
WTO Agreement on Agriculture introduced this remedy for farm products. However, not 
all WTO Members were able or in a position to take advantage of it. The disadvantaged 
Members—largely poor countries with little legal capacity during the Uruguay Round, 
when the Agreement on Agriculture was negotiated—clamored for its removal. 
 Specifically, the December 2008 Text dealt with the problem many developing 
countries face; namely, in the Uruguay Round, they gave up their right to use the SSG 
remedy under Article 5 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. They are ineligible for 
use of the SSG. That is because the remedy applies only to products that have been 
tariffed (i.e., farm goods that before the Uruguay Round had been protected by non-tariff 
barriers (e.g., discretionary import licensing, import bans, quotas, or variable duties) but 
subsequently by tariffs because of conversion from non-tariff barriers to duty rates). On 
several products, many developing countries elected to establish a ceiling binding on 
their levels of non-tariff barrier protection but not convert that protection to a tariff. For 
such products, the SSG technically was inapplicable. 
 Accordingly, for both rich and poor countries, the December 2008 Text modified 
the SSG proposals that the July Text had set out.266 In the earlier Text, the choices were 
that developed countries would (1) have to cease using the SSG or (2) reduce the number 
of products to which they could apply this remedy to 1.5% of tariff lines. The new Text 
combined the options. Developed countries would have to reduce to 1% of their tariff 
lines the number of lines eligible for an SSG. They would have to do so as soon as any 
Doha Round accords entered into force. Critically, at the end of the seventh year of 
                                                 
266  Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 126, with July 2008 
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 117. 
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implementation of the accords, developed countries would have to eliminate all SSG 
designations. That is, the SSG remedy would sunset in seven years. Further, no SSG 
could lead to a remedial duty in excess of the pre-Round bound tariff level. 
 The December Text also changed the provisions from the July Text on developing 
country entitlement and usage of SSGs.267 Any developing country could use an SSG, but 
the product lines to which they might apply an SSG could not exceed 2.5% of their total 
tariff lines. The July Text set a coverage threshold of 3%. Obviously, the higher the 
threshold, the greater the risk to agricultural exporters that the farm products they ship 
might get whacked with an SSG. Thus, the slight reduction was a step in the direction of 
free trade. If a developing country already has designated more than that threshold, then it 
would have to reduce the coverage to 2.5% of tariff lines as soon as any Doha Round 
accords took effect. For SVEs, that coverage threshold would be higher—5% of tariff 
lines could be subject to an SSG. The SVEs would have twelve years to reach this target. 
VI. Restricting Agricultural Market Access Through S & D Treatment 
A. Special Products 
 The invention of fine distinctions, such as between “Special” and “Sensitive” 
merchandise, is one reason why the world of international trade law sometimes is a 
strange one, at least to everyday commercial market participants. The designation of an 
agricultural good as a “Special Product” is another form of S & D treatment for poor 
countries, but another restriction on market access. For much of the Doha Round, 
developing countries, led by China and India, had insisted on the right to identify some of 
the farm goods they produce as Special and thereby exempt them—partially, or even 
                                                 
267  Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 127, with July 2008 
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 118. 
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entirely—from any tariff cut under the tiered tariff formula. This right would not be 
conferred on developed countries. And, it was in addition to the right of all WTO 
Members, whether developing or developed, to designate Sensitive Products. 
 The December 2008 Text largely replicated the proposed rules on Special 
Products contained in the July Text. Thus, the new Text dealt with four key issues: 
(1) What criteria should govern the designation of a good as Special? 
(2) How many goods could receive the Special Product designation? 
(3) How many Special Products could be exempt from any tariff cut as so-called 
Super Special Products? 
(4) What should the average tariff cut on Special Products be? 
The proposed rules endeavored to balance a free trade outcome in which Special Product 
designations would be tightly restricted; none would be shielded entirely from tariff cuts, 
and average cuts would be steep; and a protectionist result in which developing countries 
would have plenty of policy space in these areas. 
 On the first issue, the December 2008 Text reaffirmed the right of developing 
countries to self-designate a good as Special.268 These countries would have to apply 
three criteria: food security, livelihood security, and rural development. In other words, 
the designation could not be for the purpose of protecting a politically favored domestic 
farm sector but rather had to advance some fundamental purpose. Annex F to the Text 
contained specific indicators under each of these three criteria. 
 On the second issue, the December 2008 Text altered the key figure from what 
the July Text stated. The July Text said the minimum and maximum entitlement for 
                                                 
268  Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 129, Annex F, with 
July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 120, Annex F. 
 
136 
 
 
Special Product designations would be between 10% and 18% of all agricultural tariff 
lines, respectively. The December Text set the entitlement at 12%. Without doubt, that 
number was too low for China, India, the Philippines, and other members of the Group of 
33 (G-33) developing countries.269 They continued to press for the right to designate at 
least 20% of their farm tariff lines as Special.270 However, the April 2011 Agriculture 
Document indicated no consensus existed on these key numbers.271 
 On the third issue, the December 2008 Text embodied the same two-tier system 
for Special Products, but again altered the key figures. Super Special Products would be 
entitled to immunity from tariff cuts. But, no more than 5% of agricultural tariff lines 
could fall into this tier. The July Text had specified 6%. Hence, the new Text was a small 
step toward trade liberalization. Yet, again, the April 2011 Agriculture Document showed 
no agreement on these important figures.272 
 As to the fourth issue, the December Text called for an overall average tariff cut 
on Special Products of 11%. The July Text identified a range of 10–14%; thus the new 
Text chose the more trade-liberalizing end of that range.273 However, on the 11% target, 
and indeed on the limitation of Special Product designations to 12% of agricultural tariff 
lines and Super Special Products to 5% of the lines, many poor countries objected. The 
December Text, with remarkable candor, noted that they disagreed with these figures, 
                                                 
269  The G-33 actually has 46 WTO Members in it: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Benin, 
Botswana, Bolivia, China, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Korea, Madagascar, 
Mongolia, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Saint Kitts 
and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Tanzania, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
270  See Hopes High that Doha Round to Move Anew, BUS. MIRROR (Dec. 7, 2008), available at 
http://buisinessmirror.com.ph. 
271  See April 2011 Agriculture Document, supra note 90, ¶¶ 26–28. 
272  See id. 
273  See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 129; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 120. 
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and a resolution suitable to them would depend on outcomes on other agricultural trade 
issues. 
 Finally, the December Text retained essentially the same S & D treatment for 
RAMs and SVEs that the July Text had set out.274 RAMs would have the ability to 
identify up to 13% of their agricultural tariff lines as Special Products (whereas the July 
Text had specified one-tenth more than developing countries). The new Text also said 
RAMs would be obliged to reach an overall average tariff cut on Special Products of 
10%. SVEs would have the option of following the same rules on Special Products as for 
developing countries, along with moderated reductions under the tiered tariff formula 
cuts. Alternatively, they could eschew application of the tiered tariff formula to Special 
Products and reach an overall average tariff cut of 24% on as many tariff lines as they 
sought to designate as Special. 
B. SSMs 
 Disputes over the Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) had been the proximate 
cause of the collapse of the July 2008 Ministerial meeting at the WTO. The basic idea of 
an SSM was to allow a developing country to raise tariffs on agricultural imports, on a 
temporary basis, to protect its vulnerable domestic farmers producing a like product from 
a sudden, disruptive surge of those imports. That surge would occur, if at all, because of 
lower tariffs the developing country was obliged to maintain as a result of a Doha Round 
agreement. This idea, simple as it sounded, proved notoriously contentious. 
 America was deeply suspicious of the SSM, fearing its use by the likes of Brazil, 
China, and India would erode any market access gains the United States had won through 
                                                 
274  Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 130–31, with July 
2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 121–22. 
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general formulaic tariff cuts. 275  Islam Siddiqui, the Chief American Agriculture 
Negotiator for the Obama Administration, outlined the basic differences in October 2010 
at which point serious differences on the issue continued: 
On the one hand, you have countries like China that continue to want a 
“simple and easy to use” SSM that would allow China to walk back on its 
previously bound tariff commitments and raise its duties on soybeans, 
pork, processed products, and other goods through the use of a newly 
created SSM. Our concerns, shared by other developed- and developing-
country agricultural exporters, are that such an “easy-to-use” SSM—one 
without reasonable criteria defining its use—would be “easy to abuse.”276 
 
In his April 2011 Agriculture Document, Chairman Walker recounted that in October 
2010, he: 
advised the Negotiating Group . . . that the stage of useful analytical 
discussion [on topics such as price trigger criteria, price and volume cross-
checks, seasonality, flexibilities for SVEs, and pro-ration] appeared to 
have been exhausted. What was needed beyond that was “problem 
solving” engagement among Members to design a [special safeguard] 
mechanism capable of being used to address cases of disruptive import 
surges while not disrupting demand-induced trade.277 
 
The need for “problem solving” persisted, with “no compromise options” even being 
offered for consideration following his admonition.278 
 The United States concern was not without cause. China (in 2010) became the top 
destination for American agricultural exports (generating $17.5 billion in export sales out 
of total American farm exports of $115.8 billion), importing 58% of American soybean 
exports (the single largest product) and 20% of both U.S. cotton and vegetable oil.279 The 
                                                 
275  See Daniel Pruzin, Latest Round of WTO Farm Talks Reveals Mixed Progress on SSM, Special 
Products, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1602 (Nov. 26, 2009). 
276  Pruzin, supra note 121, at 1542. 
277  See April 2011 Agriculture Document, ¶ 35; see also id. ¶¶ 29–30. 
278  See id. ¶ 36. 
 
279  Vilsack Says China Top Market for U.S. Agriculture Exports in 2010, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 
No. 352, at xx (Mar. 3, 2011) [hereinafter Vilsack Says]. 
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United States wanted to secure, and expand, this robust market.280 Notably, every $1 
billion in agricultural exports supports 8000 jobs in the United States281 Hence, China’s 
purchases accounted for about 140,000 jobs. 
 Manifestly, the United States was not alone in its concern. Even some developing 
countries, with major exporting interests such as Costa Rica, Malaysia, and Thailand, did 
not like the idea of an SSM. But, Brazil, China, and India regarded inclusion of an SSM 
as a non-negotiable matter. Thus, negotiations during fall 2008 on the issue produced no 
breakthrough. Not surprisingly, the December 2008 Text was a verbatim repetition of the 
July 2008 Text (i.e., the same proposed rules that led to the Ministerial failure 
reappeared). 
 About 100 developing countries, led by China and India, continued to demand an 
SSM remedy they could use with reasonable ease so as to protect the livelihood of 
subsistence farmers—upwards of 700 million of them in China and 600 million in 
India.282 China and India were concerned not only about surges of agricultural products 
from developed (and even some developing) countries but also with surges of farm goods 
subsidized by the United States and EU. Developed countries led by the United States 
rejected that position as an opportunity to scupper all market access gains won through 
other rules. They also saw the SSM as a device to impede normal trade growth by 
mischaracterizing such growth as a surge. In other words, the two sides had entirely 
                                                 
280  See id. Canada is the second largest market for American agricultural exports. In 2000, the year 
before China joined the WTO, it accounted for 19% of the total U.S. soybean export market. Id. See also 
Liz White, 2011 Crop Stocks Still Tight as Prices Climb, Affects ‘12 Farm Bill, Agriculture Leaders Say, 
28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 351 (Mar. 3, 2011) (containing some of the above-referenced figures). 
281  Vilsack Says, supra note 279, at 352. 
282  See WTO May Call Meeting on Doha Pact, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 8, 2008, 
http://www.truthabouttrade.org/2008/12/10/wto-may-call-meeting-on-doha-pact/; Arun S, Differences in 
Revised WTO Texts Will Lead to Doha Round Failure, FIN. EXPRESS, Dec. 8, 2008, 
http://www.financialexpress.com/news/differences-in-revised-wto-texts-will-lead-to-doha-round-
failure/395483/#. 
 
140 
 
 
different views of what the SSM was all about. Most developing countries saw it as an 
operationally simple and effective device to mitigate a sudden surge in imports in a 
timely fashion, not as an impediment to market access.283 Developed countries viewed 
the SSM as a burden on, and potentially a closure of, market access. 
 Helpfully, Chairman Falconer issued a three-page document—Revised Draft 
Modalities for Agriculture Special Safeguard Mechanism—that suggested elements of 
convergence. First, the SSM would be a remedy available only to developing 
countries.284 That remedy would be a tariff calculated on the basis of the post-Doha 
Round bound MFN rate (even if the applied rate were below the bound rate). Thus, there 
was a kind of symmetry proposed: just as Sensitive Product designations would be 
available to all WTO Members, but Special Product designations only to developing 
countries, the SSG would be available to all Members, but the SSM only to developing 
countries. The July 2008 Text removed an important limitation from the May 2008 Text 
concerning the scope of SSMs when invoked by a developing country.285 
 Unlike an SSG, however, an SSM could be used on any product—there would be 
no a priori product limitations. Also unlike the SSG, an SSM would be invoked on the 
basis of either a price or volume trigger. So as to avoid multiple layers of remedial trade 
measures, a developing country could not invoke an SSM if it had an SSG, or a general 
safeguard under GATT Article XIX and the Agreement on Safeguards, in place on the 
                                                 
283  See Daniel Pruzin & Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. Sought to Water Down Proposal for “Stock-Taking” 
Meeting on Doha, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1673, at xx (Dec. 3, 2009). 
284  See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 132; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 123. 
285  Compare Committee on Agriculture, Special Session, Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture, ¶ 
121, TN/AG/W/4/Rev.2 (May 19, 2008) (last sentence), with July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, 
supra note 128, ¶ 123. 
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same product.286 Similarly, the same product could not be subject simultaneously to a 
price and volume based SSM. In brief, “one remedy at a time” would be the rule. 
 Would SVEs be included in the grouping of developing countries? The December 
2008 Text did not resolve the question. Following the pattern of a metastasizing of S & D 
treatment into ever-finer gradations of Members, in February 2009, the G-33 developing 
countries called for extra flexibility for SVEs. Because of their status, surely it ought to 
be easier for SVEs to invoke an SSM more easily, and with greater protective effect, than 
for a normal developing country.287 Thus, the G-33 proposal called for lower price and 
volume triggers, and perhaps also a stronger remedy, under the SSM. That proposal 
seemed likely to meet with resistance from the United States or other developed 
countries. 
 Second, the July 2008 Text restricted the use of an SSM to no more than between 
three and eight products in any twelve-month period. The July Text said the SSM, in 
principle, could be invoked on all tariff lines. Manifestly, that statement vastly expanded 
the scope of the remedy, though the twelve-month limit remained in the new Text (and 
the same six-month limit for seasonal products). No developing country could apply an 
SSM consecutively to the same imported farm good for more than two periods. 
 As for the volume-based trigger, the essential idea would be the greater the import 
volume surge over a defined threshold, the more severe the protective remedy allowed, 
with the range being additional tariffs (above the normal MFN rate) of 25–50%. 
However, a surge must be distinguished from a normal increase in trade volume. 
                                                 
286  This Agreement is reprinted in a variety of sources, including BHALA, supra note 1, Supp., 
Document 28, at 479–88. 
287  See Fratini Vergano, The EC Prepares Countervailing Measures Against Exports of Biodiesel 
from the US, TRADE PERSP. (Feb. 27, 2009), http://www.fratinivergano.eu/TradePerspectives/Iissue 
4_27_02_09.html. 
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Consequently, the December 2008 Text set three tiers of trigger surges and correlative 
remedies. Table VII summarizes them.288 
TABLE VII: 
VOLUME-BASED TRIGGER FOR SSM REMEDY IN 
DECEMBER 2008 DRAFT AGRICULTURE MODALITIES TEXT 
Tier Import Volume— 
Actual Imports in Any 
Year Measured Against 
Base Imports 
(rolling average of 
imports in preceding 
three-year period) 
SSM Remedy— 
Maximum Permissible 
Additional Duty 
(on top of Applied Rate) 
  
Lowest Actual import volume 
exceeds 110%, but not 
115%, of Base Imports 
25% of the current bound 
MFN tariff, or twenty-five 
percentage points, 
whichever is higher 
Middle Actual import volume 
exceeds 115%, but not 
135%, of Base Imports 
40% of the current bound 
MFN tariff, or forty 
percentage points, 
whichever is higher 
Highest Actual import volume 
exceeds 135% of Base 
Imports 
50% of the current bound 
MFN tariff, or fifty 
percentage points, 
whichever is higher 
 
The import volume triggers supposedly synthesized calls by the G-33, which proposed 
allowing an SSM when imports are as little as 5% over the average of the preceding three 
years, and MERCOSUR, which sought to limit the remedy to a maximum additional duty 
of between 20% and 30%. 
                                                 
288  Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 133, 138, 141, with 
July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 124, 129, 132. In checking whether a 
volume trigger was met, a developing country could count imports under an obligatory TRQ increase, 
unless the volume increase under that TRQ was attributable solely to a scheduled access opportunity for a 
Sensitive Product. But, no SSM remedy could be imposed on imports within that increase. In other words, 
an importing country could not take away the enhanced market access from a scheduled TRQ expansion by 
slapping an SSM on the farm products imported under the higher in-quota threshold. See December 2008 
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 134. 
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 As Table VII indicates, import volume would be calculated from data in the 
relevant preceding three-year period. (The technical details of how to calculate this base 
period, as well as that for the price trigger SSM, were not spelled out in the December 
2008 Draft and were the subject of debate.)289 The average during that period would be 
the Base Level against which to measure current imports during any year. If current 
imports exceeded the Base Level trigger, then the prescribed remedy could be applied. A 
de minimis exception existed: if a volume trigger is satisfied but the absolute level of 
imports is “manifestly negligible” relative to domestic production and consumption, then 
a developing country would not be permitted to take action.290 There was no numerical 
definition of “manifestly negligible;” hence the exception remained ambiguous. 
 The price trigger SSM would be fairly straightforward. There would have to be a 
15% drop in the actual import price of a shipment of the farm product in question before 
a developing country could apply an SSM.291 That import price would be judged against 
a benchmark—namely, the trigger price. The trigger price would be the monthly average 
CIF (cost, insurance, and freight) import price during the most recent three-year period. 
Thus, if the import price of the farm product in question fell below 85% of the average 
monthly price in the preceding three years, then the price-trigger SSM could be invoked. 
The comparison of actual import prices against the benchmark would be made, and any 
price-trigger SSM applied, on a shipment-by-shipment basis. As for the remedy with a 
price-based SSM, it would be an additional duty not to exceed 85% of the difference 
                                                 
289  See Pruzin, supra note 275, at 1602. 
290  Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 133(d), with July 
2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 124(d). 
291  Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 135–36, 138, 141, 
with July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 126–27, 129, 132. 
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between the import price of the shipment concerned and the trigger price.292 
 All price data would be converted (if necessary) into the domestic currency of the 
importing developing country. If that currency had depreciated by 10% or more during 
the previous year relative to the international currency or currencies against which it is 
normally measured, then the actual import price would be computed and converted using 
an average exchange rate of the currency vis-à-vis the international currency or 
currencies. This proviso would help ensure a large depreciation, which would exacerbate 
the gap between actual and target prices, and would not be the cause for applying an 
SSM. Moreover, a developing country would not normally be allowed to apply a price-
triggered SSM if the volume of imports in question in the current year was “manifestly 
declining” or was at a “manifestly negligible level incapable of undermining the domestic 
price level.”293 A cross-check mechanism existed: a developing country could not invoke 
a price-triggered SSM if prices fell but import volumes did not rise. 
 The volume-based SSM remedy would be constrained in duration. No volume-
triggered SSM could be maintained for longer than twelve months.294 For a seasonal 
agricultural product, the maximum period would be the longer of (1) six months and (2) 
the period of seasonality. No farm product could be subject to a volume-based trigger 
consecutively for more than two periods. If a developing country used the remedy for two 
consecutive periods, then it would be obliged to respect a mandatory holiday—namely, 
not resort to the remedy again on the same product until another two periods had elapsed. 
                                                 
292  An SSM remedy, whether price- or volume-based, would not apply to shipments of the product in 
question that had been contracted for, and were en route, before the effective date of the remedy. In other 
words, the SSM would not apply retrospectively. See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, 
supra note 74, ¶ 139; July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 130. 
293  Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 137, with July 2008 
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 128. 
294  Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 140, with July 2008 
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 131. 
 
145 
 
 
Oddly, perhaps, this limitation did not apply expressly to the price-based SSM remedy; to 
adapt the calculation for triggering the safeguard so that it takes into account the 
possibility that imports in an earlier period, when a safeguard was being used, might be 
lower than the general trend and therefore might exaggerate an import surge in a 
subsequent year, triggering the use of the safeguard again. 
 A related problem, known as “pro-ration,” bedeviled the negotiators.295 If an SSM 
remedy is applied, then it obviously will dampen imports. That decline could make it 
easier to impose an SSM on the same product in the future. Why? Because measuring 
volume from the most recent three-year period as a base would show a low level of 
import volume on account of the SSM. In turn, it would be easier to find a surge, owing 
to that lower base. Thus, negotiators needed to find a way to calculate an SSM volume 
trigger that would account for the possibility that during an earlier period, when an SSM 
was in place, imports were lower than the general trend, and thus an import surge in a 
subsequent year would be exaggerated. Failure to do so would mean the volume trigger 
could be reached erroneously, as it were. 
 Could an SSM remedy lead to a tariff imposed on the farm product in question in 
excess of the bound MFN tariff rate as set before the Doha Round? The question was one 
of the most controversial topics debated among WTO Members in 2008, pitting China 
and India on one side and the United States on the other side. The general answer would 
be “no,” said the December 2008 Text, like its predecessor. That is, no SSM remedy, 
either volume- or price-based, could lead to a duty rate that exceeded the pre-Round 
                                                 
295  See Pruzin, supra note 275, at 1602. 
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bound tariff level.296 The rate a developing country had before the Round would be the 
upper boundary of the SSM remedy. 
 However, there would be three exceptions: 
(1) Least developed countries could breach their pre-Doha Round bound rate, but not 
by more than 40 ad valorem percentage points, or 40% of their bound rate, 
whichever proved higher.297 
(2) On up to 10–15% of their tariff lines, SVEs, along with Bolivia, Congo, Côte 
d’Ivoire, and Nigeria (and possibly other Members), could exceed their pre-Doha 
bound rates by up to 20 ad valorem percentage points, or 20% of their bound rate, 
whichever is higher.298 
(3) Some developing countries, other than SVEs, would be able to apply a maximum 
SSM remedy above the pre-Round level on between 2–6% of their tariff lines.299 
They could not exceed the higher of 15 ad valorem percentage points above that 
level, or 15%, of the bound rate. 
In sum, the general constraint would ensure that a post-Round MFN tariff binding, plus 
an SSM remedy, would not put affected exporting countries worse off than they had been 
before the Doha Round. But, the S & D treatment afforded to least developed countries, 
SVEs, and certain developing countries meant exporters of targeted farm goods indeed 
could be worse off than before. 
 As for the document from Chairman Falconer on Revised Draft SSM Modalities, 
                                                 
296  Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 142, with July 2008 
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 133. 
297  Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 143, with July 2008 
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 134. 
298  Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 144, with July 2008 
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 135. 
299  Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 145, with July 2008 
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 136. 
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it tried to bridge the gap between the likes of China and India, on one side, and the United 
States, on the other side. This document offered rules, some as alternatives, some as 
complements, to the December 2008 Text provisions on SSM.300 
(1) A so-called double volume-based SSM trigger could lead to a remedy above the 
bound rate. First, if the import surge exceeded 120%, but was less than 140%, of 
the base import level (calculated as an average of imports in the three preceding 
years), then the maximum additional duty could not exceed the higher of one third 
of the bound tariff, or 8 percentage points. Second, if the surge were greater than 
140% of the bound level, then the SSM remedy could lead to an additional duty 
not in excess of the higher of one-half the bound rate, or 12 percentage points. In 
brief, the greater the surge, the greater the permissible remedial duty in excess of 
the pre-Round bound rate. 
(2) Absent exceptional circumstances (namely, an imminently foreseeable price 
decline based on reliable price data), a volume-based SSM could not be invoked 
unless domestic prices of the protected product were falling (and then only subject 
to review, if requested, by a standing panel of experts). In other words, there was 
a cross-check mechanism on the volume-based SSM: a developing country could 
not invoke a volume-triggered SSM if import volumes rose but prices did not 
decline. 
(3) The volume-based SSM could be applied for a maximum of four to eight months, 
and not re-applied until a further equivalent number of months had elapsed. There 
would be an overall cap on applying the volume-based SSM—it could not be used 
                                                 
301 See Sudeep Doshi, Leading the Way to a Trade Deal, FAR E. ECON. REV., Sept. 14, 2009, 
www.feer.com (quoting Mr. Rockwell). 
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against more than 2.5% of tariff lines in any twelve-month period. 
(4) On seasonable perishable products, an SSM could be paused, so that it could 
apply for a few months in one twelve-month period, and then a few months in the 
next twelve-month period. But, it could not spill over into a third twelve-month 
period. The months in which the remedy would be applied would be the peak 
periods in which domestic producers in the importing country faced the greatest 
amount of competition from abroad. 
(5) Least developed countries and SVEs would have greater flexibility than regular 
developing countries on the aforementioned points, as determined by subsequent 
negotiations. 
Whether any of these suggestions would bridge the gap was unclear. Yet two 
points were obvious. First, the integrity of the Uruguay Round tariff bindings would be 
seriously compromised by exceptions to the general constraint and the double-volume 
based trigger. Second, the entire area of SSMs was littered with mind-numbing technical 
hoops through which a developing country would have to jump before invoking the 
remedy. The first point entailed a clear deviation from free trade principles. The second 
point manifests a deviation from clarity itself. 
 The Chief Spokesman for the WTO, Keith Rockwell, later tried to put a brave 
face on the SSM conflict: 
“If the question is: do we need something in place to protect poor farmers? 
Then the answer is yes, by consensus. If the question is: do we want to 
ensure that a tariff mechanism is not abused and that normal trade flow is 
not disrupted? Then the answer is also yes, by consensus.” This reduces 
the debate to numbers, such as thresholds, duration periods, and 
flexibilities. While admittedly complicated, these provide a more concrete 
negotiation currency than plain rhetoric. “If you look at it this way, the 
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likelihood of reaching an agreement increases,” Mr. Rockwell says.301 
 
The skeptical response about that likelihood is “not necessarily.” The proposition in the 
passage is that there is a consensus among WTO Members on a SSM to protect poor 
farmers that, on the one hand, is a substantively useful remedy but, on the other hand, is 
subject to strict disciplines so that the remedy is not abused for protectionist purposes. 
That proposition is milk toast (i.e., it is so bland that nearly any Member can agree to it). 
It is akin to the statement often heard from Members and their political leaders that they 
want free trade, but it must be fair trade, too. After all, if the level of generality of a 
proposition is sufficiently high, then of course consensus can be reached. 
 That there was indeed no consensus was apparent from a January 2010 
communication circulated by the G-33 developing countries to the Members.302 They 
belittled the argument of the United States and certain other Members that the SSM 
would disrupt normal trade flows, observing that the concept of “normal trade” had never 
been defined in GATT-WTO history. No less significantly, the G-33 all but called the 
United States and developed countries “hypocrites.” The G-33 pointed out that with 
respect to the Uruguay Round SSG, 2,433 safeguard measures were notified to the WTO 
between 1995 and 2008. Which Members accounted for most of them? The answer was 
developed countries—they invoked 78% of the measures, suggesting that the developed 
country argument that developing countries would be “trigger happy” on the SSM was 
poppycock. Lest there be any doubt, the SSM was riddled with restrictions that made it 
difficult to invoke, especially strict trigger volumes and prices, restrictions on exceeding 
                                                 
301 See Sudeep Doshi, Leading the Way to a Trade Deal, FAR E. ECON. REV., Sept. 14, 2009, 
www.feer.com (quoting Mr. Rockwell). 
302  See Daniel Pruzin, G-33 Defends SSM in Agriculture, Stresses Need to Simplify Mechanism, 27 
Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 53, (Feb. 4, 2010). 
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bound tariff rates, pro-ration rules, and cross-check mechanisms. Thus, the G-33 intoned: 
It is remarkable that an instrument meant to address the development 
concerns of most developing country members is sought to be burdened 
with conditions far more restrictive than those on the SSG, which is 
mainly being used by developed countries.303 
 
Not surprisingly and in diametric contrast to the American position, the G-33 demanded 
amendment or removal of the limitations on the proposed SSM that would render it a 
remedy nearly impossible to invoke. For instance, in April 2011, one G-33 country, the 
Philippines, circulated a proposal that would provide extra S & D treatment for countries 
that have a low average bound tariff rate, which the Philippines defined at 40% or 
below.304 Such countries, it argued, should be allowed to invoke the SSM, and thereby 
raise tariffs as a safeguard under either a volume or price trigger, more easily than other 
countries. SVEs, which also sought additional flexibility on the SSM, supported the idea. 
Predictably, agriculture exporting countries opposed it. 
 Evidently, the devil truly is in the details of turning a general proposition into a 
legal and operational reality. The numbers, thresholds, duration periods, and flexibilities 
are all-important in determining whether an SSM is substantively useful to help poor 
farmers or whether it is susceptible to misuse by favored domestic agricultural interests in 
poor countries. Insofar as the Doha Round supposedly is about development—that 
middle “D” in the “DDA” acronym—the key SSM numbers should favor poor countries. 
That is, while endeavoring to steer a middle course, the Members should not hesitate to 
reach a consensus around numbers that might, on occasion, err in favor of developing 
country interests. That means, in the end, if a choice must be made, then helping poor 
                                                 
303  Id. 
304  See Farm Talks’ Chair Prepares ‘Contribution’, Next Steps to Be Discussed After 29 April, 
WORLD TRADE ORG. (Apr. 15, 2011), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news11_e/agng_15apr11_e.htm 
[hereinafter Farm Talks’ Chair]. 
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farmers should take precedence over avoiding disruption to normal trade flows. It is 
precisely this choice on which there was no consensus. 
C. Tropical Products and Preference Erosion 
 The problem of preference erosion in respect of agricultural products is 
conceptually no different from that of industrial products. The basic issue is the decline in 
the margin of preference—the difference between MFN duty rates and the preferential 
duty rate (which typically is zero)—as MFN rates fall through the implementation of 
successive multilateral trade round cuts. Preference granting countries, almost 
exclusively rich nations such as the United States and EU, are obliged to implement the 
cuts. Preference beneficiary countries invariably are a select group of poor countries 
(selected, of course, by the grantors according to criteria they set). The beneficiaries 
argue for delayed implementation of those cuts. That is because they fear export 
competition from like or substitutable products originating in third countries, both rich 
and poor, in the markets of the preference grantors. Why not urge the beneficiaries and 
phase in agricultural tariff cuts, especially on tropical products, which are of keen export 
interest to them, over an extended period of time? Because, reply third countries, every 
extra day of implementation beyond the normal period is a day their products do not 
benefit from agreed-upon tariff cuts. 
 In brief, the debate about preference erosion pits (inter alia) some poor countries 
against others in a zero-sum game. One side seeks to string out the maximum margin of 
preference for as long as possible. The other side wants a playing field leveled by MFN 
rates as quickly as possible. The game typically involves tropical products. That is 
because they are the archetypical kind of agricultural commodity eligible for a 
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preference, given that the grantors tend to be former colonial powers, and the 
beneficiaries (and, ironically, several third countries, too) are their poor former colonies. 
Ironically, given that the middle “D” in the DDA is for development, this zero-sum game 
was endemic in the Round since its November 2001 launch. That is because the Agenda 
calls both for the fullest liberalization of trade on tropical products, meaning cuts in 
tariffs on them above and beyond the reductions under the general tariff-cutting formula 
for other agricultural goods. Yet, the Agenda also asks that erosion of long-standing tariff 
preferences be addressed. 
 Not surprisingly, the December 2008 Text failed to resolve the zero-sum game, a 
failure intimated in the April 2011 Agriculture Document, despite “significant 
developments” in December 2009 in respect of preference erosion and a settlement to the 
infamous Banana War.305 On tropical products and preference erosion, the December 
2008 Text was the verbatim equivalent of the July 2008 Text.306  Tariffs on tropical 
products currently above 25% ad valorem would be cut by 85%. Tariffs at or below the 
25% threshold would be put to zero. As on other farm issues, the identical nature of the 
Texts did not intimate consensus. 
 The first problem was to agree to the list of products that would count as 
“tropical” and, therefore, be subject to tariff cuts that would (depending on the steepness 
of the reduction) erode a preference. Negotiations focused on a list of approximately 
forty-two products. This problem appeared resolved via an agreement to defer to the 
                                                 
305  See April 2011 Agriculture Document, supra note 90, ¶¶ 38–39, 43. 
306  Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 147–50, Annexes 
G–H, with July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 138–41, Annexes G–H. 
 Annex G to the July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text expanded the list of tropical products 
to include a wide array of fruit and vegetable items, coffee and tea, cigarettes and cigars, and rum. It may 
be observed that the inclusion for any trade liberalization benefits of tobacco and tobacco-related products, 
as tropical products, is ludicrous, in light of their well-known health risks. 
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African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) interest to preserve preferential access to the EU 
market on bananas, pineapples, rum, and sugar by excluding these products from the 
list.307 But, that resolution was not broad, deep, or conclusive. 
 As negotiations dragged on, both before and after December 2008, it became clear 
a significant and controversial link existed between settlement of the Bananas War, on 
the one hand, and the problem of tropical products and preference erosion, on the other 
hand. (This settlement is discussed in section X below.) Notably, under the terms of the 
15 December 2009 deal that ended the War, the signatories agreed to significant 
reductions in tariffs on certain tropical products in exchange for longer time periods for 
the EU to implement cuts on products of key export interest to ACP countries.308 That is, 
part of the Bananas War settlement was a deal on tropical products and preference 
erosion, which would (it was hoped) enter into a final Doha Round agreement on 
agriculture. Accordingly, the parties to this deal identified a list of goods that would 
qualify as “tropical products.” And, the EU agreed to trim the margin of preference 
enjoyed by ACP producer-exporters on such tropical products, and likewise for the 
United States in respect of its preference schemes, in exchange for an extended phase out 
of tariffs on those products via the Round. 
 The “preference erosion list,” which was drafted by the EU and agreed to by ACP 
                                                 
307  See Progress on EU-Latin American Banana Deal Made Before Collapse of Doha Round Talks, 
25 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1160, at 1160–61 (Aug. 7, 2008). In respect to preference erosion, 
pineapples appear not to have been a source of great controversy between ACP and Latin American 
exporters of the fruit, because the latter group enjoys preferential access to the EU market through the EU 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). See id. Other such products include arrowroot, cut flowers, and 
tobacco. See Jonathan Lynn, Update 1—EU Says Banana Deal Near, Some Producers Unhappy, REUTERS, 
Dec. 2, 2009, available at http://af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/idAFGEE5B11Z620091202?sp 
=true. 
308  The signatories to the tropical products-preference erosion portion of the settlement were the EU, 
ACP countries, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, and Peru. The 
U.S. was not a formal signatory. See Daniel Pruzin, EU, ACP Compromise on Tropical Products, Gives 
U.S., EU 10 Years to Make Tariff Cuts, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at xx (Jan. 7, 2010). Nevertheless, 
the U.S. was a contributor to the deal, and apparently agreed to adhere to its terms. 
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and Latin American countries, contained sixty-two tropical lines.309 This list was not 
made public. Reportedly, the lines excluded bananas; included bona fide tropical 
products such as pineapples, palm oil, sugar, and rice; and included some products that 
arguably are not tropical ones—citrus fruits, fresh cut flowers, fresh fruit (with some 
exceptions), fresh or chilled vegetables (with some exceptions), meats (such as beef), 
orange (and certain other fruit) juice, peas, roasted coffee, rum, table grapes, tobacco, and 
tomatoes. 
 Additionally, the United States had a list of eighteen tariff lines covering tropical 
products, the tariffs on which would be subject to longer phase out periods. The U.S. list 
included:310 
– Avocados; 
– Beverages, spirits, and vinegar; 
– Cigars, cheroots, and cigarillos; 
– Fresh or dried guavas, mangoes, and mangosteens; 
– Fruits and nuts; 
– Frozen orange juice; 
– Ground-nut oil; 
– Roots and tubers of arrowroot, salep, Jerusalem artichokes, and similar roots; 
– Rum and tafia; 
– Sauces; 
– Three tariff lines for fresh cut flowers; 
                                                 
309  See id.; Daniel Pruzin, India, Pakistan Issue Warning on Doha Tropical Products/Preference 
Erosion Deal, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1761, at xx (Dec. 24, 2009) [hereinafter Pruzin, India 
Pakistan]. 
310  See Pruzin, supra note 308, at 7. 
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– Two tariff lines for cane sugar; and 
– Two tariff lines for tobacco. 
This U.S. list included many items covered under American preference schemes such as 
the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and Central American Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA–DR). Thus, not surprisingly, the United States agreed with ACP and 
Latin American countries on its list. 
 Ostensibly, the goods on any preference erosion list are there to help preference 
beneficiaries, such as the ACP countries. As explained earlier, because goods on the list 
are considered “tropical” and are the subject of a preference, rapid tariff reduction under 
a Doha Round agreement would erode the margin of preference enjoyed by the 
beneficiaries quickly. But, a number of third countries—that is, poor countries that were 
not recipients of preferences in respect of the tropical products at issue—claimed that the 
real goal harbored by developed countries that grant preferences was to shield their 
sensitive sectors from third-country competition. For example, the presence of sugar on 
both the EU and U.S. lists suggested an interest in protecting their own sugar producers 
from low-cost imports from non-preference receiving third countries. 
 Thus, just two days after the 15 December 2009 Bananas War settlement, India 
and Pakistan jointly declared they might not accept the tropical products terms that were 
part of that settlement. They were not even signatories to the deal, which was among the 
EU, United States, ACP countries, and Latin countries. That fact in itself meant the 
tropical products terms could not automatically become part of a larger deal. India and 
Pakistan had legitimate trade concerns at stake. They were among the prominent third-
country exporters of tropical products. Agricultural exports account (as of 2008) for 12% 
 
156 
 
 
of total merchandise exports for India and 19% for Pakistan.311 In both countries, the 
growth trend has been upward: from $3.5 to $21.4 billion between 1990 and 2008 in 
India and from $1.1 to $3.9 billion between those same years in Pakistan. Manifestly, the 
larger the number of items on a “tropical products” list and the longer the phase out of 
tariffs on them by developed countries, the worse for India and Pakistan, and the better 
for their preference-recipient competitors in the Third World. 
 Achieving consensus on a “tropical products” list was only the first matter. A 
second problem was to agree on how to balance the basic tension between preference 
beneficiary countries and third countries. The rules proposed in the December 2008 Text, 
as in its predecessor, suggested that to achieve the fullest possible liberalization of trade 
in tropical products, all WTO Members would cut their bound MFN duty rates on these 
products according to the tiered tariff formula. Further, they would apply the following 
modality, which consisted of two options. 
 First, if the scheduled tariff on a tropical product is equal or below 25% ad 
valorem, then that tariff must be cut to zero. If the tariff is 25% or more, then it must be 
cut by 85%. 312  All developed countries would have four years to phase in the cuts 
(through four equal, annual installments), and they could not treat as a Sensitive Product 
any tropical good. Second, alternatively, if the scheduled tariff on a tropical product is 
equal or below 25% ad valorem, then that tariff must be cut to zero. If a tropical product 
tariff is equal to or above 10%, then it must be cut by 70%.  (A steeper cut would apply if 
the tariff exceeded 75%.) All developing countries would phase in the tariff cuts in a 
prescribed implementation period. 
                                                 
311  See Pruzin, India, Pakistan, supra note 309, at 1761. 
312  Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 147–48, with July 
2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 138–39. 
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 Interestingly, under the 15 December 2009 agreement, developing countries also 
agreed to cut their tariffs on many tropical products.313 They promised to do so by 80% 
on tropical product tariff lines that had an MFN rate over 20%. For products attracting a 
duty of 20% or less, they said they would cut that MFN rate to zero. The cuts would 
cover 65% of all tariff lines on a list (which was not finalized) of tropical products. 
 A third problem in dealing with preference erosion was timing. How fast or slow 
should developed countries phase in tariff reductions on tropical products that are the 
subject of a preference? Obviously, preference beneficiaries favored the slowest possible 
implementation (to preserve their margin of preference for as long as possible), and non-
preference beneficiaries favored the speediest (to get to a level playing field at an MFN 
rate as quickly as possible). The terms of the 15 December 2009 Bananas War settlement 
called for the EU and United States to cut their tariffs on products covered by one of their 
trade preference agreements over ten years, with no cuts in the first two years of 
implementation—in effect, a twelve-year phase out.314 The December 2008 Text, like its 
predecessor, created a reverse age discrimination rule that had two options. 
 Under the first option, no tariff cuts would be imposed by any preference-granting 
country on a product that has been the subject of a preference (listed in Annex H to the 
Texts) for ten years.315 After a decade, tariff cuts would be implemented across five years 
through equal annual installments. In other words, the longer a poor country had relied on 
a preference, the slower the phase out of that preference—a presumptively fair result that 
                                                 
313  Daniel Pruzin, EU, Latin Nations Formally Sign Agreement on Bananas; First Tariff Cuts Take 
Effect, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 828 (June 3, 2010) [hereinafter Pruzin, EU, Latin Nations]; Pruzin, 
supra note 308, at 7. 
314  Pruzin, EU, Latin Nations, supra note 313, at 828. 
315  Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 149–50, with July 
2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 140–41. 
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would minimize adjustment costs from the long-standing detrimental reliance. 
 Under option two, as an alternative, preference-grantors could impose tariff cuts 
on a preferential product in equal annual installments in a period that is two years longer 
than the implementation period for developing countries under the tiered formula (i.e., 
over twelve years). But, these cuts would apply only to a preferred product if its pre-
Round bound MFN rate exceeded 10%, the value of trade from the beneficiary was above 
a threshold (U.S. $50,000 or 3% exports from that beneficiary to the grantor country), 
and there is an unconstrained, long-standing preference in the market of the grantor 
country. 
 The 15 December 2009 deal provided the following compromise: a ten-year phase 
out, with no cuts in the first two years, for most tropical products.316 That is, for all sixty-
two tropical product tariff lines, the EU said it would phase in tariff reductions over ten 
years, with no cuts in the first two years. The United States agreed to implement tariff 
cuts over eight years, with the first two years free from any cuts on cane sugar, fresh cut 
flowers, and ground-nut oil. It pledged to cut tariffs on cigars over five years. For all 
other tropical products on the U.S. list, cuts would be phased in over ten years, with none 
in the first two years. 
 Contrary to the December 2008 Text, the 15 December 2009 deal allowed for the 
designation of tropical products as Sensitive. Under the deal, if (1) a tropical product 
were designated as Sensitive and (2) imports of that product from preference beneficiary 
countries accounted for more than 10% of total domestic consumption in the importing 
country, then the importing country would have to adjust its TRQ on the product.317 
                                                 
316  Pruzin, supra note 310, at 7. 
317  Id. 
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Specifically, the importing country would have to cut the out-of-quota tariff rate of the 
TRQ, and phase in the new in-quota quantity limits, over a seven-year period. 
Supposedly, this complex rule would help ensure that the EU and United States would 
not abuse the Sensitive Product designation for the protectionist purposes in respect of 
tropical products. Rather, they would liberalize, albeit gradually, trade in that product. 
Yet, the very allowance to designate an item as Sensitive surely was a step back from free 
trade. After all, the December 2008 Text had prohibited designation of any tropical 
product as Sensitive and called on developed countries to implement tariff cuts in four 
years. 
D. Settlement of the Bananas War: 
 The General Agreement on Trade in Bananas (GATB) 
 Linked to the problem of tropical products and preference erosion was a difficulty 
that had plagued the world trading system since before the creation of the WTO 
(specifically, 1993) and had become the longest-running dispute in WTO history. The 
EU, which is the largest importer of bananas in the world and imports (as of 2011) over 
70% of the fruit from Latin America, battled several Latin American countries over 
bananas, many of which market their fruit through prominent American companies like 
Chiquita Brands and Dole. 318  Following losses in eleven GATT and WTO cases, 
including a November 2008 Appellate Body ruling in favor of the United States and 
Ecuador that discriminatory EU tariffs giving preference to ACP bananas (which are far 
more expensive than Latin bananas) continued to violate WTO rules, the EU promised to 
                                                 
318  Joe Kirwin, EU Parliament Backs Banana Trade Deal With Latin America to Reduce Tariffs, 28 
Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 224, at xx (Feb. 10, 2011); Joshua Chaffin, End of Banana Wars Brings Hope 
for Doha, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2009, at 8. As of June 2010, the EU imported $4 billion worth of bananas. 
Len Bracken, U.S., EU Agree to Settle Dispute Over Latin American Bananas, USTR Says, 27 Int’l Trade 
Rep. (BNA) No. 856, at xx (June 10, 2010). 
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change its offending regime. 
 The EU pledged to implement a single-tariff (i.e., tariff-only) regime by 1 January 
2006 and grant at least the same level of market access to third country exporters as to its 
preferred ACP trading partners.319 Indeed, without such a pledge, third country producers 
(located mainly in Latin America) had threatened in November 2001 to block the launch 
of the Doha Round. While the EU did drop its quota and licensing system and shift to a 
tariff-only system in 2006, it also maintained a duty-free quota of 775,000 tons for ACP 
producers. Thus, the regime generated one of the legal cases against the EU, yielding 
another WTO judgment that is discriminatory. 
 Initially in the regime it commenced in 2006, the EU set the tariff at €230 per 
metric ton. Latin American countries challenged that rate successfully in two WTO 
arbitration proceedings as the €230/ton level failed to maintain equivalent market access 
for their banana exports to the EU. The EU responded by dropping the tariff to €176/ton 
but also set up an annual duty-free quota of 775,000 metric tons for ACP exporters. 
Ecuador (the world’s largest banana exporter) and the United States (headquarters of two 
major banana distributors, Chiquita and Dole) prevailed against the EU in WTO 
proceedings, obtaining rulings that the EU quota was illegal because it unfairly 
discriminated among WTO Members.320 
 To avoid further adjudicatory proceedings, WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy 
                                                 
319  See Raj Bhala, The Bananas War, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 839, 948–49 (2000) (detailing the EU’s 
pledge); Alan Beattie, Expectations Low as Doha Talks Commence, FIN. TIMES, July 22, 2008, at 8; Daniel 
Pruzin, WTO’s Lamy Delivers Compromise Text Aimed at Resolving EU Banana Dispute, 25 Int’l Trade 
Rep. (BNA) No. 1048, at xx (July 17, 2008) (quoting an unnamed Latin American official). 
320  Those rulings also included a WTO Appellate Body compliance report, issued Nov. 26, 2008, 
which upheld two Panel decisions that the EU had failed to comply with previous adjudicatory rulings, as 
its banana import regime continued to discriminate in favor of ACP bananas and against Latin and other 
non-ACP supplying countries. Daniel Pruzin, Latin Countries Slam EU Inaction on Banana Tariffs, Push 
2008 Side Deal, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 155, at xx (Jan. 29, 2009). 
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agreed to mediate a solution. His report, delivered on 12 July 2008, suggested a 
compromise whereby the EU would make an immediate down payment to Latin 
American exporters of a large cut to its €176/ton tariff and make further cuts across a 
defined transition period. Specifically, the final tariff would be €114/ton, which the EU 
would reach over an eight-year period starting on 1 January 2009 with an immediate cut 
on that date of €28/ton.321 (The July 2008 Text called for the EU to reach the final rate of 
€114/ton by the end of 2016.) Thus, there would be a tariff cut of just over 35% (from 
€176/ton to €114/ton). In exchange, the Latin banana exporting countries would drop all 
WTO litigation and rights of retaliation against the EU and acquiesce to the EU giving 
ACP exporters duty-free access.322  
 The Lamy compromise pleased no one—even though, ironically, a single tariff-
only regime of €176/ton was the deal struck years earlier to end the Bananas War.323 The 
ACP countries—most of which were former British, French, or Portuguese colonies—
feared for their historical preferences. If a banana tariff cut through the Lamy 
compromise were too steep, then their access to the EU market would be jeopardized. 
Likewise, if bananas were not designated as Sensitive and subject to the July 2008 Text 
proposal of an 85% tariff reduction, the new tariff would be €26.4/ ton—effectively 
eroding the ACP margin of preference. 
                                                 
321  Id. 
322  Daniel Pruzin, EU Official Optimistic on Banana Deal, But Latin Exporters See Key Differences, 
26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 484, at xx (Apr. 9, 2009). 
323  See Bhala, supra note 319, at 948–49 (detailing the deal that ended the Bananas War); Jeremy 
Smith, EU, Latin America Look to WTO Talks for Banana Deal, REUTERS, Dec. 5, 2008, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/12/05/us-eu-banana-analysis-idUSTRE4B427320081205 (describing 
displeasure with Lamy’s compromise). 
 Note that a few Latin banana exporting countries, namely, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, and Panama, were reported to have agreed with the EU to the deal. Pruzin, supra note 322, at 
484. Of course, Colombia and Costa Rica were Banana Framework Agreement (BFA) countries, and thus 
had cut a deal with the EU in the past. 
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 The ACP position was influential in the EU. It accorded with the commercial 
interests of the two major banana producers in the EU, France and Spain, which have 
considerable operations in the ACP. The EU insisted that if it cuts its banana tariff via the 
compromise, then the compromise must unambiguously permit it to exclude bananas 
(along with melons, rum, and sugar) from the list of tropical products slated for Doha 
Round tariff reductions. That is, the EU should be allowed to declare bananas as a 
Sensitive Product, so that it does not have two legal obligations to slash banana tariffs. 
Further, the EU was adamant that any deal on bananas would have to be contingent on an 
overall agreement in agriculture. 
 The EU position, shaped by the ACP, was the diametric opposite of the Latin 
American stance. For Latin banana exporting countries, resolving the Bananas War was a 
separate matter. There should be no deal in the Round without its settlement. Latin 
American countries attacked the Lamy compromise as “very much biased” in favor of the 
EU, which they said already had agreed in negotiations to an immediate 20% cut in the 
€176/ton figure. 324  The implementation period, too, was a battlefront, with the EU 
arguing for a transition period of fifteen years and the Latin American exporting 
countries demanding four or five years. In brief, the Bananas War heated up, and 
Ecuador—the largest banana exporter in the world—said that without a settlement it 
found agreeable, it would not join a consensus to conclude the agriculture modalities.325 
Seeking a middle ground, the EU proposed in February 2009 that the €114/ton 
end-tariff for non-ACP bananas apply even if there were no, or a delayed, Doha Round 
                                                 
324  Pruzin, supra note 319, at 1048–49 (quoting an unnamed Latin American official). 
325  Update 1—Ecuador Threatens Doha Deal Over Banana Dispute, REUTERS, Nov. 26, 2008, 
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/11/26/ecuador-banana-doha-idUSN2636452920081126. 
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deal.326 Negotiations proceeded through 2009, with the EU on one side and five key Latin 
banana exporters on the other side—Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, and 
Panama. Once all countries agreed on a bananas deal, then the EU would commence cuts 
for three years. The EU would freeze further reductions for three years, if the Round were 
not concluded, and then resume the cuts, regardless of the status of the Round. 
 Accordingly, the new EU proposal would mean a cut from the initial MFN tariff 
of €176/ton to €114/ton by 2019 (approximately an eight-year period, and three years 
later than the July 2008 Text specified), with a reduction to €136/ton in the interim. As a 
down payment, the EU would make an immediate cut of €28/ton (to €148/ton) from 
€176/ton (with “immediate” meaning in October 2010).327 The €136/ton rate would apply 
from 2011 to 2014, followed by gradual cuts. The final result of a €114/ton tariff would 
be reached by the end of 2019 (instead of 2016, under the Lamy compromise), if the 
Round were not concluded. 328  Likewise, the EU would cut tariffs on other tropical 
products, such as pineapples and sugar, at least until the outcome of the Doha Round was 
clear. 
 As part of its proposal, the EU insisted on three conditions. 329  First, any 
settlement would obligate Latin American countries to drop their outstanding legal 
challenges at the WTO and waive any rights of retaliation they had based on their 
                                                 
326  Joshua Chaffin, ‘Banana Wars’ Pact Between EU and Latin America Nears Fruition, FIN. TIMES, 
Nov. 18, 2009, at 4; Pruzin, supra note 322, at 484. 
327  Daniel Pruzin, EU, Latin Americans Conclude Banana Deal, but Haggling Remains over Tropical 
Products, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1662 (Dec. 3, 2009). 
328  Note that following the Seventh WTO Ministerial Conference in Geneva in November-December 
2009, the precise details of the transition period were not entirely clear. By one account, following the cut 
in October 2010 to €148/ton, the EU would reduce the tariff in annual installments to €132/ton in 2013. If 
no Doha Round agreement were reached by the end of 2013, then the €132/ton rate would remain in effect 
until the Round was completed. Id. 
329  Jonathan Lynn, Exclusive—Banana Deal Emerging—Trade Sources, REUTERS, Nov. 3, 2009, 
available at http://in.reuters.com/article/2009/11/02/idINL21012120091102. 
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previous adjudicatory victories. (After their major victory at the Appellate Body level in 
1997, the United States and Ecuador won the right to retaliate against the EU.330 The 
United States was authorized to impose $191 million of sanctions, which it did on goods 
from coffee makers to handbags, though it lifted the sanctions in 2001. Ecuador was 
authorized to impose $202 million in trade sanctions on EU imports, including—for the 
first time in the annals of GATT-WTO dispute resolution—the right to suspend 
intellectual property protection and wholesale distribution rights for EU goods and 
services. Ecuador never imposed the sanctions.) The EU did not want to come to a 
settlement in the Banana War, only to have that War reignited by another legal fight or 
suffer retaliation based on a previous one. The EU wanted the “Peace Clause” to take 
effect as soon as the settlement deal was signed by all relevant parties.331 However, some 
of those parties—potential complainants—argued the Clause should not enter into force 
until the EU registered the deal with the WTO. Until such registration—technically 
known as “certification,” whereby the WTO approves in the tariff schedule of the EU and 
the new rates become legally binding332—the EU could renege on the deal. 
 Second, the EU would be permitted to continue to grant duty-free access to ACP 
bananas. The EU had no interest in entirely abandoning its former colonies. Moreover, 
these cuts would slash the margin of preference historically enjoyed by ACP countries. 
To help those countries face adjustment costs and restructure, the EU would grant them 
€190 million in development aid. That figure was too low to mollify some ACP 
producers, such as Cameroon. Caribbean countries queried how the EU would divide the 
                                                 
330  Daniel Pruzin, EU, Latin, U.S. Officials Welcome Beginning of End to WTO Dispute on Banana 
Imports, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1733 (Dec. 17, 2009). 
331  Lynn, supra note 307. 
332  Pruzin, supra note 327, at 1662. 
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funds among ACP countries with divergent interests.333 After all, as the Trade Minister of 
Trinidad poignantly noted, banana exports are critical to Caribbean economies, and not 
exporting them would be “like not exporting watches from Geneva.”334 
 Third, bananas would be treated as a normal agricultural good, not as a tropical 
product. Consequently, bananas would not be subject to the faster, deeper tariff cuts 
imposed on tropical products under the proposed July 2008 Doha Round agricultural text. 
If they were, then the problem of preference erosion would be exacerbated, against the 
interests of the ACP, because those cuts would be applied on top of the special 
transitional rules for bananas. 
 This purported middle ground appeared to the ACP to be tilted in favor of the EU 
and Latin America. In May 2009, the ACP asked the EU for compensation of €500 
million, along with any agreed-upon tariff-cutting deal.335  No less than that level of 
compensation would be needed to cover the drastic economic losses, and the attendant 
social dislocations and political instability, which assuredly would occur immediately 
after the EU implemented any deal. The ACP averred they would occur because, in a 
liberalized trading regime for bananas, its fruit would lose yet more share of the EU 
market to competition from Latin suppliers (i.e., Latin bananas would flood the EU 
market, drowning out the ACP bananas). Initially, the EU balked at the compensation 
figure, offering what the ACP regarded as a paltry sum—€100 million—before boosting 
it to €190 million. 
 Happily, on 15 December 2009, the Banana War finally ended with a settlement 
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along the above-delineated lines of the EU’s middle-ground proposal of February 2009. 
The settlement consists of two key documents. 
 First, there is the “General Agreement on Trade in Bananas” (GATB), formally 
signed on 31 May 2010 at the WTO, and contingent in part on completion of the Doha 
Round. The signatories to GATB were the EU and eleven Latin American countries—
Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador (which is the largest banana exporter in the 
world), Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela.336 The 
EU Parliament approved the settlement in February 2011.337 Second, on 8 June 2010, the 
EU and United States signed a separate, linked deal, the “Agreement on Trade in 
Bananas Between the United States of America and the European Union.” The only 
material changes rendered by this Agreement and GATB from the above-described 
parameters in the February 2009 EU proposal were the exact transition dates and 
compensation figure:338 
● The EU will cut its MFN tariff on bananas from Latin America and any other 
non-ACP origin from €176/ton to €114/ton by 1 January 2017 (or, possibly, 
2019). The overall cut in the tariff, from €176/ton to €114/ton, is 35%. 
● The EU will make an immediate, initial cut (i.e., a down payment) to €148/ton (as 
of 1 June 2010 retroactive to 15 December 2009 when the Agreement and GATB 
were initialed). 
                                                 
336  Bracken, supra note 318, at 856; Pruzin, supra note 330, at 1733. 
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● After the first cut, the EU will drop its tariff to €143/ton on 1 June 2011; €136/ton 
on 1 January 2012; and €132/ton on 1 January 2013. 
● As of 1 January 2013, if there is a Doha Round agreement on agriculture, then the 
EU will continue to cut the tariff to €127/ton in 2014, €122/ton in 2015, and 
€117/ton in 2016. Thus, the final rate of €114/ton will apply on 1 January 2017. 
● However, if there is no final deal on farm trade, then the EU will freeze its tariff 
at €132/ton for two years—2014 and 2015—before re-commencing cuts in 
January 2016. Then, it will reach the final rate of €114/ton per ton in January 
2019. In other words, the final duty level will be achieved two years faster under 
the scenario of a successful outcome to the Round, which itself is an incentive for 
some Members to achieve that success. 
● The EU agreed to boost the compensation figure to ACP countries to roughly 
€200 million. 
Accordingly, the Latin countries agreed to all three of the EU’s aforementioned 
conditions. First, there will be no more law suits, and an end to all legal proceedings, as 
soon as the EU inscribes its new tariff commitment into its legally-binding Schedule of 
Concessions. Second, the EU can continue its tariff-only preference for ACP bananas 
under the new Economic Partnership Agreements the EU reached with ACP countries, 
which entered into force in January 2008, and which are WTO compliant. Third, bananas 
will be treated as a good subject to normal tariff reductions under any deal (not 
accelerated duty elimination as a tropical good). 
E. Least Developed Countries 
 As the poorest of the poor countries, least developed countries always knew they 
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could count on the most favorable derogations from any Doha Round obligation. After 
all, they account for just one percent of world trade. 339  Thus, even under the most 
mercantilist of calculations by developed countries, a grace for the poorest hardly would 
be a sacrifice for the richest. What the least developed countries did not know, nor had 
much practical control over, was how generous those derogations might be. They had 
secured, at the December 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial Conference, a Decision on 
Measures in Favor of Least Developed Countries. The December 2008 Text, like its July 
predecessor, essentially incorporated the text of this Decision, with minor adjustments. 
 With these developments, the extent of generosity started to become clear. Least 
developed countries would not have to undertake reductions in bound MFN tariff rates on 
agricultural products. 340  But, most of the rest of the provisions for least developed 
countries were exhortative in nature.341 For instance, WTO Members reaffirmed their 
commitment to integrate these countries into the world trading system and to ensure 
preferential rules of origin would be simple and transparent. 
 The key substantive commitment from developed countries, and from developing 
countries in a position to make the commitment, concerned duty free, quota free (DFQF) 
treatment for exports originating in least developed countries.342 The obvious generous 
rule would be to provide immediate, lasting DFQF treatment on 100% of these exports 
                                                 
339  Pascal Lamy, Director Gen., World Trade Org., Address to the UN Conference on Least-
Development Countires (May 9, 2011), in Global Trading System Must Deliver More to the Least-
Developed—Lamy in Istanbul, WORLD TRADE ORG. (May 9, 2011), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/ 
sppl_e/sppl191_e.htm. 
340  Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 151, with July 2008 
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 142. 
341  Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 152, 154, with July 
2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 143, 154. 
342  Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 153, with July 2008 
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 145. If a developing country was not in a position to 
provide DFQF treatment to least-developed country cotton exports, then it would have “to look positively 
at possibilities for increased import opportunities” of the product. December 2008 Draft Agriculture 
Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 156; July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 146. 
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immediately upon the entry into force of any Doha Round accords. Indeed, Australia, 
New Zealand, Norway, and Switzerland all provide DFQF treatment to 100% of their 
imports from least developed countries.343 As of 2009, the EU provides 100% coverage, 
except for arms and ammunition, under its “Everything but Arms” (EBA) initiative.344 
Thus, the EU eliminated tariff quotas on rice and sugar imports from least developed 
countries.345 
 Shamefully, though, that level of generosity—towards the poorest of the poor—is 
too much to ask of some rich countries, even though non-oil exports from least developed 
countries account for only 0.7% of total imports by developed countries. 346  Several 
developed countries protect their sensitive sectors from competition from least developed 
countries: Canada excludes from DFQF treatment dairy products, eggs, and poultry and 
Japan denies such treatment to fisheries products, leather goods, sugar, and rice. As for 
the United States, it says “no” to (inter alia) cotton, dairy, leather, sugar, and T & A 
merchandise.347 Consequently, for all least developed countries, the United States gives 
DFQF access on just 82.4% of tariff lines and, for such countries that participate in 
AGOA, 90% of tariff lines.348 Indeed, the United States maintains more DFQF exceptions 
on least developed country exports—covering 1,800 tariff lines—than any other rich 
country in the world.349 
                                                 
343  Daniel Pruzin, Key WTO Members Discuss Elements for LDCs in Doha ‘Deliverables’ Package, 
28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1112 (July 7, 2011). 
344  Id. 
345  Daniel Pruzin, WTO Lauds EU on Resisting Protectionism; Trading Partners Hit Out at Some 
Barriers, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1173 (July 4, 2011). Also in 2009, the EU adopted more flexible 
rules of origin under its Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) scheme to widen the eligibility of 
products from poor countries. Id. 
346  Pruzin, supra note 54, at 1228. 
347  Pruzin, supra note 343, at 1112. 
348  Id. 
349  Id. 
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 Thus, the rule proposed for the Doha Round, in the December 2008 Draft NAMA 
Modalities Text, was to grant DFQF treatment on at least 97% of least developed country 
exports, by a date yet to be agreed. That is, the target of 100% DFQF treatment remained, 
but Members unable to hit it would have to provide such treatment for at least 97% of 
their imports from least developed countries and try to achieve progressive compliance 
with the 100% target.350 
 SVEs, in contrast to least developed countries, were unable to secure any 
numerical target. Developed countries, and developing ones in a position to do so, agreed 
only to provide “enhanced improvements in market access” for products of export 
interest to SVEs.351 Unsurprisingly, rich countries hunted for the 3% exemption for farm 
sectors they aimed to protect. A few major developing countries made some effort to help 
their least developed brethren, which, on the one hand, was symbolically important, but, 
on the other hand, substantively limited.352 
 First, India became the first developing country to offer DFQF treatment to least 
developed country exports, doing so in 2008. India boasted it grants DFQF access to 94% 
of all goods from least developed countries (i.e., 94% of the products exported by least 
developed countries). 353  Covered products of keen export interest to those countries 
included cane sugar, cocoa, cotton, and ready-made garments (RMGs). India pledged that 
                                                 
350  See Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Textile Industry Group Slams WTO Push for LDC Duty-Free/Quota-Free 
Deal, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 972 (June 16, 2011). 
351  Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 158, with July 2008 
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 148.  
352  See, e.g., Brazil, India to Push Ahead on Duty-Free Schemes for the Poorest Countries, WORLD 
TRADE ORG. (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news10_e/devel_18mar10_e.htm. In 
addition to the Indian measures noted above, India signed FTAs with Afghanistan and MERCOSUR in 
2009–2010, invoking the Tokyo Round Enabling Clause, and notifying the WTO Committee on Regional 
Trade Agreements. India also has FTAs with Chile and Bhutan, and is part of the South Asian Free Trade 
Agreement (SAFTA). See id. 
353  Pruzin, supra note 350, at 972. 
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by 2013, it would give DFQF to 85% of all tariff lines.354 But, India’s scheme was fully 
operational (as of April 2010) for only fourteen least developed countries, including 
neighboring Bangladesh. Most of the eligible countries simply did not take advantage of 
it. 
 Second, Brazil offered DFQF treatment on 80% of its tariff lines, though coverage 
would start at 60%. Brazil promised to increase it to 80% over four years.355 Eventually, 
Brazil promised, coverage would reach 100%. Yet, it failed to implement this pledge. 
 Third, China said it already was generous to least developed countries. It said it 
commenced DFQF benefits (as of June 2011), covering nearly 4800 tariff lines.356 DFQF 
treatment on those lines represented 60% of tariff lines and 98% of export value (i.e., 
98% of the value of exports from least developed countries). So, China boasted, it was 
the largest market for exports from least developed countries in the world—taking 23% 
of all such exports. China said it expected to raise the percentage of tariff lines eligible 
for DFQF treatment to 95%.357 Unfortunately, China’s claims—plus those of India and 
Brazil—proved difficult to verify. 
 As indicated above, T & A was one sector in which the United States and other 
developed countries were reluctant, if not loathe, to offer DFQF treatment to least 
developed country exports. Cotton was another such sector. The United States had poured 
billions of dollars into cotton subsidies, as had been widely reported throughout the Doha 
                                                 
354  Pruzin, supra note 343, at 1112. 
355  Id.; Pruzin, supra note 350, at 972; Gary G. Yerkey & Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Ready for ‘Endgame’ of 
WTO Talks But Needs More from Others, Kirk Says, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1675 (Dec. 3, 2009). 
356  Pruzin, supra note 196, at 1063; see Pruzin, supra note 350, at 972 (reporting China claimed to 
have increased the percentage of least developed country exports eligible for DFQF treatment from 38% to 
97%); Geoff Dyer & James Lamont, China and World Bank in Talks to Establish Industrial Zones in 
Africa, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2009, at 1 (reporting China added that it planned to eliminate tariffs on 60% of 
exports from least developed countries). 
357  Pruzin, supra note 343, at 1112; Pruzin, supra note 196, at 1063. 
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Round. 358  Protecting these subsidies was important; all the more so after Brazil 
successfully attacked them in WTO litigation and won retaliatory rights against the 
United States.359 Less widely known was the Chinese stance in favor of protecting its 
cotton producers. 
 Many of China’s cotton farmers are Muslim, and ethnically not Han. They reside 
in the far western province of Xinjiang. About the last outcome from the Round that the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) wanted was to enrage these Uyghur Muslims. What the 
CCP calls the “Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region” might become a movement for 
“Uyghurstan” or “East Turkistan,” redolent of a “Free Tibet” campaign, threatening not 
only the monopoly of the CCP on political power but the integrity of China itself. The 
tragic Han-versus-Uyghur violence in Urumqi (capital of Xinjiang) in July 2009, which 
left over 197 dead and 800 injured, and which provoked a predictable iron-fisted response 
from the CCP that restored order but not real peace because it addressed symptoms, not 
causes, of the violence, graphically illustrates the problem.360 Thus, for the ruling elite in 
Beijing, retaining China’s 40% tariff on imported cotton was critical.361 
 The United States took the position it would not cut its cotton subsidies unless 
                                                 
358  See, e.g., Bradley S. Klapper, Doha Deal Falters as WTO Fails to Set Meeting Date, SEATTLE 
TIMES, Dec. 8, 2008, available at 
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/businesstechnology/2008482430_apeuwtotrade 
talks.html?syndication=rss (observing “the U.S. was on the defensive over the hundreds of millions of 
dollars in cotton subsidies it hands out each year”). 
359  Appellate Body Report, United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton, ¶ 763, WT/DS267/AB/R 
(Mar. 3, 2005) (adopted Mar. 21, 2005) (complaint by Brazil); Bhala & Gantz, supra note 124, at 215–27. 
360  David Pilling, Beijing Strains to Hear the Voice of the People, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2009, at 13; 
Kathrin Hille, Ethnic Violence in China Leaves at Least 150 Dead and 800 Injured, FIN. TIMES, July 7, 
2009, at 1; Kathrin Hille & Richard McGregor, ‘Premeditated’ Violence Blamed on Outsiders, FIN. TIMES, 
July 7, 2009, at 7; Beijing is Unwise to Play with Fire: China Must Address, Not Suppress, Its Ethnic 
Tensions, FIN. TIMES, July 7, 2009, at 8. 
361  See Pruzin, supra note 54, at 1228 (noting the forty percent rate); Pruzin, supra note 343, at 1112 
(noting the forty percent rate); Pruzin, supra note 196, at 1063 (also noting the forty percent rate); Daniel 
Pruzin, G-7 Makes No Progress on Resolving Differences on WTO December Package, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. 
(BNA) No. 1016 (June 23, 2011) (also noting the forty percent duty rate); Pruzin, supra note 193, at 886 
(also noting the forty percent rate). 
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China cut its cotton tariff so as to increase market access for American farmers. It took 
this position notwithstanding the fact that between 2004 and 2008, cotton was the second 
largest American farm export to China, totaling $7.8 billion. 362  From the American 
perspective, the potential to ship yet more cotton to China’s T & A mills was enormous, 
and the unscrupulous behavior of the Chinese government—manifest in a new non-tariff 
barrier against cotton, namely, a registration system for imports—was of serious concern. 
Moreover, with a sharp fall in American cotton exports that occurred between the 2005–
2006 and 2008–2009 crop years—a fall of 25%—the American side was all the more 
insistent.363 That insistence applied to India too, which by 2009 accounted for 24% of 
global cotton production and 19% of global cotton exports. In brief, the Americans 
demanded market access for their cotton in China and India in exchange for relenting on 
cotton subsidies. As for the Cotton Four countries, they had become a sideshow in a high-
stakes game played by giants. 
 The Chinese response was silence; that is, right through July 2011 and beyond, 
China refused to state its position on cotton.364 To the CCP, given its fear of restive 
Muslims, the Americans had taken a position that had to be resisted. Textually, the result 
was obvious—a fudge. The December 2008 Text, like its predecessor, stated that 
developed and developing countries alike must give DFQF treatment to cotton exports 
from least developed countries, but only if they “declar[ed] themselves to be in a position 
                                                 
362  See Amy Tsui, China’s Imported Cotton System Violates WTO Commitments, Senators Tell 
Vilsack, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 323 (Mar. 5, 2009). 
363  See Doug Palmer, Changed Market Makes WTO Cotton Deal Harder, REUTERS, July 21, 2009, 
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/07/21/us-usa-africa-cotton-analysis-idUSTRE56K6XZ20 
090721. 
364  See Pruzin, supra note 196, at 1063. 
 
174 
 
 
to do so.”365 Practically, the losers from the Sino-American gridlock on generosity to 
foreign cotton farmers became clear—least developed countries. More particularly, the 
Muslim farmers of the Cotton Four seemed forgotten, if not doomed. 
 America’s reluctance to accord DFQF treatment to 100% of the exports from least 
developed countries was based on more than concerns specific to sensitive domestic 
sectors like cotton. The United States questioned whether all least developed countries 
wanted such treatment. Deputy USTR and U.S. Ambassador to the WTO, Michael 
Punke, said in May 2011: “[F]rankly, we hear very different viewpoints from different 
LDCs [least developed countries], with some expressing grave concern about [tariff] 
preference erosion.” 366  Was this remark meant to divide-and-conquer, pitting poor 
countries that benefit from tariff preferences (and thus fear across-the-board preference 
erosion that would occur from DFQF treatment) against ones that do not get such 
preferences (and thus clamor for DFQF treatment)? Was it an effort to link DFQF 
treatment to resolution of the problem of preference erosion and thus buy extra time for 
American producers who benefit from tariff protection on merchandise exported by least 
developed countries? Was it an honest assessment of divergent interests among the 
poorest of poor countries? Or, was it an adulteration of concern for these countries with 
commercial self-interest? 
 Reiterated in May 2011, the American position shed light on the answer: namely, 
a deal on DFQF was certain to be rejected by Congress unless the United States benefited 
from some other dimension of the Doha Round package, such as trade facilitation 
obligations implemented by poor countries in a manner that enhanced market access for 
                                                 
365  Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 155, with July 2008 
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 143(e). 
366  Pruzin, supra note 193, at 886. 
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American exporters, or an elimination of trade barriers on environmental goods and 
services. 367  Offering DFQF treatment, without reciprocal benefits, was regarded on 
Capitol Hill as “unilateral disarmament.”368 In June 2011, Lloyd Wood, spokesman for 
the American Manufacturing Trade Action Coalition (AMTAC), which represents 
American T & A producers, explained: 
With U.S. unemployment hovering at nearly 9 percent, conceding duty-
free/quota-free market access for all LDC [least developed country] textile 
and apparel exports would only put more middle-class manufacturing jobs 
on the chopping block to be offshored. This would be a tough sell to the 
industry and [the United States] Congress during a booming economy, let 
alone . . . in these uncertain times. 
A key reason why any such early harvest proposal would be a nonstarter 
for U.S. textile manufacturing [is] because LDCs like Bangladesh and 
Cambodia already are textile and apparel exporting superpowers.369 
 
Why should Bangladesh or Cambodia, which are internationally competitive in certain T 
& A merchandise markets and are the sixth and ninth largest clothing suppliers to the 
United States, respectively, get a boost from DFQF treatment?370 Similarly, under AGOA, 
the United States offers DFQF treatment to 99.7% of all non-petroleum exports from 
thirty-seven Sub-Saharan African countries.371 Why should T & A exporters in Ghana or 
Zambia, which enjoy AGOA preferences, get a Doha Round benefit too? What if DFQF 
treatment through the Round helped some poor countries, like Bangladesh and Cambodia 
(because of the elimination of barriers to their exports), but hurt others, especially in Sub-
Saharan Africa (because of unrestricted competition their exports would face vis-à-vis 
Bangladeshi and Cambodian exports)?372 
                                                 
367  Id. 
368  Beattie, supra note 181, at 6 (quoting an unnamed senior aide in the U.S. House of 
Representatives). 
369  Pruzin, supra note 350, at 972. 
370  See id. 
371  See id. 
372  See Pruzin, supra note 54, at 1228. 
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 Plausible responses, to be sure, exist to these questions. First, generosity towards 
the poorest of the poor should know no bounds, if America indeed prides itself as being 
the most generous of nations. Second, America has a good national security motive to be 
magnanimous. Many least developed countries—Bangladesh included—have both 
produced and been a victim of terrorism. And, actually benefitting from an AGOA 
preference is contingent on satisfying restrictive rules of origin, including the use of 
American-grown cotton.373 As for a differential impact of DFQF treatment across least 
developed countries, surely a simple formula embracing competitive need limits could be 
negotiated. That is, once achieving a sustainably strong position in relevant product 
markets, an exporting country would graduate from DFQF treatment, thereby ensuring 
the benefits of such treatment are targeted for the poor countries based on need. 
 Gripped by its short-term manufacturing interests at home rather than its long-
term national security interests in poverty alleviation and threat reduction overseas, the 
United States was in no mood to broker a compromise. The United States, along with 
other major trading powers, was unwilling to revert to an exclusive focus on the key 
original intention behind the DDA, conveyed by the middle “D” in the acronym—
development. The better acronym, from the perspective of American and other developed 
countries, was “DRA”—the Doha Reciprocity Round. Reciprocal concessions should be 
expected of even the poorest countries most vulnerable to spawning and suffering from 
Islamist extremism. 
 To be clear, the United States was not the only WTO Member blocking a 
slimmed-down “deliverables” package in the Doha Round for the December 2011 
                                                 
373  See Raj Bhala, The Limits of American Generosity, 29 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 299, 380 (2006) 
(discussing Oxfam’s finding that African countries must use U.S. or African fabrics to benefit from AGOA 
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Ministerial Conference in Geneva that would have included reaffirmation of the 2005 
Hong Kong Ministerial Conference Decision on DFQF treatment. That is, the United 
States was by no means alone in its unwillingness to grant 100% DFQF treatment to least 
developed countries without gaining a reciprocal benefit.374 Brazil said it would not offer 
such treatment unless its demands on export competition were met—namely, restraints by 
developed countries.375 Canada countered by refusing to link export competition to DFQF 
treatment because it wanted to avoid disciplines on its state trade enterprises (STEs).376 
The EU and Switzerland approved of a link between DFQF treatment and export 
competition, but not in the way Brazil hoped: they refused to eliminate agricultural export 
subsidies unless other Members (especially China) imposed disciplines on industrial 
subsidies and on state owned enterprises (SOEs).377 The EU and Switzerland also refused 
to give least developed countries DFQF treatment unless their demands for extended 
protection for geographical indications were satisfied.378 In brief, driven if not blinded by 
their own short-term demands for reciprocity, Members could not forge even a simple, 
development-friendly agreement on just a few topics—an accord that would have at least 
indirect counter-terrorist benefits in the poorest of countries. 
VII. Farm Exports 
A. Export Competition 
 Support for agricultural product exports is the most pernicious form of farm 
subsidy, in the sense of distorting global trade patterns. The intrinsic purpose of a farm 
                                                 
374  See Daniel Pruzin, Hopes Fading for WTO ‘Deliverables’ Deal as Delegations Take Hard Line on 
LDC-Plus, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1164 (July 14, 2011). 
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export subsidy is to boost exports from the subsidy-granting country to the detriment of 
competitive products from third countries. It does so by making up the difference 
between a domestic floor or target price, on the one hand, and the world market price, on 
the other hand. Thus, a high-profile goal in the Doha Round of almost all WTO 
Members—with the notable exception of some EU states, like France, which traditionally 
use export subsidies—was to eradicate this kind of support, and as quickly as possible, to 
boot.379  That is true even though, or perhaps because, the EU committed under the 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture to reduce its export subsidies. 
 The December 2008 Text bore the same pledge as its predecessor—namely, that 
developed countries eliminate agricultural export subsidies by the end of 2013.380 This 
                                                 
379  The EU spent over € 3 billion annually, for Marketing Year 2002–2003, on agricultural export 
subsidies, far in excess of the U.S. or any WTO Member. See Daniel Pruzin, EU Reports Continued 
Decline in Spending on Export Subsidies for Agricultural Goods, 25 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1716, 
(Dec. 4, 2008). However, the general expenditure trend has been down, with the EU notifying the WTO of 
agricultural export subsidies of € 1.46 billion for Marketing Year 2006–2007. See id. The largest crop 
receiving an EU export subsidy is sugar. See id. Dairy products (butter, cheese, milk, and skim milk 
powder), grains, poultry, wheat and wheat flour are other major recipients. See id. 
 An issue related to elimination of export subsidies is the identification of Members that are 
“significant exporters.” Article 9 of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture contains commitments 
to reduce export subsidies. See Agreement on Agriculture, art. 9, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 410, 417–
18. Any Member obliged to reduce its export subsidies must notify the WTO Committee on Agriculture of 
the amounts of the products it exports that it subsidizes. See Restricted Exports, Breached Limits and 
Cotton Aired in Farm Committee, WORLD TRADE ORG. (June 23, 2011), www.wto.org/english/news_e/ 
news11_e/agcom_23jun11_e.htm. That is true whether or not the Member actually has paid out export 
subsidies. See id. In addition, a Member that did not make export subsidy reduction commitments in the 
Uruguay Round, but which is a “significant exporter” of a product, must notify the Committee of its export 
amounts. See id. That is true even if the “significant exporter” has not paid out or is too poor to pay out 
export subsidies. See id. The Chairman of the WTO Committee on Agriculture compiles a list, on a 
product-by-product basis, of “significant exporters” that have no export subsidy reduction commitment. See 
id. A Member that is a “significant exporter” of a particular agricultural product is not supposed to do so. 
 In other words, there are two categories of Members for export subsidy purposes: (1) Members 
that made reduction commitments during the Uruguay Round; and (2) Members that did not make such 
commitments, but which are “significant exporters.” The discipline on the first category is to adhere to the 
reduction commitment. The discipline on the second group is not to commence subsidization. 
 What, then, is the criterion for “significant exportation”? The term is nowhere used in the 
Agreement on Agriculture. However, in 1995, the WTO agreed that a Member is defined to be a 
“significant exporter” of a commodity if it has a share of total world exports in excess of five percent. See 
id. 
380  Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 160, 162, with July 
2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 150, 152. The new Text made modest 
alterations to quantity commitment levels. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, 
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obligation would include eliminating subsidies disguised as non-emergency food aid or 
veiled by credit programs.381 It also would include eradicating cotton export subsidies by 
the end of the first year of the implementation period of any Doha Round agreement.382 
 The pledge was not new. WTO Members had agreed to it in the December 2005 
Hong Kong Ministerial Conference. Likewise, they also agreed in that Ministerial 
Conference to a rule against back-end loading. They would cut half of the export 
subsidies by 2010 in equal annual installments and get to zero by the end of 2013. For 
their part, developing countries agreed to eliminate their farm export subsidies in equal 
annual installments by the end of 2016.383 The December Text added that during the 
phase-out period, no new export subsidy programs (either in respect of new markets or 
products) could be created.384 
 Arguably, the pledge was not resolute either. With a 50% fall in the wholesale 
price of milk amidst the global economic recession that started in 2008 and amidst loud 
protests from EU farmers, in early 2009 the EU Commission temporarily re-established 
                                                                                                                                                 
supra note 74, ¶162(b), with July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶152(b) (the July 
text requires a reduction in equal annual installments to zero or an eventual reduction in actual applied or 
bound levels by twenty percent while the December text requires no new subsidies and a standstill in 
quantity commitment levels). 
381  Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 167, Annex L, with 
July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 157, Annex L. 
382  Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 168–69, with July 
2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 158–59. 
383  Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 163, with July 2008 
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 153. Developing countries would be permitted to 
continue to subsidize marketing costs (including international transport and freight) and internal transport 
and freight charges, associated with farm products, as allowed under Article 9:4 of the WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture, until the end of 2021. See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 
164; July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 154. This dispensation also was not 
new, having been set out in the December 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial Conference. See December 2008 
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 164; July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, 
supra note 128, ¶ 154. 
384  Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 162(b) (last 
sentence), with July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 152. 
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export subsidies for dairy products.385 The Commission also acquiesced to continued 
public intervention buying of surplus butter and skim milk powder and granted private 
storage aid for these products. 386  However, it averred it would not abandon its 
agricultural reforms agreed to in November 2008. 
 Indeed, by July 2011, it was clear the pledge was not resolute at all. As the Doha 
Round talks continued to flounder in 2010 and 2011, the WTO Director-General, Pascal 
Lamy, called for agreement by the December 2011 Ministerial Conference in Geneva on 
at least a five-part package—a “deliverables” deal, or “early harvest” of accords, which 
would emphasize the interests of developing and least developed countries: 
(1) Trade facilitation. 
(2) Export competition, including export subsidies, as well as export credits and food 
aid. 
(3) A mechanism to monitor commitments on S & D treatment for poor countries. 
(4) Progress on addressing fishing subsidies. 
(5) Progress on cutting market access barriers to trade in environmental goods and 
services. 
However (as intimated above in the discussion of DFQF treatment), demands for 
                                                 
385  See Fischer Boel Says Protesting Dairy Farmers Tarnish Image of Common Agricultural Policy, 
26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1358 (Oct. 8, 2009); European Commission Calls for Continued Dairy 
Export Subsidies to Help EU Farmers, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1030 (July 30, 2009). 
386  See European Commission to Offer New Dairy Support to Prop Up Prices, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. 
(BNA) No. 1429 (Oct. 22, 2009). 
 Specifically, the Commission proposed to (1) extend the time for intervention buying from the 
normal period of March 1 through August 31 of each year to March 1 through the end of February 2010, 
and (2) to make purchases above the normal quota limits of 30,000 tons of butter and 109,000 tons of skim 
milk powder. See Fratini Vergano, Are the Measures Taken by the EC to Combat the Dairy Crisis WTO 
Compatible?, TRADE PERSP. (Oct. 30, 2009), available at 
http://www.fratinivergano.eu/TradePerspectivesArchive.html. All such purchases are stored in public 
warehouses. See id. In other words, the Commission agreed to make year-round purchases and storage with 
no quantitative limit. On 19 October 2009, the EC Council approved the proposal of the Commission. See 
id. 
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reciprocity and linkages of various sorts impeded any such deal. The EU responded that 
elimination of export subsidies was contingent on an overall agreement.387 It was linked 
to other items on the DDA, including reductions in farm and industrial subsidies, 
enhancements in market access, and protection for geographical indications. In other 
words, a matter of keen interest to developing and least developed countries—that 
developed countries cut their farm export subsidies—was a bargaining chip for 
ambitious, reciprocal concessions from those countries. 
 Consequently, as demands from various WTO Members piled up, the prospect of 
a slimmed down, development-friendly Doha Round package died in July 2011. The 
Director-General himself conceded defeat: 
What we are seeing today is the paralysis in the negotiating function of the 
WTO, whether it is on market access or the rule-making. . . .  
What we are facing is the inability of the WTO to adapt and adjust to 
emerging global trade priorities, those you cannot solve through bilateral 
trade deals.388 
 
The first sentence is objectively correct. However, in the second sentence, Mr. Lamy 
erred. The correct diagnosis is not an inability to adapt but an inability to stick to the 
plan. The Members had lost sight of their original purpose, and the Director-General 
appeared to have done little to remind them of it. As the Members strayed, they sought to 
obtain as many of their self-interested objectives through bilateral deals as possible—and 
understandably so. 
 What about other development-friendly objectives, in particular, export credits, 
export credit guarantees, and insurance programs? The term “export competition” refers 
                                                 
387  See Pruzin, supra note 196, at 1063. 
388  Pascal Lamy, Director Gen., World Trade Org., Statement to Informal Trade Negotiations 
Committee Meeting (July 26, 2011), in Members to Think About ‘What Next for Doha, WTO’ for December 
Meeting, WORLD TRADE ORG. (July 26, 2011), www.wto.org/english/news_e/news11_e/tnc_infstat_26jul 
11_e.htm; see also Pruzin, supra note 54, at 1228 (quoting and discussing the Lamy speech). 
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not only to overt export subsidies but also to implicit support through domestic policies 
like export promotion, and even taxes. The EU had long claimed that these programs, 
utilized intensively by the United States, were a hidden export subsidy. The United States 
had long responded that they were not per se export subsidies but also had agreed to 
eliminate any trade-distorting element in them. The December 2008 Text followed the 
July Text, which in turn followed earlier documents. The key rules would be as 
follows:389 
(1) There would be disciplines on export credits. For instance, the repayment period 
would be limited to 180 days, or between 360 and 540 days for least developed 
countries and NFIDCs. Obviously, the longer the repayment period, the more a 
credit looks like a subsidy. Programs would have to be self-financing, in the sense 
of not making losses over a period and recovering costs according to a 
commercially viable standard over a rolling four- or five-year period. Manifestly, 
a loss-making credit scheme is presumptively a subsidy. There also would be 
disciplines on export credit guarantees or insurance programs. 
(2) International food aid could be subject to loose disciplines. Essentially, for such 
aid to qualify for a Safe Box (and thereby be immune from a WTO lawsuit), an 
international organization (such as the United Nations, World Food Program, or 
Red Cross) would have to declare an emergency. Such a declaration would 
alleviate doubts as to whether the food was aid or an offloading of surplus 
production. Non-emergency food aid would be subject to a needs assessment 
conducted by an appropriate United Nations agency to ensure this aid does not 
                                                 
389  Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 165, Annexes J, K, 
L, with July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 155, Annexes J, K, L. 
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displace commercial trade. 
It remained unclear how monetization of food assistance (i.e., selling donated products to 
raise funds for aid) might be disciplined. Also left ambiguous was whether monopoly 
power associated with agricultural exporting state trading enterprises (STEs, as defined in 
GATT Article XVII) would be prohibited or simply restricted in some way.390 
 Finally, the December 2008 Text included the same conflict of law, or pre-
emption, rule as its predecessor in July on food crises.391 The rule ensured commitments 
made to NFIDCs during the Uruguay and Doha Rounds would be undiminished by any 
other provision in the Text. Indubitably, this provision reflected the global economic 
context in which it was drafted in the summer of 2008—namely, one of sharp food price 
increases threatening tens of millions of people, especially in poor countries.  
B. Export Restrictions 
 As for restrictions on exports, especially food, the December 2008 Text was 
nearly identical to the July Text, which in turn had not changed much following issuance 
of the February 2008 Text. Accordingly, the December Text proposed strengthening 
Article 12 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, the only provision in the GATT-WTO 
regime containing direct disciplines on measures to limit farm product exports.392 (GATT 
Articles XI:2(a) and XX(i)–(j) condone such limits, under certain circumstances.) 
                                                 
390  See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 166, Annex K; July 2008 
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 156, Annex J. 
391  Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 161, with July 2008 
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 151. 
392  See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 171; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 161. For journalistic accounts, see, for example, Daniel 
Pruzin, French Trade Minister Sees No Action in Doha Round on Food Export Restrictions, 25 Int’l Trade 
Rep. (BNA) No. 637 (May 1, 2008) (discussing different countries’ proposed export restrictions in addition 
to the restrictions found in Article 12 of the Agreement on Agriculture); Daniel Pruzin, WTO Members in 
Ag Talks Fail to Tackle Growing Problem of Food Export Restrictions, 25 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 479, 
at 479–80 (Apr. 3, 2008) (discussing a proposed limit in export restriction length). 
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 In particular, Article 12 of the Agriculture Agreement, which is inapplicable to 
developing and least developed countries, contains two loose requirements: a WTO 
Member (1) should give due consideration to the effects on NFIDCs of any prohibitions 
or restrictions it might impose on its food exports as well as (2) provide notice of the 
nature and duration of any constraints as far in advance as practicable to the WTO 
Committee on Agriculture.393 From the perspective of NFIDCs, “due consideration” and 
“notice” are not strong restrictions on their food imports falling victim to export 
restrictions from food exporting countries. Accordingly, in April 2011, one change 
NFIDCs sought in the December 2008 Draft Agriculture Text was an explicit rule that 
neither they nor least developed countries would be subject to food export restraints.394 In 
effect, this S & D treatment would be a waiver from an MFN requirement (i.e., that food 
export restraints would apply equally to all Members). 
 Broadly speaking, a key concern with export constraints is if they cover food, 
including food aid, such constraints put NFIDCs at the mercy of the restraining countries. 
The December 2008 Text contained five further disciplines: 
(1) Extant food export restrictions must be eliminated by the first year of 
implementation of any Doha Round deal.395 
(2) The duration of any new limits must be capped at twelve months (or eighteen 
                                                 
393  See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 117, art. 12. Effective March 2010, exchanges by WTO 
Members of information on their agricultural policies become publicly available, 60–90 days after 
restricted circulation among the Members, on the WTO website, www.wto.org. See Committee Going 
Public on Farm Trade Concerns, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Mar. 10, 2010), www.wto.org/english/news_e 
/news10_e/ag_com_10mar10_e.htm. 
394  See Farm Talks’ Chair, supra note 304. 
395  See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 178; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 166 (both texts contain the provision). 
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months, if affected importing Members agreed).396 
(3) The exporting Member implementing the restrictions must give notice of the 
reason for them.397 
(4) Notice of export restrictions is required within ninety days of their entry into 
force.398 
(5) Annual updates must be provided by the exporting Member about its export 
constraints to the Committee on Agriculture, which is in charge of monitoring 
compliance with all disciplines.399 
The December 2008 Text added a sixth discipline that was not explicit in its predecessor, 
about consultation.400 
 The sixth discipline had an interesting history. As commodity prices rose in 
2007–2008, proposals to help NFIDCs, such as rice importers like Bangladesh, 
Indonesia, and the Philippines, were floated in WTO circles. But, exporting WTO 
Members like Argentina, Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam, 
as well as non-Members like Kazakhstan and Russia, resisted any constraint on their 
sovereign freedom to manage domestic food problems. All of these exporting countries 
had, in early and mid 2008, imposed export tariffs, outright export bans, or other export 
restrictions on basic staples and foodstuffs such as barley, edible oils, rice, soybeans, and 
                                                 
396  See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 179; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 167 (both texts contain the provision). 
397  See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 173; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 163 (both texts contain the provision). 
398  See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 172; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 162 (both texts contain the provision). 
399  See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 176–77; July 2008 Draft 
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 164–65 (both texts contain the provisions). 
400  See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 174–75 (requiring a 
Member intending to institute export prohibitions and restrictions to consult with any other Member having 
substantial interest as an importer upon request and to report progress made in consultations to the 
Committee on Agriculture). 
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wheat. They took these measures to promote their own food security. Consequently, the 
exporting Members fervently opposed an April 2008 joint proposal by Japan and 
Switzerland—each of which is a net food importer—to strengthen Article 12 of the 
Agriculture Agreement. 401  That proposal was to require advance notice to the WTO 
Committee on Agriculture of any impending export restriction (especially as to the 
duration and reasons for the measure) and consultations in the event of a dispute. The 
proposal also called for establishment of a standing committee of experts to be used if 
consultations failed, and which would render a binding judgment as to whether the 
disputed restriction is necessary. Its implementation would be prohibited pending 
outcome of the case. 
 The sixth discipline in the December 2008 Text was a compromise of sorts. An 
exporting Member that intends to institute an export restriction or prohibition would have 
to consult with any other Member that has a “substantial interest” as an importer of the 
product in question. This requirement of a priori consultation effectively offset the fact 
that under the fourth discipline, formal notice need not be given in advance of 
implementing an export constraint. The exporting Member would be obliged to provide 
(upon request by the importing Member) necessary economic information about the 
                                                 
401  See Daniel Pruzin, Developing Countries Cool to Ag Proposal by Japanese, Swiss on Export 
Restrictions, 25 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 673, at 673–74 (May 8, 2008). 
In June 2010, it was suggested by Charlotte Hebebrand, President, International Food and 
Agricultural Trade Policy Council, that: 
Developing countries could use export restrictions as a bargaining chip in Doha Round 
trade negotiations, as they have little else to offer beyond market access. . . . Revisiting 
the issue of export restrictions could introduce a negotiating dynamic that could help to 
break the present logjam. 
Len Bracken, Rebalancing of Exporter, Importer Rights, Responsibilities Could Help Revive Doha Talks, 
27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 930 (June 24, 2010). While a creative argument, its vulnerability is the 
negotiating dynamic introduced might well pit developing country food exporters against NFIDCs. Any 
kind of poor-versus-poor dynamic is regrettable. Moreover, the logjam is not so much between these two 
groups, but between the U.S. and major developed countries on one side, and Brazil, China, India and their 
allies, on the other side—though even this characterization is simplistic, as there are plenty of schisms in 
the Round. 
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expected constraint. However, the new Text did not define “substantial interest;” thus it 
remained unclear precisely which countries might invoke the consultative mechanism. 
Equally unclear was what would happen in the event of a disagreement—other than, 
perhaps, formal WTO adjudication. 
 Notwithstanding all six disciplines, as a practical matter of political economy, no 
government—except one of pirates and bandits—would sell domestic food production to 
the highest bidder overseas when its citizens were desperately short of food. The above 
six disciplines all amount to procedural checks to give warning, and modest comfort, to 
third country food importers. None of the restrictions is a substantive benchmark to gauge 
whether the restrictions enhance the global distribution of a foodstuff during a crisis to 
ensure that goods reached in a timely fashion the people in greatest need. Perhaps, then, 
the real consolation for food-importing countries would be the fact that none of the 
disciplines applied to least developed countries or NFIDCs.402 Assuming they had an 
exportable surplus, they could impose export prohibitions or restrictions as they saw fit. 
VIII. Losing the Plot 
A. The Doha Round as a Stimulus Package 
 The argument—that a Doha Round deal would limit the extent to which WTO 
Members could boost applied tariff rates and farm subsidy levels, simply by virtue of a 
single undertaking to cut bound rates and levels—is poignant in the climate of a global 
economic slump. It is repeated ad nauseum by WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy.403 In 
June 2010, he did so and testified that the Round is not anchored by its original purpose 
                                                 
402  See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 180. 
403  See, e.g., Pascal Lamy, Director Gen., World Trade Org., Address to German Engineering 
Federation Summit (Oct. 13, 2009), in Doha Success Can Yield Double Dividend of Global Stimulus and 
Structural Reform—Lamy, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Oct. 13, 2009), www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/spp 
l137_e.htm. 
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of poverty alleviation and counter-terrorism: “in 2009 our focus was on fighting 
protectionist tendencies, [and] the 2010 focus will be on making the case for the Doha 
Round as a low cost fiscal stimulus package for all.”404 The statement almost gives the 
impression of grasping at straws: saying anything that might somehow coax out a 
conclusion.405 
 Certainly, the argument about fighting recession and economic stimulus is 
reinforced by the statistic that if every Member raised all of its applied tariff levels to the 
maximum legally permissible bound rates, then the average tariff level in the world 
would roughly double.406 In turn, exporters would be about 100% worse off than before. 
Thus, the argument continues, avoid a re-run of the Great Depression, during which 
protectionist, beggar-thy-neighbor trade measures and competitive devaluations 
exacerbated the severity and length of the world-wide declines in output, employment, 
                                                 
404  Pascal Lamy, Statement to Trade Negotiations Committee (June 11, 2010), in Lamy: No 
Ambitious Doha Result Possible Unless All Parties Gain, WORLD TRADE ORG. (June 11, 2010), 
www.wto.org/english/news_e/news10_e/tnc_dg_stat_11jun10_e.htm (emphasis added). 
405  As another example, one claim by the Director-General is that a Doha Round conclusion will 
enhance energy security (whatever that means) by (1) building on existing disciplines like national 
treatment and applying them to trade in energy goods and services, (2) cutting tariffs on renewable fuels 
like biodiesel and ethanol and on equipment used in energy production and distribution, (3) strengthening 
rules on subsidies, (4) improving rules on transit and trade facilitation, (5) liberalizing trade in energy-
efficient, climate-friendly technology, and (6) opening energy services such as engineering, drilling, 
technical testing, pipeline construction, and distribution. See Pascal Lamy, Director Gen., World. Trade 
Org., Address to World Energy Congress 2010 (Sept. 16, 2010), in Lamy: “A Stronger WTO Rule Book 
Could Benefit the Energy Sector,” WORLD TRADE ORG. (Sept. 16, 2010), www.wto.org/english/news_e/ 
sppl_e/sppl169_e.htm. 
 Still another example is the claim by Lamy the Doha Round will lead to enhanced rules on trade in 
natural services. See Lamy: Doha a “Stepping Stone” to Better Trade Rules in Natural Resources, WORLD 
TRADE ORG. (Oct. 26, 2010), www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl175_e.htm. And, yet another 
example is that a deal will enhance world commodities trade, leading to lower commodity prices, by 
dismantling barriers to such trade. See Lamy: Doha Will Oil the Wheels of World Commodities Trade, 
WORLD TRADE ORG. (Jan. 31, 2011), www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl184_e.htm. 
 Perhaps such happy outcomes might occur. The point here simply is that virtually any potential 
salubrious benefit is seized upon by the Director-General in his pleas for concluding the Round. The larger 
the number of straws grasped at, the further the Round drifts from its original purposes of employing trade 
as a weapon against poverty and Islamist extremism. 
406  See Pascal Lamy, Director Gen., World Trade Org., Keynote Address at World Trade 
Organization Public Forum (Sept. 28, 2009), in G20 Must Now “Walk the Talk” on Doha—Lamy, WORLD 
TRADE ORG. (Sept. 28, 2009), www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl136_e.htm. 
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and wages. Act now to counter protectionism, and thereby stimulate the global economy 
and foster the political economy dynamics of reform. 
B. Five Rebuttals 
 Yet this argument has five serious limitations. The first is the obvious point that 
not all WTO Members are going to raise all of their applied duties to the maximum 
bound rates. The fact that the policy space exists for them to do so does not mean they are 
likely to move into that space. To the contrary, it would be more reasonable to expect 
many Members would resist raising their barriers at all, so as not to trigger or hasten a 
march toward protectionism, a march that would reciprocally redound to their detriment. 
It also would be more reasonable to expect that a Member boosting applied rates would 
not do so on every single tariff line. Why raise the applied rate to the bound level on, for 
example, artificial Christmas trees, and thereby penalize consumers through higher costs, 
if there is no vociferous domestic constituency to protect? 
 Empirical evidence buttresses this first point. Consider the fact the WTO itself, in 
its 2010 biennial review of American trade policy, lauded the United States for resisting 
protectionist pressures and maintaining some of the most open trade and investment 
markets in the world.407 Consider, too, that in November 2009, the European Commission 
put out its annual report in which it monitors protectionist measures around the world. 
 The European Commission report listed 223 “potentially trade-restrictive 
measures” implemented by the forty major trading partners of the EU between October 
2008 and October 2009.408 (The greatest number of such measures were put up by Russia 
                                                 
407  See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Praises United States for Resisting Protectionism, Partners Voice 
Complaints, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1506 (Oct. 7, 2010). 
408  Bengt Ljung, Global War of Protectionism Resulting from Economic Crisis Avoided, EC Says, 26 
Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1542 (Nov. 12, 2009). 
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(forty-eight), which is not a WTO Member; Argentina (thirty-five); the United States 
(sixteen); and China (thirteen).409 They included buy national policies in government 
procurement contracts and certain discriminatory criteria in fiscal support schemes.) But, 
the report explicitly stopped short of labeling them “protectionist.” Moreover, the report 
credited existing GATT-WTO disciplines for containing traditional protectionism 
measures, namely, tariff hikes and non-tariff barriers increases (e.g., import bans, quota 
or license restrictions, and reference pricing schemes). Most importantly, the 
Commission declared that the world had avoided the worst-case scenario of a tit-for-tat, 
downward spiral of protectionism.410 
 Shortly after the EU issued its report, the WTO itself conceded the point. In a 
report of its own on annual developments in international trade, the WTO admitted 
“[t]here has been no systemic breakdown in the international trading system and WTO 
[M]embers have resisted the allure of protectionism.” 411  Indeed, all of the trade-
restricting or trade-distorting measures that Members implemented since October 2008 
collectively affected a maximum of one percent of world trade and were concentrated in a 
few sectors (particularly agriculture, iron, steel, and to some degree in electronics, 
footwear, and textiles and clothing).412 Likewise, WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy 
wrote in a letter to trade ministers that “[t]he world economy is about as open for trade 
today as it was before the crisis started.”413 
                                                 
409  See id. 
410  See id. 
411  Jonathan Lynn, WTO Urges Non-Discrimination as Crisis Ends, REUTERS, Nov. 19, 2009, 
available at www.reuters.com/article/2009/11/19/idUSLJ379965. 
412  See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Chief Says Protectionism Surge Has Been Avoided, but Vigilance 
Needed, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1606 (Nov. 26, 2009). 
413  Lynn, supra note 411; see also Daniel Pruzin, WTO Chief Says Economic Downturn Led to 12 
Percent Drop in 2009 Global Trade, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 294 (Mar. 4, 2010) (quoting Director-
General Lamy as saying that import demand and trade finance were the causes for the twelve percent drop 
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 The Director-General had little choice but to climb down. In March 2010, in their 
joint second Report on Group of 20 (G-20) Trade and Investment Measures, the WTO, 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) admitted the G-20 countries had 
imposed fewer trade-restrictive measures between September 2009 and February 2010 
than they had in the preceding six-month period (April–August 2009) covered in the first 
Report.414 (The G-20 is an informal talk shop of 19 industrialized and big emerging 
market countries, plus the EU, with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World 
Bank as ex-officio members.)415 The second Report also conceded that new AD, CVD, 
                                                                                                                                                 
in the volume of world trade in 2009 and “[t]o a much lesser degree, trade has been adversely affected by 
some instances of increased tariffs and domestic subsidies, new non-tariff measures, and more antidumping 
actions”) (emphasis added). 
414  See Daniel Pruzin, OECD, WTO, UNCTAD Find Major Economies Eased Protectionist Measures 
in Last Period, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 375, 375–76 (Mar. 18, 2010). In October 2010, UNCTAD 
also reported that at least 41 countries around the globe had implemented new investment measures to 
attract FDI in the preceding 6 months, plus 50 new international investment agreements involving 79 
countries, leading it to conclude that despite the global economic slump, the review period “witnessed an 
ongoing trend towards more investment liberalization, facilitation, and promotion.” Daniel Pruzin, 
UNCTAD Report Cites Continued Trend Toward Liberalization in Investment Pacts, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. 
(BNA) No. 1548 (Oct. 14, 2010). 
 Likewise, in its November 2010 report on new measures that impede trade and investment, 
UNCTAD said G-20 countries generally resisted protectionist pressures. Covering the period mid-May to 
mid-October 2010, UNCTAD observed the rate of increase in new protectionist measures slowed. See 
Daniel Pruzin, Reports Say G-20 Countries Resisting Protectionism, Despite Increase in Measures, 27 Int’l 
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1712 (Nov. 11, 2010) (citing fifty-six trade-restrictive measures between March and 
May 2010 and 54 such new measures—including thirty-three trade remedies, fourteen border measures, 
and four export restrictions—in May–October 2010). 
 Notably, some of the new trade-restrictive measures take the form of sanitary and phytosanitary 
(SPS) and technical barriers to trade (TBT) rules, and they may be either entirely new rules, or stricter 
application of existing rules. It may well be that governments resort increasingly to SPS and TBT measures 
for protectionist purposes, notwithstanding the global economic slowdown, as these devices have a 
politically palatable basis for legitimacy: the protection of consumer health and welfare. See generally Amy 
Tsui, USTR Will Seek to Address NTBs, Outstanding Trade Disputes, Reif Says, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 
No. 413 (Mar. 25, 2010) (reporting on the view of Tim Reif, General Counsel, USTR, that non-tariff 
barriers are the hardest kind of problem to deal with in dispute resolution proceedings and that bilateral 
negotiation often is preferable to litigation to resolve them). 
415  The G-20 was created in response to the 1997–99 Asian financial crisis and first met in December 
1999 in Berlin. See Factbox—What is the G20?, REUTERS, Mar. 30, 2009, available at 
in.reuters.com/article/2009/03/30/financial-g20-group-idINLU96805420090330. Accounting for ninety 
percent of world Gross National Product (GNP), eighty percent of world trade, and two-thirds of world 
population, the members are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the EU, France, Germany, India, 
Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, Turkey, the 
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and safeguard measures affected only about 0.7% of G-20 imports, or 0.4% of total world 
imports. (The comparable figures for the first Report were 1.3% and 0.8%, respectively.) 
Overall, the WTO omitted in its November 2010 report on protectionism, from October 
2008 through October 2010, trade restrictions imposed by G-20 countries during this 
period covered in aggregate only 1.8% of G-20 imports and 1.4% of total world 
imports.416 Even these miniscule amounts were over-estimates for two reasons. 
 First, the trade coverage of a measure is not exactly equal to the diminution of 
trade caused by the measure, unless that measure is prohibitive and shuts down trade in 
the targeted product. Second, trade coverage estimates are at the six-digit customs 
classification level when in fact the value of trade affected by the measure may be at the 
eight-digit level. So, the argument that the Doha Round is an essential tool to keeping 
trade open and fighting the global economic recession was retracted by its proponents. 
The lasting impression is the WTO Secretariat and its Director-General grasp at any 
expedient assertion to exhort Members to finish the Round, rather than focus on the 
original purposes of the Round and the extent to which negotiating texts match those 
purposes. 
 The results from the joint second Report, which the WTO, OECD, and UNCTAD 
issued in June 2010 covering the period November 2009 through mid-May 2010, were 
even more encouraging.417  G-20 countries continued to refrain from imposing trade-
                                                                                                                                                 
United Kingdom, and the U.S. Id. The G-20 is a forum for discussing global economic governance and 
stability, and resolving cross-border problems. 
416  See Daniel Pruzin, G-20 Leaders Say Time to Conclude Doha; Obama Prepared to Take Risks for 
Approval, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1755 (Nov. 16, 2010). 
417  See Daniel Pruzin, Survey Sees G-20 Warding Off Protectionism, as Limits on Exports, Bailouts 
Cause Concern, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 886 (June 17, 2010). 
 Likewise, a report by an NGO, Global Trade Alert (GTA), issued in September 2010 found that in 
the first 8 months of 2010, the rate of discrimination against foreign commercial interests was about the 
same as in 2009. This report, the seventh issued by GTA, was notable in that for the first time, it covered 
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restrictive measures though some Members had resorted to or extended export 
restrictions on commodities, particularly food products. As for trade remedies, AD, CVD, 
and safeguard measures collectively covered just 0.4% of annual world imports, but this 
trade coverage probably over-stated their actual impact. Moreover, the Members had 
cooled off in their recourse to remedial actions during the first four months of 2010. 
 Certainly, past is not always prologue. In their joint fifth Report, issued in May 
2011 and covering mid-October 2010 to April 2011, the WTO, OECD, and UNCTAD 
said protectionist pressures were more manifest than before: there were 122 new trade-
restrictive measures, more than double the previous reporting period, and the highest 
recorded in any of the five reports.418 Export restrictions (such as export quotas and 
taxes) increased, and protectionist measures (especially tariffs and non-automatic import 
licensing) impacted 0.6% of all G-20 imports. 419  Thus, the fifth Report sounded a 
                                                                                                                                                 
not only traditional import protectionist measures, but also export management measures, that is, export-
enhancing measures such as bailouts, export subsidies, local content requirements, and tax rebates. It did so 
for two reasons: first, such measures consume domestic resources that could be used for alternative 
purposes, and make the cost of exports cheaper for foreigners to purchase; and, second, export incentives 
allow exporters to lower their prices, which compels exporters from other countries to follow suit so as not 
to lose out profits or market share. Both reasons mean export-enhancement is tantamount to a beggar-thy-
neighbor policy, benefiting one country (specifically, its exporters) at the expense of another (i.e., harming 
exporters from other countries). See Len Bracken, NGO Finds 2010 Rate of Protectionism Tracks Previous 
Year Despite Trade Rise, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1375 (Sept. 16, 2010). 
418  See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Cites Jump in G-20 Trade Protection: OECD, UNCTAD See Positive 
Investment News, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 938 (June 9, 2011). 
419  Protectionist Pressures on the Rise, Latest G20 Monitoring Report Says, WORLD TRADE ORG. 
(May 24, 2011), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news11_e/igo_24may11_e.htm; Pruzin, supra note 
418, at 938. 
 A WTO report circulated in June 2011 to the Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB) offered 
conclusions nearly the same as those in the joint fifth Report. Covering the period mid-October 2010 
through the end of April 2011, and based on data from 30 of the then 153 WTO Members, the WTO report 
said import-restrictive measures had increased. But, the amount of trade affected by them had fallen – to 
just 0.53 percent of global trade, from 0.8 percent in the previous six-month review period – and nearly half 
of the share of affected trade was the result of only three measures: (1) EU restrictions on steel; (2) EU AD 
and safeguard proceedings against Chinese wireless modems; and (3) an increase by China in its import 
tariffs on fuel oil and jet fuel. Moreover, the WTO report conceded AD investigations fell by 10 percent, 
CVD investigations by 36 percent, year-on-year during the six-month review period, and the number of 
safeguard cases fell from 13 to 7. See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Report Says Members Have Boosted Trade 
Restrictions as Crisis Resolve Fades, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1021 (June 23, 2011). 
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negative tone. But, the export restraints were no surprise: imposed particularly on 
agricultural products, metals, and minerals, they could be explained as defensive 
measures against rising food and commodity prices. As for the import measures, they still 
affected only 0.5% of global imports, and trade remedy actions were in decline. 
Moreover, of the 550 measures that countries had taken since October 2008, 18% had 
been rescinded or modified to reduce their negative impact on trade whereas 15% had 
been altered since issuance of the fourth Report in November 2010. Such measures 
tended to be temporary duty increases or trade remedy actions. Also, WTO Members 
were adhering to their market access commitments across services sectors, though 
understandably some emerging countries were resorting to capital controls, thus affecting 
the supply of financial services.420 
 If there is any worrying possibility about trade-restrictive measures implemented 
in the wake of the global economic crisis, then it concerns persistence. In May 2010, the 
European Commission put the number of such measures at 278 and said that none had 
been lifted even though the overall trade climate had improved during the first half of 
2010.421  Further, some measures took the form of traditional protectionism, like the 
decision by MERCOSUR to increase certain tariffs and the decision by Russia, Belarus, 
and Kazakhstan to create a customs union as of 1 January 2010 that consolidated tariff 
hikes implemented by Russia since the onset of the crisis. To be sure, the 278 measures 
affected only 1.7% of EU exports (mainly in agri-food, automotives, steel, and textiles) 
                                                                                                                                                 
 The point, then, is that the argument made by the WTO Director-General, Pascal Lamy, that a 
conclusion to the Doha Round is necessary to prevent a descent into protectionism is false. There was no 
such descent during or in the aftermath of the global recession. 
420  See Pruzin, supra note 418, at 938. 
421  See Joe Kirwin, Trade Restrictions Adopted During Economic Crisis Still in Place, EC Says, 27 
Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 820 (June 3, 2010). 
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and only 1% of total world trade in goods. Nonetheless, the concern was the trade-
restrictive measures may linger long after a full economic recovery has occurred. And 
yet, after a 13% contraction in the volume of world goods traded in 2009, 2010 saw a 
surge of 15.1%, bringing world trade back to its 2008 level.422 
 Second, political rhetoric outstrips political courage. Leaders of the G-20 nations 
champion this argument.423 The G-20 calls for “Keynes [i.e., fiscal stimulus] at home and 
Smith [i.e., free trade] abroad,” as Professor Razeen Sally puts it. 424  Yet, as he 
provocatively observes: 
The G-20 is unlikely to be more than a chat forum given to non-binding 
pledges. Even in the improbable event of a Doha conclusion anytime soon, 
it will not contain protectionism: what is on the table is a very low 
common denominator and a dog’s breakfast of loopholes and 
exemptions.425 
 
The “very low common denominator” and “dog’s breakfast” are the subject of much of 
the present article. For now, the key point is the chatter. 
 G-20 leaders periodically issue a plethora of commitments to resist protectionism 
and complete the Doha Round on what they promise would be ambitious, balanced 
terms.426 Likewise, apparently oblivious to the original development orientation of the 
                                                 
422  See Alan Beattie, World Trade Back at 2008 Levels, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2011, at 6. 
423  See Pope Urges World Leaders to Stabilize Markets without Excluding Poor, CATH. NEWS 
SERVICE (Mar. 31, 2009), http://www.catholicnews.com/data/stories/cns/0901475.htm. 
424  Razeen Sally, The Quest for a Global Solution Is Misguided, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2009, at 9 
[hereinafter Sally, The Quest]. See generally RAZEEN SALLY, NEW FRONTIERS IN FREE TRADE—
GLOBALIZATION’S FUTURE AND ASIA’S RISING ROLE (2008) (critiquing global economic organizations and 
governance). 
425  Sally, The Quest, supra note 424, at 9 (emphasis added). 
426  See, e.g., Kirk Meets with New Japanese Agriculture Minister, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 
1397 (Oct. 15, 2009). The G-20 is not the only plurilateral venue in which such calls are issued. They 
come, for example, from the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. In January 2011, trade 
ministers from 19 countries (Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Costa Rica, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, 
Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, South Africa, Switzerland, and the 
U.S.) vowed to “seriously accelerate” efforts to reach a Doha Round breakthrough by mid-2011. Daniel 
Pruzin, Trade Ministers Vow to Overcome Differences, Achieve Doha Breakthrough, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. 
(BNA) No. 178 (Feb. 3, 2011). 
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Round in a post-9/11 context, WTO Director-General Lamy calls for “a combination of 
ambition and balance for ALL participants.”427 They even (1) toss in a preferred target 
date, if they can agree to one; (2) default to an ambiguous future period; (3) abandon an 
earlier target completion date entirely, as they did in June 2010 G-20 Summit in Toronto; 
or (4) somehow proclaim trade remains high on their agenda, and they are determined to 
resist protectionism, engage in horizontal negotiations, and conclude the Round as they 
did at the November 2010 G-20 Summit in Seoul.428 The anodyne phrase “ambitious and 
balanced” is commonly used among politicians and trade negotiators when pressed to 
characterize their expectations for the Doha Round.429 
                                                 
427  Lamy, supra note 404 (emphasis in original). 
428  See Daniel Pruzin, South Korea Pushing to Put Trade Talks High on Agenda of November G-20 
Meeting, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1102, at 1102–03 (July 22, 2010). At the Toronto Summit, the G-
20 backed away from earlier commitments to finish the Doha Round by the end of 2010. See Len Bracken, 
G-20 Omits Doha Round Target Date, Seeks Jobs from Trade in Declaration, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 
No. 974 (July 1, 2010); see also Paul Taylor, Do-Little G20 Summit Cheers Spared Bankers, REUTERS, 
June 28, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USTRE65L3O720100628 (stating 
“that the G-20 has stepped away from imposing an arbitrary timeline”). Notably, just prior to the G-20 
meeting, at the June 2010 Group of Eight (G8) Summit in Toronto, the G8 countries (Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and United States, which are the G-7 countries, plus Russia) not 
only backed off from earlier calls to finish the Round in 2010, but also from multilateral trade liberalization 
in favor of regional trade agreements (RTAs): 
We will continue . . . to promote liberalisation of trade and investment under the WTO, 
through the national reduction of barriers, and through bilateral and regional 
negotiations. 
Alan Beattie & Chris Giles, U.S. Pledge to Revise S Korea Trade Deal, FIN. TIMES, June 27, 2010, at 2 
(emphasis added) (quoting final communiqué of G8). 
429  The ambitious-and-balanced formula was used, for example, by the leaders of the Asia-Pacific 
countries in their joint declaration—calling for an “ambitious and balanced conclusion to the Doha 
Developmnet Agenda (DDA) in 2010”—following the November 2009 summit of the Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum hosted by Singapore. Tripti Lahiri, APEC Leaders Call for 
Completion of Doha Round in 2010, Urge Flexibility, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1580 (Nov. 19, 
2009). It was used again by the Deputy USTR in a 5 June 2010 press release. See also Toshio Aritake, 
APEC Ministers Deliver Statement in Support of Concluding Doha Round ‘As Soon As Possible,’ 27 Int’l 
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 845 (June 10, 2010). Similarly, in Seoul, the G-20 heads of state reaffirmed their: 
strong commitment to direct our negotiators to engage in across-the-board negotiations 
to promptly bring the Doha Development Round to a successful, ambitious, 
comprehensive, and balanced conclusion consistent with the mandate of the Doha 
Development Round and built on the progress already achieved. We recognise that 2011 
is a critical window of opportunity, albeit narrow, and that engagement among our 
representatives must intensify and expand. We now need to complete the end game. Once 
such an outcome is reached, we commit to seek ratification, where necessary, in our 
 
197 
 
 
 Notably, the phrase does not appear in the Ministerial Declaration that launched 
the Round, nor does the word “ambitious.”430 The word “balanced” appears three times, 
in Paragraphs two, eleven, and twenty-two of that Declaration. In Paragraph two, in a 
sentence that highlights the importance of poor country interests, it is remarked that 
“enhanced market access [and] balanced rules” are important, too. In Paragraph eleven, 
the Work Program for the Round is characterized as “broad and balanced.” In Paragraph 
twenty-two, it is said that any deal on trade and investment “should reflect in a balanced 
manner the interests of home and host countries,” following which the interests of poor 
countries are highlighted. 
 On reflection, it appears the terms “ambitious” (or a synonym, such as “broad”) 
and “balanced” are meant by developed countries to counter-balance the aspirations poor 
countries have (or once had) for the Round. Interpreted literally, if cynically, “ambitious” 
connotes coverage of every topic a developed country thinks is important, and “balanced” 
means the developed country believes what its country gained from a Doha Round deal is 
at least as good, and preferably better, than what its country conceded. Certainly, in a 
world of real politik bargaining, developing and least developed countries could well 
apply the same meanings to these terms. For the United States, at least under the 
Administration of President Barack H. Obama, “balanced” means a return to the ways of 
the past, in which Asia exported manufactured goods, America imported them, and thus 
the American consumer was indispensable to Asian growth and prosperity, was 
                                                                                                                                                 
respective systems. We are also committed to resisting all forms of protectionist 
measures. 
G-20 Leaders Statement from Seoul Summit (Nov. 12, 2010), available at www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-
11741674 (emphasis added). This statement, while providing somewhat more detailed instructions to trade 
negotiators than previous communiqués, left out any reference to a target date for completing the Round. 
Pruzin, supra note 416, at 1755. 
430  The Ministerial Declaration is available on the WTO website, www.wto.org, and reprinted in 
BHALA, supra note 1, at 633–45. 
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unthinkable. Those ways were unsustainable, as the global economic recession of 2008–
2009 had revealed. 
 In any event, the G-20 has made pledges for an ambitious, balanced, and timely 
conclusion of the Doha Round at their November 2008 Summit in Washington, D.C., at 
their April 2009 Summit in London, and at their September 2009 Summit in 
Pittsburgh.431 But, the Summits have failed to kick-start the Round. Worse yet, after the 
                                                 
431  See Gary G. Yerkey, G-20 Leaders Seek (Again) to Revive WTO Talks but Success Far From 
Certain, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1279 (Sept. 24, 2009) (quoting from the draft joint communiqué of 
the Pittsburgh Summit) [hereinafter Yerkey, G-20 Leaders Seek]; Daniel Pruzin, Indian Minister Affirms 
Plans to Host G-20 Trade Meeting on WTO Doha Round, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 874 (July 2, 
2009) (reporting on efforts in the run-up to the Pittsburgh Summit to draft a positive final communiqué); 
Guy Dinmore & Marco Pasqua, Trade Promise at Heart of Draft Communiqué, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2009, 
at 5 (reporting on efforts to complete the stalled global trade talks at the London Summit). The 2 April 
2009 communiqué, entitled “The Global Plan for Recovery and Reform,” states in paragraph 23 that the G-
20: 
remain[s] committed to reaching an ambitious and balanced conclusion to the Doha 
Development Round, which is urgently needed. This could boost the global economy by 
at least $150 billion per annum. To achieve this we are committed to building on the 
progress already made, including with regard to modalities. 
The Global Plan for Recovery (Apr. 2, 2009), available at http://www.g20.org/Documents/final-
communique.pdf, (Apr. 3, 2009) (emphasis added). 
 The first sentence is standard rhetoric but lacks a deadline, the second sentence is speculative and 
cites a small figure in light of the magnitude of the crisis, and the third sentence suggests the December 
2008 Draft Texts would be the basis for any conclusion. 
 The pledge made at the Pittsburgh Summit was modestly more detailed and hopeful. Paragraph 49 
of the communiqué states: 
We are determined to seek an ambitious and balanced conclusion to the Doha 
Development Round in 2010, consistent with its mandate, based on the progress already 
made, including with regard to modalities. We understand the need for countries to 
directly engage with each other, within the WTO bearing in mind the centrality of the 
multilateral process, in order to evaluate and close the remaining gaps. We note that in 
order to conclude the negotiations in 2010, closing those gaps should proceed as quickly 
as possible. We ask our ministers to take stock of the situation no later than early 2010, 
taking into account the results of the work program agreed to in Geneva following the 
Delhi Ministerial, and seek progress on Agriculture, Non-Agricultural Market Access, as 
well as Services, Rules, Trade Facilitation and all other remaining issues. We will remain 
engaged and review the progress of the negotiations at our next meeting. 
Text: G20 Final Communique—Opening the Global Economy, REUTERS, Sept. 25, 2009, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USTRE58O6TZ20090925 (emphasis added). 
 The ideas of an “ambitious and balanced conclusion” based on existing progress, including 
modalities, are not new. Referring to 2010 thrice at least identifies a target end-point, along with an interim 
stock-taking exercise. The second sentence is a reference to the two-track approach (discussed later in this 
article) whereby multilateral consensus on modalities and bilateral negotiations on concessions occur 
simultaneously. Mentioning topics other than agriculture and NAMA in the penultimate sentence is useful 
in identifying how much further negotiations have to proceed for closure to occur. 
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November 2008 Summit, fourteen of the twenty countries raised trade barriers in one 
manner or another.432  By September 2009, seventeen of the twenty G-20 states had 
                                                                                                                                                 
 Notably, however, the U.S. rejected a proposal made at the Pittsburgh Summit by Australia, 
Brazil, the EU, and other WTO Members to reach agreement on core formulas – that is, modalities – on 
agriculture and NAMA by early 2010. Led by the Deputy National Security Advisor for International 
Economic Affairs, Michael Froman, the U.S. thought substance, not artificial timelines, should govern. See 
Gary G. Yerkey, G-20 Leaders Vow to Work on Completing Doha in 2010, See No Early Breakthrough, 26 
Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1310 (Oct. 1, 2009). That argument is, of course, correct. However 
undisciplined by deadlines, talks can drag on, and the impression conveyed can be one that the U.S. is 
either ambivalent about or reluctant to lead. In that regard, roughly 100 developing countries issued a joint 
statement during the Pittsburgh Summit supporting conclusion of the Doha Round by 2010, so long as 
developed nations showed “true engagement, flexibility, and political will.” Id. at 1311. 
432  Amy Tsui, Avoiding Protectionism Key to Reversing Economic Downturn, Former USTR Asserts, 
26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 359 (Mar. 12, 2009). 
In March 2009, the World Bank published a study identifying 47 trade-restrictive measures that countries, 
including 17 of the G-20 nations, had implemented since the onset of the global economic crisis in fall 
2008. Prime illustrations were: 
● Tariff increases, which made up one-third of the trade-restrictive measures: 
 For example, Ecuador raised tariffs on over 600 products, and Russia boosted tariffs on used cars. 
● Non-tariff barriers: 
 For instance, Argentina imposed non-automatic import licensing requirements for auto parts, 
leather goods, televisions, textiles, and toys. Indonesia announced all imports of five categories of 
merchandise—electronics, food and beverages, garments, shoes, and toys—could be admitted only 
at five of its air or sea ports. 
● Tightened Product or Sanitary Standards: 
 For example, China banned imports of some kinds of Belgian chocolates, British sauce, Dutch 
eggs, Irish pork, and Spanish dairy products. India banned imports of Chinese toys. 
● Export Subsidies: 
 The EU temporarily implemented new subsidies for exports of butter, cheese, and milk powder. 
● Sector-Specific Subsidies: 
 Several governments had subsidized their domestic auto industry, with the amount summing to 
$48 billion. The U.S. had provided direct subsidies of $17.4 billion, and Argentina, Brazil, 
Canada, China, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and the United Kingdom had given either direct 
or indirect subsidies to their national producers. 
Diana I. Gregg, World Bank Takes 17 Nations in G-20 to Task for Implementing Trade-Restricting 
Measures, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 406 (Mar. 26, 2009). 
 Note, however, many WTO Members—including India and the U.S.—rejected the 
characterization of WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy that there had been “significant slippage” toward 
protectionism since the advent of the crisis. To the contrary, they urged, WTO disciplines had helped 
prevent a descent into protectionism. Moreover, the world was a different place—far more inter-dependent 
through global supply chains and manufacturing processes—than in the 1930s, when the U.S. passed the 
notorious Smoot–Hawley Act and other countries responded with protectionist and beggar-thy-neighbor 
policies. See Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Challenges WTO Chief Lamy’s Assertion of ‘Significant’ Slipping Toward 
Protectionism, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 505, at 505–06 (Apr. 16, 2009). 
 Additionally, the fact is that not all Members raised barriers following the onset of the global 
economic crisis. G-20 countries such as Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, as well as Russia (which is not a Member), all reduced import duties, fees, and surcharges, and 
removed non-tariff barriers on a range of products. China even lessened restrictions on some services. 
Thus, suggesting world-wide descent into protectionism is akin to using fear-mongering to push Members 
to complete the Round. See Daniel Pruzin, Agencies Say G-20 Countries Have Avoided ‘Widespread 
Resort’ to Trade Protectionism, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1235 (Sept. 17, 2009). 
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violated the pledge they re-took at the April 2009 Summit—not to resort to protectionism 
to fight the recession.433 
 Put bluntly, hypocrisy abounds. Fortunately—from a free trade perspective—the 
hypocrisy does not always manifest itself in measures that affect a broad swath of traded 
goods.434 Trade remedies (that is, AD, CVD, and safeguard measures) typically strike 
only a small percentage of commerce. For example, between the first quarter of 2008 and 
first quarter of 2009, trade remedies affected only 0.4% of the value of imports into the 
United States and EU. Proposed remedies in that period affected just 0.6% and 1.8% of 
imports into China and India, respectively.435 By the account of the OECD, the use of 
protectionist measures in general, by all countries, was “relatively muted,” affecting only 
about one percent of world trade.436 (However, dollar-for-dollar, the effect is serious: 
raising tariff revenues by $1, which entails a direct trade-distorting measure, causes a 
                                                                                                                                                 
 Note, too, that some skepticism of the World Bank’s analysis may be appropriate. After the April 
2009 G-20 Summit, the Bank reported G-20 countries had taken, or were contemplating taking, 23 actions 
that were trade restrictive, 7 of which were by the U.S. Yet, several of the actions, including the American 
imposition of a 10 percent duty on Canadian softwood lumber, and the Section 421 safeguard investigation 
of Chinese tires, were pursuant to normal trade remedy procedures. See Diana I. Gregg, World Bank Says 
More Trade Restrictions Imposed by G-20 Countries Since Summit, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 569 
(Apr. 30, 2009). There is a certain automaticity built into these procedures, and inferring they are taken in 
response to the global economic crisis, and in defiance of G-20 pledges, is a bit of a stretch. 
433  Yerkey, G-20 Leaders Seek, supra note 431, at 1280. In September 2009, Global Trade Alert, a 
London-based monitoring service at the Center for Economic Policy Research, reported that since the 
November 2008 Washington, D.C. Summit, the G-20 states had implemented 121 “blatantly protectionist” 
measures—roughly one every three days—and were on the verge of enacting another 134 such measures. 
Id. Here again, some skepticism is in order. The service is supported by the World Bank, and its ideological 
inclination appears to be toward free trade. 
434  Interestingly, and not surprisingly in an era of globalization, over fifty percent of world trade in 
goods, and seventy-five percent of services trade, is in intermediate products or services used to make or 
offer other goods or services. See Rick Mitchell, Protectionist Measures Had Small Role in 12.5% Trade 
Plunge of 2009, OECD Says, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 854 (June 10, 2010). The Boeing 787 
Dreamliner is a case in point: its engines are made in the United Kingdom and U.S., its doors are made in 
Sweden and France, its flaps and ailerons are made in Canada and Australia, the fuselage is made in Japan, 
Italy, and the U.S., its horizontal stabilizers are made in Italy, its landing gear is made in France, and its 
wings are made in Japan. Overall, there are forty-three suppliers in over 135 production sites around the 
world. See id. (reporting on a May 2010 report from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, Trade and the Economic Recovery: Why Open Markets Matter). 
435  See Alan Beattie, Barriers Failing to Dent Global Trade, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2009, at 4. 
436  Mitchell, supra note 434, at 854 (reporting on a May 2010 OECD report, Trade, Policy, and the 
Economic Crisis). 
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$2.16 fall in world exports and $0.73 fall in world income.) Moreover, launching a trade 
remedy investigation—while it might have an in terrorem effect on respondent producer-
exporters, forcing them to raise their prices or otherwise change their behavior—results 
in imposition of a remedial measure in 50% of the cases as of 2009, which is a decrease 
from the 80–90% figure of 2008.437 
 Nevertheless, the point is that what G-20 leaders say with aplomb, eloquence, and 
gravitas in a G-20 communiqué does not translate into paradigmatic shifts at the WTO 
bargaining table. That is true notwithstanding efforts by thirteen WTO Members, which 
in May 2009 produced a communication urging the entire WTO Membership to back the 
G-20 pledge to refrain from any new trade barriers though 2010.438 In other words, there 
is a mismatch between, on the one hand, grandiloquent political rhetoric, and, on the 
other hand, foot-dragging behavior of WTO Members in multilateral negotiations and 
protectionist-oriented domestic trade policy.439 To the extent G-20 (and indeed, all other) 
leaders sincerely seek to conclude the Round with alacrity, their representatives would do 
more than wrap up unresolved technical matters. These representatives also would 
engage seriously in horizontal discussions that cut across sectors.440 
 That is, WTO Members would put out on the bargaining table proposed trade-offs 
                                                 
437  See Beattie, supra note 435, at 5. 
438  Daniel Pruzin, WTO Members Fighting Protectionism Gain Support in Push for Trade Barrier 
Standstill, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 698 (May 28, 2009). The 13 Members were Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Hong Kong Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Singapore, Switzerland, 
Turkey, and Uruguay. They had the support of Israel, Lichtenstein, South Korea, Macedonia, Thailand, and 
Ukraine, as well as of least-developed countries (for which Tanzania spoke). Australia, China, and the U.S. 
all welcomed the support for the G-20 standstill pledge. See id. 
439  See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Members Highlight ‘Mismatch’ in Doha Ambitions; U.S. Cites Mixed 
Progress, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1023 (July 30, 2009). A related mismatch is between the 
ambitions of WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy, and the Chairs of the negotiating groups. In the summer 
of 2009, the Director-General pushed them to issue revised draft modalities texts. But, as the Chair of the 
agricultural negotiations, Ambassador David Walker said in July 2009, there was no basis for doing so, as 
no material progress had been made. Id. at 1023–24. 
440  See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Chief Cites Need to Broaden Doha Talks Beyond Agriculture, NAMA, 26 
Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 988, at 988–89 (July 23, 2009). 
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in agricultural, non-agricultural, and services trade, and in rules, so that each Member 
could come to a final decision, at the political level, as to whether the overall package 
was ambitious and balanced. And, in the meantime, Members would eschew any new 
protectionist measures. Yet, summits of the leaders simply were not matched by this kind 
of vigorous follow up. Not surprisingly, then, in July 2009 Brazil announced a reversal of 
its long-standing policy of focusing exclusively on completion of the Doha Round and 
eschewing free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations such as the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA). 441  With the Round going nowhere, and with pressure from the 
Brazilian business community, Brazil said it would seek a pact between MERCOSUR (of 
which it, of course, is a member along with Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay, with 
Bolivia, Chile, and Venezuela as associate members) and the EU.442 By May 2010, EU 
officials, frustrated at the lack of progress in the Round, no longer insisted on waiting for 
the outcome of the Round or trying to resolve market access and farm subsidy issues on a 
multilateral level, and negotiations commenced—after a six-year hiatus—in July.443 
 Third, the argument has led to a problem of forum, which has cascaded into a 
problem of puissance. The G-20 is not a forum in which to negotiate trade deals. That 
                                                 
441  See Ed Taylor, Brazil Losing Hope on Doha Round, To Concentrate on Mercosur–EU Trade Pact, 
26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1059 (Aug. 6, 2009). 
442 See Beattie, supra note 435, at 5. 
443  See David Haskell, EU Lawmakers Minimize Hostility to FTA with Mercosur, Say Talks to Begin 
in June, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 869 (June 10, 2010); David Haskel, Mercosur, EU to Hold First 
Round of Formal Free Trade Talks in Early July, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 783 (May 27, 2010); 
David Haskel, Mercosur-EU Free Trade Negotiators Meet; Mood Upbeat but No Sign of Solid Progress, 
27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 678 (May 6, 2010). 
 To be sure, the negotiating issues are difficult. All MERCOSUR states are major exporters of 
beans, beef, fruit, and grain, as are many EU states. On such products, MERCOSUR seeks greater market 
access to the EU through lower tariffs and an end to quotas, as well as the reduction or elimination of EU 
farm subsidies – all of which EU members like Austria, Cyprus, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Poland, and Romania oppose. MERCOSUR also demands greater and speedier concessions 
from the EU given the asymmetry in development between the two sides. Conversely, the EU seeks greater 
market access from MERCOSUR for industrial goods, in conflict with the interests of infant industries in 
MERCOSUR states, as well as better opportunities for EU financial service providers and government 
procurement bidders, plus better protection for EU copyrights and geographically-indicated products. 
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mandate rests with the WTO. The WTO Director-General was not invited to the 
November 2008 Summit. When he is asked to join a meeting, as in the April 2009 
Summit, he can do little else than (1) report on the state of the Doha Round, (2) re-
dedicate his good offices to the Round, and (3) offer to serve as a watchdog by shaming 
WTO Members through public blacklisting if they raise trade barriers.444 The more the G-
20 grabs the headlines on the trade policy and the more it vaults itself into the role of the 
puppeteer, the more marginal the WTO becomes and the more the Director-General 
becomes the G-20 marionette. A cynic might say that is precisely what some G-20 
leaders would like to happen. 
 Fourth, the strength of the argument depends on critical details. In the 1990s and 
early years of the new millennium, amidst favorable economic conditions, many 
Members cut their applied rates unilaterally. For example, on industrial products, the 
average world-wide applied rate fell from 26% in 1986 to 8.8% in 2007.445 Thus, as of 
2008, the average amount of “water” (the difference between bound and actually applied 
tariff rates) was three-fold (i.e., countries could raise duties by three times before hitting 
their bound ceiling level).446 But, it is important to look past averages and focus on 
individual countries and product categories. A trebling of an applied duty from 2% to 6% 
is marginally significant. A trebling from 20% to 60% imposes major commercial 
                                                 
444  Indeed, the G-20 communiqué from the April 2009 summit calls on the WTO to monitor, on a 
quarterly basis, adherence of the G-20 countries to their pledge not to implement new protectionist barriers. 
See Sion Barry, G20 Six Pledge Communique, WALES ONLINE (Apr. 2, 2009), 
http://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/wales-news/2009/04/02/g20-six-pledge-communique-91466-
23299550/550/. By at least one indicator, adherence was dubious. In the spring 2009, the EU re-introduced 
dairy export subsidies, and on May 22, 2009, the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture, Tom Vilsack, announced 
allocations under the Dairy Export Incentive Program for 2008–09 to counter the EU subsidies and level 
the playing field for American exporters. See Griffin, supra note 79, at 772. 
445  Barriers to Entry: A Rise in Protection Would Worsen the Already Grim Outlook for World Trade, 
ECONOMIST, Dec. 20, 2008, at 121. 
446  Fare Well, Free Trade, ECONOMIST, Dec. 20, 2008, at 15. 
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hardships on producer-exporters. In brief, the gain from binding duty rates hinges on the 
Member and merchandise at issue. 
 Related to this fourth point is a critical reality about how international trade 
works. Over 90% of import-export transactions are paid for through trade finance, such 
as commercial and standby letters of credit, performance guarantees, and insurance, and 
the global market for trade finance is about $10 trillion annually.447 Suppose the G-20 
commitments were more than chatter and catalyzed a Doha Round deal that resulted in 
pure free trade in agriculture and industrial goods. With all tariff and non-tariff barriers 
set to zero under this unlikely deal, would the value and volume of import-export 
transactions jump immediately? 
 The surest answer is “no.” What is needed to boost trade flows is trade finance, 
not merely the eradication of trade barriers, nor the discipline on WTO Members not to 
hike their barriers. To be sure, the decline in global trade following the onset of the global 
economic recession fell even more than the decline in the availability of trade finance.448 
In other words, a key reason for the decline in world trade (which was 12% by volume in 
2009, bigger than in any year since the Second World War, and was about 20% between 
October 2008 and January 2009, a faster drop relative to economic growth than during 
the Great Depression) was the synchronized drop in import demand in all major 
economies. 449  That drop was made worse by global supply chains, which quickly 
                                                 
447  See Daniel Pruzin, Global Downturn Drives Down Demand for Trade Financing, Funding 
Stabilizes, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1237 (Sept. 17, 2009). 
448  According to World Bank President Robert Zoellick, trade finance (i.e., the higher cost of it) 
accounted for no more than 10-15 percent of the overall contraction in global trade following the onset of 
the global economic recession. Those figures, while hardly inconsequential, are debated among observers. 
See Alan Beattie, Volume of Global Trade Rises at Sharpest Rate in over Five Years, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 26, 
2009, at 1. 
449  See Pruzin, supra note 413, at 294; Alan Beattie, Global Trade Index Shows Rapid Recovery, FIN. 
TIMES, Mar. 2, 2010, at 4. 
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transmitted a decline of one component from one country to a decline for other parts in 
other countries. Nevertheless, trade finance was a causal factor, too. To get unstuck trade 
credit, leaders at the April 2009 G-20 Summit in London agreed to set up a two-year, 
$250 billion Global Trade Liquidity Program (GTLP).450 The result was a drop in the cost 
of trade finance, measured in terms of fees above the London Inter-Bank Offer Rate 
(LIBOR), though this consequence also followed from a drop in demand for trade finance 
with the fall in trade. 
 Fortunately, by March 2010, trade financing had recovered to its pre-financial 
crisis levels. 451  But, the recovery did not necessarily benefit developing or least 
developed country exporters. The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) reported in 
March 2010 that of 5.2 million letter of credit transactions between 2005 and 2009, only 
1,140 of them (0.02%) resulted in default. However, in the sixty poorest countries of the 
world, two-thirds of exporters get no trade finance support from regional development 
banks (e.g., African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, and Inter-American Development Bank). That means 
the exporters and importers must deal with the international financial markets directly, 
which can unfairly punish them simply because of their location.452 As one example, 
traders in a particular poor country may be asked to pay an extra 10% (1000 basis points) 
and post 50% of the value of the merchandise being traded as collateral to secure 
issuance of a letter of credit. As another example, although there never has been a case of 
a Pakistani trader defaulting on a letter of credit, Pakistani traders find it difficult to get 
                                                 
450  See Pruzin, supra note 447, at 1237. 
451  See Daniel Pruzin, Reinforce Regional Development Banks to Close Trade Finance Gap, Group 
Says, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 521 (Mar. 31, 2011). 
452  See id. 
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letters of credit to finance their import-export deals. 
 The point is two-fold. First, trade finance is every bit as important to reigniting 
trade as is vigilance against protectionism. Second, resolving market inequities in trade 
finance can assist poor countries. Focusing on the latter phenomenon as a justification to 
complete the Doha Round is a post hoc rationale for the Round, one in no way associated 
with the launch of the Round in November 2001. Moreover, the indispensable 
mechanism for unlocking trade finance is reform of the banking system, to unstick 
lending. That is because banks are the purveyors of that finance. Consequently, whatever 
politicians say about the trade-promoting effects of a successful outcome in the Round, 
they are right to focus on the removal of toxic assets from the balance sheets of banks and 
the recapitalization of those banks.453 
 They also are quite correct to reexamine international bank capital adequacy 
standards—the so-called Basle II Framework, which was finalized in June 2004 by the 
Basle Committee on Banking Supervision. That Framework compels banks to post more 
capital than is necessary for extensions of trade finance because it assigns unreasonably 
high risk weightings and long maturities to fixed, short-term, trade-related finance 
transactions. 454  The Framework sets higher capital requirements for riskier credit 
exposures. Longer-term exposures are riskier; thus capital set aside rules are more 
                                                 
453  In this respect, the July 2009 statement by WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy, that “government 
bailouts had constrained risk-taking” outside of national boundaries, and his fear that the “finance industry 
will be on the side of the forces of deglobalization,” simply misses the greater need to re-start trade finance. 
See Peggy Hollinger, Lamy in Warning Over Bank Bail-Outs, FIN. TIMES, July 6, 2009, at 4 (quoting Mr. 
Lamy). 
454  See Daniel Pruzin, Experts Cite Basel Capital Accord as Barrier to New Trade Financing, 26 Int’l 
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1272 (Sept. 24, 2009); Alan Beattie, Doubts Remain Over Resilience of Trade 
Finance System, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2009, at 2. For an analysis of the Basle I Framework, see generally 
RAJ BHALA, PERSPECTIVES ON RISK-BASED CAPITAL (1989), and for the transition to value at risk (VAR) 
models of capital adequacy and Basle II, see Raj Bhala, Applying Equilibrium Theory and the FICAS 
Model: A Case Study of Capital Adequacy and Currency Trading, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 125, 125–262 
(1996). 
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stringent in proportion with the maturity length of an exposure. The Framework imposes 
a one-year maturity floor for all lending facilities. In doing so, it fails to recognize that 
short-term trade finance is self-liquidating, almost always with a maturity of 0 to 180 
days. Posting large amounts of capital for a year is not rational. The disproportionate 
capital requirement results in a diminution of funds available for trade finance (because 
the funds are tied up to meet capital requirements), an increase in the costs of this finance 
(to cover the costs of the capital set aside), or both. 
 Ominously, new international capital adequacy rules, known as the Basle III 
Framework, categorize trade finance instruments as off-balance sheet exposures, just like 
credit derivatives.455 These rules are scheduled to be phased in through 1 January 2019. 
The rules compel banks to allocate up to 100% of the value of a trade finance transaction 
as capital against the risk of default by the obligor on the instrument. Under the Basle III 
Framework, an import/export letter of credit required a 20% capital charge, and a 
performance guarantee required a 50% capital charge. Yet, the default rate on letters of 
credit is extraordinarily low. A study published by the Banking Commission of the 
International Chamber of Commerce in March 2011 covered a five-year period 
(including the 2008–2010 global economic slump), nine banks, and 5.2 million 
transactions: it found only 1140 letter of credit transactions, or 0.02% of them, resulted in 
default.456 Ironically, if the Basle III rules are not changed, then banks subject to them 
may sell their trade finance businesses to non-bank entities not subject to the rules, such 
                                                 
455  See Pruzin, supra note 451, at 521. The reason for classifying a letter of credit as an off-balance 
sheet activity is that a letter of credit typically has a provision known as a “cancelable payment 
commitment.” This provision can be invoked if all of the necessary documents concerning collateral to 
back the letter of credit are not presented. But, only a payable commitment may be included on the balance 
sheet of a bank. See Daniel Pruzin, Survey Finds Recovery from Crisis for Trade Financing; Fears About 
Basle III Rules Linger, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 576 (Apr. 7, 2011). 
456  See Daniel Pruzin, Survey Finds, supra note 456. 
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as hedge funds, or securitize their trade finance portfolios—with the likely investors 
being hedge funds. 
 Fifth, and perhaps most importantly, as just intimated, the argument obfuscates 
(and maybe even suppresses) the whole purpose of the DDA. Neither eliminating water 
in tariff schedules nor fighting global economic slumps was the primary motivation for a 
Doha Round. Rather, in the immediate post-9/11 environment, it was the nexus between 
trade liberalization, alleviating poverty, and fighting extremism that galvanized WTO 
Members. Continue the march to an open international capitalist system in which all 
persons—including Muslims—can compete on a reasonably level playing field. With 
every victory on that field, a person obtains a greater stake in the global economic order 
and becomes that much more immune to the vile, violent vituperation of Al Qaeda, the 
Taliban, and their misguided sympathizers. She appreciates the bad guys not only are evil 
but also are lousy economists. Certainly, some Members anticipated in November 2001 
that trade liberalization would assist in fighting a future, then-unseen recession. But, to 
catapult that anticipation into the key argument for finishing the Round is to risk 
betraying the original intent for the Round. 
 Indubitably, following the July 2008 collapse of multilateral trade negotiations 
under the DDA, only truly optimistic trade souls could keep faith in the resurrection of 
the Round. 457  In May 2009, the WTO General Council announced a Ministerial 
                                                 
457  For a gossipy account of the collapse, see generally PAUL BLUSTEIN, MISADVENTURES OF THE 
MOST FAVORED NATIONS—CLASHING EGOS, INFLATED AMBITIONS, AND THE GREAT SHAMBLES OF THE 
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (2009) (narrating the slide into dysfunctionality of the July 2008 ministerial 
meeting); Paul Blustein, The Nine-Day Misadventure of the Most Favored Nations: How the WTO’s Doha 
Round Negotiations Went Awry in July 2008, BROOKINGS GLOBAL ECONOMY AND DEVELOPMENT (Dec. 5, 
2008), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/articles/2008/1205_trade_blustein/1205_trade_blustein. 
pdf (narrating the unraveling of the July 2008 ministerial meeting). 
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Conference for Geneva from 30 November to 2 December 2009.458 That proclamation 
was a de facto admission the WTO had operated in violation of its own rules. It was two 
years overdue, given the (1) legal fact of Article IV:1 of the Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement) and (2) practical fact the WTO had not 
held a Ministerial Conference since the December 2005 Hong Kong meeting. 
 Worse yet for Doha Round optimists, the announcement came with a disclaimer: 
the Round was not the purpose for the Conference. Rather than negotiate DDA items, the 
trade ministers would chat about the Conference theme, “The WTO, the Multilateral 
Trading System, and the Current Global Economic Environment.” To boot, in that 
“Environment,” the Chairman of the General Council, Ambassador Mario Matus of 
Chile, instructed them to chat without materialist extravagance or fanfare. In retrospect, 
the pessimists proved correct. The Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP), 
headquartered in Minneapolis, said “This Ministerial [Conference] was so meaningless 
that many trade ministers actually left before the meeting was over.”459 The International 
Policy Network (IPN), based in London, called the Conference a “pointless exercise.”460 
The Financial Times sarcastically remarked the Round was “deadlocked,” and the 
exclusion of it from the formal agenda was “the rough equivalent of holding the 1919 
Versailles Conference without talking about the war.”461 
 As is well known, the DDA launched the Round in the Qatari capital, Doha, in 
November 2001. It is the ninth iteration of multilateral trade negotiations since the birth 
                                                 
458  WTO to Hold 7th Ministerial Conference on 30 November–2 December 2009, WORLD TRADE 
ORG. (May 26, 2009), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news09_e/gc_chair_stat_26may09_e.htm; 
Daniel Pruzin, WTO Members Will Hold Fall Ministerial with Focus on Global Economy, Not Doha, 26 
Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 699 (May 28, 2009). 
459  Pruzin, supra note 78, at 1638 (quoting Anne Laure Constantin, IATP). 
460  Id. (quoting Alec van Gelder, Trade Policy Analyst, IPN). 
461  See Alan Beattie, Retread Required, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2009, at 7. 
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of the modern world trading system with the signing of the GATT on October 30, 1947. 
Coming immediately in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the 
launch was dramatic. In the subsequent eight years, most of the high drama in the Round 
took the form of incremental evolutionary developments toward a yet-elusive consensus 
among Members on agriculture and NAMA issues, and to a lesser degree on trade 
remedies. The discussion below chronicles and critiques this drama, as it were. 
C. The Challenge of Resurrection 
 Metaphorically speaking, the key Doha Round challenge is resurrection. To many 
participants and observers, the Round is dead, and has been since at least July 2008 when 
a major Ministerial meeting collapsed. Another figurative phrase is the Round is “at least 
comatose if not dead.”462 Less conclusively, the characterizations of the Round facing a 
“cold snap,” or being in “hibernation,” “semi-hibernation,” or a “deep freeze,” sometimes 
are used.463 So also are the terms “deadlock,” “impasse,” “fatigue,” “frustration,” and 
                                                 
462  Yerkey, supra note 431, at 1279 (quoting Steven P. Schrage, Analyst, Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, Washington, D.C.). 
463  See, e.g., Daniel Pruzin, Hopes for Conclusion to Doha Round Talks Go into Hibernation in Early 
2009, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 107, at 107–08 (Jan. 22, 2009); Daniel Pruzin, USTR Schwab Sees 
Period of ‘Quiet’ Talks on Doha Round Negotiations in Early 2009, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 37 
(Jan. 8, 2009). 
 There are sometimes radically different perceptions of the same events (as fans of Akira 
Kurosawa’s 1951 classic movie, Rashomon, can well appreciate). At the World Economic Forum in Davos, 
Switzerland in January 2009, trade ministers met to discuss prospects for the Doha Round. WTO Director-
General Pascal Lamy gave a rosy review to the WTO General Council, saying: 
They continue to attach the highest priority to a successful conclusion of the Round and 
they recognized the major progress made in 2008 towards finalizing modalities, which 
they believe provides a sound basis for an early resolution of the remaining differences. 
Pascal Lamy, Director Gen., World Trade Org., Report to General Council (Feb. 3, 2009), in“Ministers 
Continue to Attach Highest Priority to the Round’s Conclusion”—Lamy, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Feb. 3–4, 
2009), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news09_e/tnc_chair_report_03feb09_e.htm. The Financial 
Times, however, did not play the role of cheerleader: 
The completion of the Doha trade round appeared as far away as ever at the week-end, 
when a gathering of trade ministers at the World Economic Forum in Davos descended 
into acrimony. 
Normally, the closing session of the forum displays ritualistic expectation that the trade 
round will be completed in the coming year, but there was little such optimism in 2009. 
Chris Giles, Acrimony Dashes Doha Hopes, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2009, at 2. 
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“absence of trust and confidence.”464 Indubitably, the most antipathetic diagnosis and 
prescription is this: the Doha Round “has been dead for some time and the corpse is 
putrefying: so a burial, a wake, and some appropriate words of farewell” are in order.465 
 For its part, the United States—both under the Bush and Obama 
Administrations—has made it crystal clear that no deal is better than a bad deal reached 
simply for the sake of accord.466 For instance, in May 2010, when again confronted with 
the demand that to kick-start the Round, the United States must lay out hypothetical 
additional concessions it would make if Brazil, China, and India offered further 
concessions of their own, President Obama’s USTR, Ambassador Ron Kirk, said: 
We’ve asked everyone to engage with us in honest, tough negotiations, 
[and] we’ll do that. But the notion that we somehow have to prepay or 
advance pay in those negotiations is one we expressly reject. [The United 
States has] paid a pretty heavy price to produce what are the results in 
agriculture without having the ability to balance that with what we might 
be able to achieve in services and [industrial tariffs]. I will tell you 
unequivocally that we reject the notion that we now have to make another 
advance payment to have negotiations that we contemplated from the very 
beginning.467 
 
China replied with its own bluster: America was making “dangerous unilateral” demands 
that contributed to a “lack of good faith” in the talks and “could kill the Round.”468 
 If the Doha Round is dead or moribund, then what happens? Given the content of 
                                                 
464  See Aritake, supra note 429, at 845; Daniel Pruzin, WTO Doha Round Talks at Impasse, but 
Negotiators Commit to Press on, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 810 (June 3, 2010). 
465  Jean-Pierre Lehmann, End the Charade in Talks on Global Trade, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2011, at 8 
(emphasis added). 
466  See, e.g., Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. Says No WTO Deal Possible Until Other Countries Improve Their 
Offers, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 304 (Mar. 5, 2009); Gary G. Yerkey, Clinton Says Chances of 
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the negotiating texts, poverty will not be alleviated, nor will Islamic countries be more 
fully integrated into the world trading system. Unfortunately, even if WTO Members 
complete the Round, the same outcomes are likely: little dent will be made to reduce the 
suffering of the poor. Hence an opportunity to reduce vulnerability to Islamist extremism 
will have been lost. Why? Simply put, because of the hideously hacked-up terms and 
conditions in the negotiating texts that betray the initial purpose of the Round. What 
might have been accepted—at least by seasoned trade professionals—as an appropriate 
level of complexity required to forge consensus among diverse, selfish interests has 
crossed the boundary between a necessary evil and pure hell.469 
 
                                                 
469  No less an authority than Aaditya Mattoo, the lead economist in the developmental research group 
of the World Bank, and a former economic counselor in the Trade in Services Division of the WTO, 
declares that “Doha’s promise is very limited,” and argues against resurrecting the Round, because it is an 
“inconsequential enterprise.” Gary G. Yerkey, WTO Negotiations Need to be ‘Repositioned’ to Address 
New Protectionism, Mattoo Says, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 270 (Feb. 26, 2009). His solution is a 
change in the DDA to cover what he views as more significant issues than traditional trade protectionist 
devices (e.g., tariff barriers) and subsidies, namely, exchange rate misalignment and climate change. See 
Mattoo & Subramanian, supra note 12, at 15–26 (2009). That solution is dubious, because if the WTO 
Members cannot come to a reasonably balanced bargain on territory that is familiar to them, a fortiori they 
will have greater difficulty doing so on a radically expanded agenda covering unfamiliar matters. In other 
words, while care must be taken to assure the DDA remains relevant, just as much care must be given to 
ensuring the agenda does not crumble under its own weight. 
 Interestingly, even the WTO Director-General, Pascal Lamy, concedes “elements of the 
Washington consensus … have failed, such as deregulation,” though understandably he warns against 
increased protectionism. Pascal Lamy, Director Gen., World Trade Org., Address to Japan Institute of 
International Affairs (Feb. 25, 2009), in Lamy Underscores Doha Round Benefits for Japan, WORLD 
TRADE ORG. (Feb. 25, 2009), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl116_e.htm. In his address to 
the WTO General Council on 29 April 2009 (in which he sought—successfully—reappointment as 
Director-General), Mr. Lamy ruled out expansion of the DDA to topics such as climate change, 
competition policy, energy, financial protectionism, food security, FDI, or labor rights. See Daniel Pruzin, 
Lamy Rules Out Expanding Doha Agenda to Tackle Climate Change, Other Topics, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. 
(BNA) No. 603, (May 7, 2009). 
